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This thesis investigates methods for explaining and understanding how and why reinforcement
learning agents select actions, from a causal perspective. Understanding the behaviours, decisions
and actions exhibited by articially intelligent agents has been a central theme of interest since
the inception of agent research. As systems grow in complexity, the agents’ underlying reasoning
mechanisms can become opaque and the intelligibility towards humans can be diminished,
which can have negative consequences in high-stakes and highly-collaborative domains. The
explainable agency of an autonomous agent can aid in transferring the knowledge of this
reasoning process to the user to improve intelligibility. If we are to build eective explainable
agency, a careful inspection of how humans generate, select and communicate explanations
is needed. Explaining the behaviour and actions of sequential decision making reinforcement
learning (RL) agents introduces challenges such as handling long-term goals and rewards, in
contrast to one-shot explanations in which the attention of explainability literature has largely
focused.
Taking inspirations from cognitive science and philosophy literature on the nature of explanation,
this thesis presents a novel explainable model —action inuence models— that can generate
causal explanations for reinforcement learning agents. A human-centred approach is followed
to extend action inuence models to handle distal explanations of actions, i.e. explanations that
present future causal dependencies. To facilitate an end-to-end explainable agency, an action
inuence discovery algorithm is proposed to learn the structure of the causal relationships from
the RL agent’s interactions. Further, a dialogue model is also introduced, that can instantiate the
interactions of an explanation dialogue. The original work presented in this thesis reveals how a
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This thesis concerns itself with explainable reinforcement learning (RL) agents. Inspired by
themes prevalent in cognitive sciences, causal explanation models are proposed for reinforcement
learning agents. Empirical evaluations in computational and human behavioural studies yield
strong results for the causal explanation models.
Understanding the behaviour and the decisions of articially intelligent machines have been
a focal point of Articial Intelligence (AI) research since its inception [222, 96, 49, 245]. Being
intelligible to humans is a highly desirable trait of AI systems, especially in interactive settings.
In collaborative environments, to be eective and accurate, agents needs to understand the
decisions of others, as is the case for human-human collaborations. The need of intelligible
systems is further emphasised in high-stake domains like healthcare, law and nance, where
a single action of an agent can have drastic outcomes. The knowledge discrepancy that exists
between the user and the AI system in terms of its capabilities, information and reasoning
mechanisms can diminish the understanding and the trust of the users. Explainable AI (XAI)
aims to bridge this knowledge gap between the autonomous system and its users.
The explainability of an autonomous agent can be thought of as the agency it has to communicate
the reasoning underlying its behaviour. This can include the capability of providing information
that factored into the past behaviour, and information about the decision making model, which
can help in anticipating future behaviour. The dissemination of such information can consist of
dierent methods such as using transparent behaviour (where the reasoning is embedded and
made visible into behaviour itself) and using interpretable models (using intelligible decision-
making models). Explanation is another facet of the explainable agency of an autonomous system,
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where the knowledge transfer is done via explicitly providing explanations of the behaviour.
The explanation for some decisions can be in the form of natural language text, visualisations
and demonstrations among others.
The high-level reasoning capabilities of autonomous agents have evolved rapidly since the
development of Shakey the robot [171], that used predicate logic and symbolic representations
of the world to make decisions. In terms of being explainable, these early intelligent systems had
the advantage of being inherently interpretable (though perhaps only to their developers) due to
having less complex decision-making models. As the capabilities of these agents became more
advanced, dedicated explainability facilities also emerged that can support complex decision
making. The attention and the importance given to such facilities is evident in the expert systems
literature [222, 96, 49, 245, 2, 43]. Autonomous agents’ complexity grew at an accelerated pace in
the last decade, fueled by the advancements in articial neural networks. In contrast to early
intelligent systems, most modern AI systems have black-box optimisation and decision making
systems. While black-box models like neural networks can greatly enhance the performance
and the capabilities of an agent, the opaqueness of the decision-making process can reduce the
intelligibility of the system.
Reinforcement learning agents are sequential decision making agents that learn behaviour
(commonly known as the agent’s policy) by interacting with an environment. The policy of
the agent is inuenced by the rewards obtained through interaction. This makes RL agents
fundamentally dierent from other machine learning techniques like classication, and the
explainable agency in RL thus requires a dierent perspective. The sequential nature of RL also
poses a challenge that classication systems do not face. An explainable classier generally
explains a one-shot decision (e.g. why an input was classied into a certain class). In contrast, to
be explainable, an RL agent should be able to provide justications for an action or a sequence of
actions, which can depend on the rewards and environmental conditions. Further, though some
actions give no immediate reward, they can still be desirable when future rewards are enabled
and increased by those actions, making the explainability of RL agents dicult. This thesis
focus on the explainability of model-free RL agents, which presents a harder challenge than in
model-based RL agents due to the unavailability of a model that can be exploited for intelligibility.
Further, generating explanations for agents’ actions is a plausible strategy to enable explainable
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agency in RL.
The nature of explanation is a well explored notion in philosophy and cognitive science. Having fa-
miliar human-centred models of explanation is desirable for explainable systems [131]. Miller’s [156]
work drew a landscape for explainable AI, taking insights from social sciences, to build successful
systems that are accepted by end-users. Indeed, much of the research contributions detailed in
this thesis was inspired by philosophy and cognitive science literature in causal and interactive
explanations.
With the widespread adoption of autonomous intelligent systems, calls for explainable AI has
seen renewed vigour in recent years. This interest in XAI is evident not just in the research
community but in popular press [73, 84] and from recent initiatives of explainable AI from tech
giants like Google [72] in responsible AI guidelines [188] and in AI principles [180]. Contrary to
the explosion of AI research, widespread adoption of AI systems has remained cautiously limited
due to ethical reasons [11] and the lack of trust [137] from its users. By building explainable,
interpretable and more transparent AI systems, users can potentially be better equipped to
understand and therefore learn to trust and better use these systems [156, 99].
1.1 Research Contribution
The problem of Explainable AI can be thought of as a human-agent interaction problem, as it
primarily involves transferring the knowledge of why an AI model made a decision to a human
that is interacting with the system [156]. In most cases, researchers in XAI use their intuition
to dene what forms a ‘good’ explanation. Miller, Howe, and Sonenberg [158] argues that this
can lead to the failure of the XAI system. The experts that build AI systems are often not in the
best position to judge the eectiveness of an explanation to a layperson, which Miller, Howe,
and Sonenberg refer to as “Inmates running the asylum”. Thus, a human-centred approach to
XAI that understand how humans dene, generate, select and communicate explanations can
arguably form an important research agenda for the XAI community.
Much of the recent progress in explainable AI was concentrated on developing interpretable ma-
chine learning methods (e.g. explaining classiers like convolutional neural networks). Advances
have also been in the planning literature [76, 40], in explaining sequential decision making
agents in planning and scheduling domains. Comparatively, explainability in reinforcement
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learning is underexplored. Much recent work in the explainable RL literature has focused on
porting successful interpretable methods like SHAPLEY values and saliency maps from explain-
able classication and applying them in the RL context [242, 88, 205]. While in theory this
makes sense (as most modern RL agents also make use of neural networks) and can help in the
intelligibility of the RL agent, in practical scenarios, these methods can be less eective [103]. As
[156] emphasised, a grounded approach that takes cues from cognitive science and philosophy
may fair better in user-centred settings.
To this end, this thesis aims to look beyond what is technically possible to explain and follow a
bottom-up approach, rst understanding the nature of human explanation and then building
computational models that encompass that understanding. Seminal work in cognitive and
philosophy of science have explored the nature of explanation [53] and how human perceive
explanations through a causal lens [248]. In human-computer interaction literature, eorts have
been made that follows a user-centric view to understand what constitutes an explanation [241,
1].
The primary focus of the research work will be on developing novel explainable models for
reinforcement learning agents, grounded on theories in cognitive science (specically causal
explanation). In addition, another aim of this thesis is to introduce a general explanation dialogue
model as an explanation interface. This research will contribute to the growing body of XAI
research in a multi-disciplinary manner. Models, methods and ndings of this research will
potentially be useful not only for the AI community but also for the HCI community. Figure
1.1 visualises the research contribution and the inuences of this thesis and how the work is
situated in the multi-disciplinary XAI landscape.
1.1.1 Research Questions
This thesis will specically answer the following research questions (Figure 1.1 shows how
individual research questions are positioned in terms of the contribution and the impact).
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Figure 1.1: Research Agenda of the Explainable Reinforcement Learning.
RQ1: How can reinforcement learning agents provide causal explanations
of agent behaviour that increase the understanding and trust of the
users? (Figure 1.1 (1)).
RQ2: Do distal causal explanations of RL agents improve the intelligibility
of the agent behaviour? (Figure 1.1 (2)).
RQ3: How can reinforcement learning agents discover the causal action
inuence structure of the domain? (Figure 1.1 (3)).
RQ4: What are the patterns of dialogical explanation that can facilitate
interactive explanations in XAI systems? (Figure 1.1 (4)).
The central research contribution of the thesis lies in the development of computational and
theoretical causal explanation models for reinforcement learning agents.
1.2 Explaining Reinforcement Learning Agents
To address the research questions RQ1 and RQ2, a causal explanation approach is followed. This
is motivated by the cognitive science theories that point to the usefulness of causal explanations
for intelligibility [248, 156, 155]. Using causal explanations as the scaolding, RQ1 will be
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answered by building a computational causal explanation model that can answer ‘why’ and
‘why not’ questions about the RL agents actions. This model captures the inuences of the
agents’ actions through the proposed action inuence model that is based on structural causal
models (SCM) [92]. The action inuence model contains the state variables, reward variables and
the actions of the RL agent. The model can be graphically depicted through a directed acyclic
graph (DAG), where the nodes give the state and reward variables with edges annotated with
the agent’s actions according to the causal inuence they have on a particular state/reward
variable. Explanations are generated by extracting the causal chain of an action that leads to a
sink node of the DAG. Further, using causal models enable action inuence models to simulate
counterfactuals to generate contrastive explanations for why not questions. Action inuence
models’ are evaluated computationally in OpenAI RL benchmarks [31] and in the StarCraft
II environment ([235] and Section 1.2.1). To measure the usefulness and the eectiveness of
the generated explanations, a human study is conducted using StarCraft II agents, with results
showing that the action inuence models’ explanations perform signicantly better than existing
local RL explanation methods in metrics; task prediction, perceived explanation quality and
trust [110].
RQ2 builds on the insights gained from the evaluation of action inuence models in StarCraft
II human-agent interaction setting. Participants were asked to provide their own explanations
of StarCraft II RL agent behaviour using free text. Through thematically analysing the human
explanations of the RL agents’ actions, several key concepts were observed. A distal explanation
model is proposed to implementing these insights primarily focusing on opportunity causal
chains [156] that explain a causally dependant future action. Importantly, the proposed models
and artefacts for RQ1 and RQ2 are model-agnostic, in that, action inuence models and distal
explanation models do not depend on the dierent architectures and techniques in the RL
paradigm. That is, model-based, model-free, on-policy, o-policy RL algorithms, etc. can all make
use of action inuence models and distal explanation models as surrogate explainable models to
generate explanations.
RQ3 addresses the main shortcoming that exists in action inuence and distal explanation models.
Both of the aforementioned models require a causal structure that describes how actions inuence
the variables, to be given in advance (either handcrafted or approximated). The scalability of
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handcrafted action inuence graphs can suer in larger domains with complex causal structures.
RQ3 answers this shortcoming via learning the action inuence structure end-to-end using only
the state-action trace data of an RL agent. As before, this method is also model-agnostic and can
function across various RL algorithms. RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 together form an end-to-end pipeline
of an explainable model for RL agents.
RQ4 looks at the explanation interface of an explainable system to propose an interaction
protocol in the form of an explanation dialogue model. This dialogue model contains the
structure required to maintain a sequential explanation dialogue between the explainer and the
explainee. Human explanation dialogues were analysed to create a state model that is formalised
using the agent dialogue framework (ADF) [150]. This model can be instantiated to present the
causal explanations generated by the action inuence and distal explanation models.
Several drawbacks exist in the explainable RL models and the dialogue model proposed in this
thesis. For explainable models, it is of importance to infer the knowledge level and the epistemic
state of the explainee to provide eective explanations. If the explanations are not given at
the correct abstraction level, the intelligibility of the system can fall. The explanation dialogue
model can be used as the interaction method to infer the correct abstract level to adjust and
select explanations. Further improvements can be made to the explanation dialogue model, to
handle dierent forms of explanation interfaces (e.g. visualisation based) and to have better
synergy with sequential decision making agents (where the dialogue ow can be used to identify
counterfactuals to generate contrastive explanations).
1.2.1 StarCraft II Environment
Much of the work described in this thesis uses the StarCraft II environment both as a computa-
tional benchmark and as a baseline for human-subject evaluations. StarCraft II was coined as a
new challenge for articial intelligence [235], that has a large action and state-space needing
macro and micro strategies to compete. In its basic form, StarCraft II is a real-time strategy game,
where the player compete against an opponent in an adversarial setting. The objective of the
game is to gather resources to build your base of operations while simultaneously destroying
the opponent’s base. There are units that can be trained using the gathered resources to attack
the opponent’s base and units. Importantly, StarCraft II agents can exhibit complex strategies
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and behaviours, which makes it an ideal test-bed to evaluate explainable models.
Indeed, many research in explainable agents have used StarCraft II environment as sand-box
to evaluate and implement explainable agents [181, 179, 143, 89]. The StarCraft II learning
environment can provide both pixel-based and state-based information to an RL agent, having
the option to use high-level feature maps [235]. The StarCraft II environment also includes a
map-maker application. Importantly this allows one to develop their own ‘game’ with dierent
objectives, goals and rewards. As using the full state and action space is computationally
intensive to train an RL agent in a reasonable time frame, the map-maker can be used as a tool
that limits the action and state space, and develop interesting scenarios that are better suited for
an explainability task. The work described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 make use of the map-maker
application to dene and develop custom scenarios. These scenarios include a search and rescue
task, a collaborative task (StarCraft II platform can also be used as a human-agent collaboration
environment) and a simplied adversarial scenario. These scenarios are detailed at length in
Chapter 4.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 provides a commentary of related
literature that encompass early work in explainable AI, theories of explanation in cognitive and
social sciences, explainability in RL agents, causal inuence learning and dialogical explanations.
The chapter is concluded by drawing insights from cognitive science and social science literature
to develop computational models for explainable RL agents.
Chapter 3 presents original work and introduces action inuence model that answers the RQ1,
giving a formalisation and denitions of how an explanation looks for a RL agent. Chapter 3
also details on how to generate explanations using action inuence models, and report on the
computational and human subject evaluation results. Chapter 4 introduces the distal explanation
model which address the RQ2, that improves upon action inuence models by generating distal
explanations. A similar evaluation methodology is followed in Chapter 4 with new StarCraft
II scenarios. Distal explanations are shown to be especially eective in collaborative scenarios
in human-subject experiments. Chapter 5 presents original work in action inuence discovery,
answering the RQ3, that addresses the main limitation that exists in action inuence and distal
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explanation models. To assess the soundness of the proposed action inuence discovery method,
the generated inuence graphs are evaluated against ground truth graphs obtain from the
RL simulators. Chapter 6 address the RQ4, which discuss the novel interaction protocol as
situated in the explanation interface in the broader explainable AI landscape. This explanation
dialogue model is developed following a grounded approach that analysed human explanations
(instantiated as a state model), formalised using agent dialogue games, and is then evaluated in a
human-agent interaction setting.
Following the presentation of the original work, Chapter 7 positions the contribution in the
larger explainable AI context and discusses the current and potential future impacts the work
can have in the explainable RL landscape. Chapter 7 further summarises the original work and
concludes the thesis by presenting a way forward that extends causal explanation models of RL




Explainability and explanation are broad concepts that span across multiple disciplines with a
vast body of literature going back to the Aristotelian era. To draw a comprehensive path through
the literature in the context of explainable agents, this section is structured in a way that gives
the reader insight into how foundational concepts in explainability inuenced and help navigate
the research agenda.
This chapter is arranged as follows; background central to this thesis is rst discussed followed
by a brief introduction, highlighting the foundations of explanation in philosophy and early work
in the AI community. Relevant work in explainable reinforcement learning is then surveyed,
followed by a discussion of causal explanation in XAI literature. Then the work of learning
causal models are discussed. The dialogical explanation is then surveyed and the chapter is
concluded with a summary.
2.1 Background
This section provides a succinct discussion of the paradigms, concepts and evaluation domains
that is central to the thesis. Later sections of this Chapter provides commentary on specic
research work that encompasses these explainability paradigms and concepts.
2.1.1 Explainability
The development of explainable systems can be categorised into two distinct concepts [89], the
explainable model and the explanation interface. The explainable model deals with transform-
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ing the agents’ black-box decision-making process into a model that can be used to generate
explanations. This can include developing new inherently interpretable models or introducing
surrogate models that act as proxies having the ability to generate explanations for the underlying
decision-making process. Both inherently interpretable models [196] and surrogate models [191,
144, 161] have found success in developing explainable models. Explanation interface develop-
ments tend to be user-centric and function as the middle-ware that communicate the generated
explanations to the user (explainee). Importantly the explanation interface handles the two-way
interaction between the system and the user. This can be in the form of an explanation dialogue.
The mode can also dier from text-based, touch-based to visualisation based interactions. These
two concepts are akin to the cognitive process and the social process that humans follow when
explaining phenomena [156]. The cognitive process corresponds to the explainable model where
facts that form an explanation is generated and the social process is similar to the explanation
interface where the goal is to communicate the generated explanations.
The knowledge that is concatenated in an explanation can be structured in several ways. The
explanation can be partial or complete. Complete explanations generally reveal all the causes
and facts that led to a particular decision or behaviour of the agent. This type of explanation
can contain numerous irrelevant information that had no inuence on the end decision of
the system [156], and has the risk of inducing a higher cognitive load on the explainee. A
compromise can be made between completeness and minimalism by dening a minimally
complete explanation [122] template for the context, that contain all the necessary causes that
inuenced the agent’s decision. Another dimension for the structure of the explanation lies
in local vs global explanations. As the name suggests, local explanations provide causes for a
single decision instance. In classication tasks, this can be in the form of highlighting what
features impacted the classication of a single input. In a sequential decision-making agent, local
explanations provide justications for a single action or sequence of actions. Global explanations
dier from local explanations in the scope that encompass the explanation model. For instance,
in an RL agent, a global explanation would be for the policy instead of for a single action.
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Evaluation Metrics
As the denition of explainability is loosely dened and varies across dierent contexts, the
evaluation of explainable AI methods also diers from model to domain. Evaluation methods for
XAI can be broadly divided into two phases, computational and human-based evaluations. The
former focus on assessing the delity and the performance of the developed explainable model.
In surrogate explainable models, computational evaluation checks the faithfulness of the model
to the original black-box model. Related to this thesis, computational evaluation of explainable
RL agents can verify the model through pitting it against the underlying policy and computing
the dierence.
Human evaluation of XAI systems is a crucial step in assessing the usefulness and eectiveness
of the explainable agency. Human evaluations generally take the form of a user study and
can contain both quantitative and qualitative metrics. Quantitative evaluations examine the
knowledge gained through the explanations by inspecting the mental model of the explainee.
Dierent proxies can be used to infer the updated mental model of the explainee, and a frequently
used method for this examination is the task prediction [110]. Here, after providing explanations,
the explainee is queried to provide a prediction for a new input (explainee would be able to
provide a better prediction if explanations successfully made the model intelligible). Qualitative
evaluation metrics focus on the qualities of the given explanation from a user perspective. These
qualities can include the completeness, satisfaction and suciency of the explanation [110]. In
addition, qualitative metrics can also be used to evaluate aspects like the trust and the usability of
the XAI system. Using both quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods can paint a complete
picture of how eective a potential XAI system can be when deployed in an interactive setting.
2.1.2 Reinforcement Learning
The roots of the reinforcement learning paradigm date back to the early days of computer science,
neuroscience and cybernetics [118]. Recent years have seen tremendous progress in applying
RL methods to accomplish optimisation and strategic tasks [182]. The essence of RL lies in
the repeated enforcement of agent behaviour through the reward signals obtained through the
interaction with the environment. The standard model of the RL involves solving a problem
dened by a nite Markov Decision Process (MDP) to yield the maximum expected reward [219].
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The goal of the agent is formalised as the reward signal and the objective of the agent can be
then thought of as achieving the goal optimally. The RL agent receives observations from the
environment in the form of a state and uses actions to interact. An MDP is dened as a tuple
(S ,A, T ,Rγ), where S and A give state and action spaces respectively (here we assume the
state and action space is nite and state features are described by a set of variables φ); T = {Psa}
a set of state transition functions (Psa denotes state transition distribution of taking action a
in state s); R : S ×A → R is a reward function and γ = [0, 1) is a discount factor. Solving
this MDP results in a policy π that maps states to actions by maximising the expected sum of
rewards received.
Reinforcement learning can be separated into model-based and model-free agents. In model-free
RL, agents do not have access to the transition functions T and the reward functionR. Though
we focus on model-free RL agents in this thesis, models and methods devised are general enough
to be applicable to other sequential decision making agents (e.g. model-based RL, planning
agents). Dierent classes of methods exist that can solve or approximately solve an MDP to
obtain the policy for the agent. Temporal dierence learning methods like q-learning and sarsa
are some of the commonly used techniques in small nite state and action spaces [219]. As
most domains in practical settings have large state and action space, approximate techniques
like REINFORCE, policy gradient (PG), actor-critic have found success [219]. Based on the
environment, RL agents can have deterministic or stochastic policies. Another way that RL
agents are categorised is based on how the policy update happens, where methods can be divided
by having the update done on-policy or o-policy. Another important concept in the RL paradigm
is the dilemma of exploration vs exploitation. The agent needs to balance the exploration or the
environment (to potentially receive better rewards) and to continue on the current best policy.
This conict of interest can be addressed through using dierent action selection policies like
ε− greedy and multi-armed bandit algorithms [219]. Section 2.3 gives a detailed account of the
related work in explainable reinforcement learning later in this Chapter.
2.2 Explanation
Though ‘explainable AI’ has been coined as a viable solution that can help understand the
ever-evolving inner workings of black-box articial intelligence models that became popular in
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the last decade, its roots can be traced back to the expert era. If one considers the theoretical
notion of ‘explanation’, origins of it can be seen even in the works of Aristotle [128]. This section
examines key philosophical and cognitive science foundations of explanation and how they
might better inform the research agenda of explainable AI. This section further highlights notable
early work in explainable AI, especially in expert systems and applications.
2.2.1 Nature of Explanation
An explanation can be thought of as transferring knowledge of some fact or an event from one
party to another. We can dene this knowledge transfer as the act of explaining [134]. There are
many facets of explanation that resides within this act of explaining.
Causal Explanations
The nature of explanation and causality have been tightly coupled in philosophical and cognitive
science literature. Aristotle argued that the search for causes for an explanation was a search
for answers to the question “why?” [74]. Causality can be separated into two major schools of
thought. Dependence theories on causality argue that if there is a cause between two events,
the second event should always be followed by the rst event [133]. Dependence theories of
causality can also be extended to understand counterfactuals.
In contrast, Transference theories are dened on the physical causation of the transference of
energy between objects [64]. An event and its causation according to transference theories are
dened as the quantity of energy transferred. Counterfactuals are also implicitly present in
transference theories as energy transfers that are unnatural.
It is evident from the literature in both cognitive science and philosophy that causality is a major
pillar in the foundation of explanation. The school of Dependence theories of causation seems to
be better suited in forming the basis in explainable AI work, and indeed this thesis is largely
inuenced by this school of thought. A more substantial discussion on causal explanations from
the perspective of explainable AI is done in Section 2.4 of this chapter.
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The Structure of Explanations
Miller [156] argues that the act of explanation can be thought of as a twofold process. First,
the Cognitive process handles the generation of the explanation, where nding the causes,
counterfactuals and abductive reasoning is performed. The selected causes, counterfactuals,
facts that constitute the explanation are dened as the explanans. The event that explanans
are generated for is called the explanandum [156]. The resulting explanans from this cognitive
process can be thought of as the product of an explanation [141].
The second process is the Social process of the explanation [156] and describes how the knowledge
is transferred between the explainer and the explainee. As Chapter 6 of this thesis discusses,
this process can be a two-way dialogue between the explainer and the explainee. The main goal
of this process is to convey information to the explainee to understand an event. The request
for this understanding can be posed as a question to the explainer. It is also important to note
that this process can be a continuous interaction between the explainer and the explainee and
multiple agents can participate in this interaction.
Though we see a substantial body of evolving work in the XAI community that address the
cognitive process of an explanation, less progress has been made towards incorporating the
social process of the explanation into XAI.
Explanatory Questions
To begin the cognitive process of the explanation, an explanandum is needed. This is often
inferred through a question posed by the explainee (though there are explanations that do
not need a question). An explanation can be thought of as an answer to a ‘why’ question, as
explanations are viewed as inherently providing causal information [134]. Though there are
counter theses for the causal nature of explanation [189], causality can still be used as a tool to
categorise the types of explanatory questions. Pearl and Mackenzie [178]’s ladder of causation
is a good candidate to distinguish the types of questions based on the level of causation [178].
Miller separated explanatory questions into three groups based on the ladder of causation.
‘What’ questions need associative reasoning capabilities in the cognitive process to generate
explanations. An explainee might need to know what ‘changed’ in event A when another event
B occurred. On the other hand, the explainee might want to know what will change when event
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A is modied to event B or if event B still occur given a change to event A. This type of questions
can be categorised as ‘How’ questions and require an intervention mechanism in the cognitive
process to generate explanations. ‘Why’ questions are the most challenging questions for the
cognitive process of explanation. Why questions require counterfactual reasoning and need to
examine and simulate alternative causes of an event to measure what happens to the proceeding
events. E.g. Instead of event A occurring, what would happen to event B when event C occurs.
A why question also implicitly contain a ‘why not’ question as the goal of the explainee here is
to understand the counterfactual event [156].
Abstraction in Explanation
As noted above, an explanation can be thought of as a knowledge transfer. The knowledge or
the information in an explanation can be instantiated at dierent levels that may depend on the
explainee and the explainer.
This notion of abstraction is captured well in Aristotle’s theory of abstraction and the Four
Causes model [16, 94]. Aristotle’s proposed framework abstracts answer’s to four levels. First,
the Material level, where the substance of something is explained (e.g. rain is made out of water
droplets). Second, the Formal, where the properties of something is explained (e.g. a water
droplet is spherical). Third, the Ecient, in which the proximal rules and mechanisms might
cause something to change (e.g. wind might distort the shape of a rain droplet). Forth, the Final,
where the end goal of something is explained (e.g. replenishing water sources can be thought of
as the goal of the rain). Thus the same why question can have dierent explanations (multiple
explanations as well) based on these levels.
Dennett’s [60] seminal work also proposed a similar model that is based on physical, design and
intention. In developing XAI techniques, a suitable abstraction model similar to the above should
be adapted as it is clear that questions posed by the explainee can be strongly linked to dierent
levels of knowledge.
Above discussed aspects of explanation from a philosophical perspective can be used as the
foundation for developing rigorous XAI techniques. Though recent concepts and work in XAI
can be mapped to these foundations, it is also important to correctly merge these concepts as a
bottom-up approach in developing XAI techniques.
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2.2.2 Early Work in XAI
As machines get more and more complex, the need to understand them also deepens. This is the
same in Articial Intelligence, and the rst glimpse of explainable systems can be seen in the
expert systems paradigm. This section aims to capture the early work that led to the development
of XAI that is visible today.
Applications
Perhaps the best examples of the need for an explainable system can be found in critical domains
such as healthcare. It is a necessity that these systems are well understood by medical practi-
tioners. Swartout [222] introduced a medical therapy advisor that had the capability to provide
explanations of the systems methods used for the diagnoses and how they are applied. Swartout
later introduced the XPLAIN system that aims to provide automatically generated explanations
based on goals [221, 223]. The XPLAIN system also has the advantage of providing justication
as explanations. Hasling, Clancey, and Rennels [96] also explored how diagnostic systems in
the medical domain can be made explainable. Hasling, Clancey, and Rennels generated the
explanations by identifying the distinction between the domain knowledge and the strategic
knowledge of the system.
Frameworks
Clancey [49] introduced a framework for rule-based expert systems that aims to provide expla-
nations that are based on structural, strategic and support knowledge of the system. Wick and
Slagle [245] proposed another framework that implements an explanation facility or a role in an
expert system. This approach is similar to news reporting where events are explained as pieces of
news. The RATIONALE framework was proposed by Abu-Hakima and Oppacher [2] to explain
knowledge-based expert systems by reasoning explicitly. The system works by providing the
explanation to itself and improving upon them. Importantly Abu-Hakima and Oppacher also note
the causal aspect of the explanation process and how it can be used to construct explanations.
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Interactive Systems
The importance of the ‘User’ as the consumer of an explanation was highlighted in several works
in explainable expert systems. Ye and Johnson [250] studied the impact an expert system with
an explanation facility can have on the end-user. The authors highlighted how the explanation
facility can inuence users’ condence and attitude towards the expert system. User modelling
for explanations was also given attention in the literature, notably Chandrasekaran, Tanner,
and Josephson [43] work explored how to generated explanations based on dierent abstraction
levels.
It is evident that since the inception of explanations in the expert system era, researchers have
considered concepts like abstraction and the user perspective important in giving explanations.
Though these concepts are paid much less attention in recent work. In critical domains like
healthcare, expert systems often had an explanation facility, which highlights the importance of
explanations in highly sensitive scenarios.
2.3 Explainability in Reinforcement Learning
This section focuses on the body of literature that explores explainability in Reinforcement
Learning (RL) agents. The work that has inuenced the explanation and interpretability of
reinforcement learning, some of which are central to the original work in this thesis is also
discussed.
Explanation in RL agents can be categorised into three classes. First, action-based explanations,
where the explanation is generated for a specic action (often called local explanations). Here,
the explanation is can be focused and based on the underlying model of the agent (e.g. and
MDP). Second, policy-based explanations, where the explanation is for the policy of the agent
(sometimes called global explanations in RL context). And Third, where the explanation is a
visualisation of the agent’s belief or attention. This section does not discuss visualisation based
explainable methods of RL further. Much of the work for visualisation based explanations are
derived from interpretable supervised learning literature. Instead, the discussion of this section
focuses on action and policy-based explanations and their derivatives.
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2.3.1 Action Based Explanations (Local Explanations)
Literature that sought to generate explanations for MDP based agents falls into the scope of
preceding work on explainable RL. Often, these earlier work provided local explanations in that
the explanation is for a question about an action of the agent.
The concept of ‘relevant variables’ in a factored state of an MDP was exploited by Elizalde
et al. [69] to generate explanations. Explanations were primarily targeted at human trainees of a
system and explanations were built-in and were presented when the operator (trainee) selected
an incorrect action. An explanation constitutes a relevant variable that is selected by an expert
for each action. Elizalde et al. later extended this work to generate explanations automatically
based on the utility that a state variable had on the policy selecting the action [67, 68]. Khan,
Poupart, and Black [122] was inuenced by the relevant variable explanations and proposed
minimally sucient explanations for MDPs. Here, the long term eects of an optimal action are
considered when generating the explanation. Three domain-independent templates were used as
the basis of explanations. This thesis later uses one of these templates as a benchmark method
in the evaluation section. Relevant variable explanations present a straightforward method of
generating explanations from an MDP, though their inability to provide contrastive explanations
of counterfactuals remains a weakness. Khan, Poupart, and Black [122] attempted to remedy this
by generating contrastive explanations through value-function comparisons. The eect MDP
based agents’ explanations have on ‘trust’ was examined by Wang, Pynadath, and Hill [243].
Experiments were carried out to measure trust in human-robot teams inuenced by Partially
Observable MDP based explanations. As the measurement of trust was self-report, it is unclear
whether the trust gain was from actually understanding the system.
2.3.2 Policy Explanations (Global Explanations)
Policy explanations make use of the agent’s policy to extract explanations. Explanations can be
at the local level or the global level. Global level explanations generally provide an explanation
for the whole policy. Some studies suggest that humans are more receptive to global explanations
of agents in certain situations [236]. We discuss literature on both global and local explanation
methods in this section.
Struckmeier, Racca, and Kyrki [215] introduced a model-agnostic explanation generation method
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using agent policies. In cases where the underlying model (i.e. the policy function) is a black box,
Struckmeier, Racca, and Kyrki sample the policy of the agent to extract relevant state dimensions.
Understanding of the agents’ policies was measured in a human experiment and the perceived
understanding of the human participant was used as a proxy to show the transparency of the
agent.
Policy explanations of an agent generally aim to provide a ‘global’ interpretation of the agent’s
behaviour. Hayes and Shah [99] sought to improve the transparency by providing policy level
explanations for agent-based robot controllers. These behavioural explanations of the agent are
considered as ‘summaries’ of the agent’s policy. Discreet, continuous and multi-agent domains
were used to evaluate the generated policy descriptions against expert descriptions and were
shown to improve the transparency of the robot. Amir and Amir [9] also aims to summarise the
agent’s behaviour and introduced the HIGHLIGHTS algorithm. Important states are extracted
from the agent’s execution trace based on the Q-values. Human-subject experiments showed that
participants preferred HIGHLIGHTS summary explanations compared to full policy explanations
though in some situations participants’ assessments did not always correlate with their condence.
Policy summarisation was also explored in the context of inverse reinforcement learning to
investigate if these explanations are viable if there is a discrepancy between the agent’s model
and the human’s mental model.
2.3.3 Reinforcement Learning Agent Explanations
Here we discuss work in recent years that specically use characteristics of reinforcement
learning (e.g. rewards) to explain behaviour. These characteristics can be used to create an
approximate model of the agent’s policy or model and then generate explanations through using
the approximate model.
Tabrez, Agrawal, and Hayes [224] proposed a framework (RARE) that repairs the agent’s un-
derstanding of the domain reward function through explanation. RARE is especially useful in
human-agent collaborative scenarios when the human’s reward function of the collaborative task
is erroneous. Explanations are given to the collaborators to update their own reward function.
Human experiments were conducted to demonstrate the eectiveness of the RARE framework
in collaborative tasks. Explanation in the context of interactive reinforcement learning (IRL) has
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been studied [77]. This approach uses the instructions given in the IRL process to the agent as
representations to generate explanations about the future behaviour of the agent. Evaluated
through a human study, this method arms that when explanations are given in a familiar
medium to the human (e.g. using instruction representations), they can yield a deeper under-
standing of the agent. Waa et al. [236] developed a method that can translate an MDP of a RL
agent to an interpretable MDP. This translation model can then be used to generate a contrastive
policy that can be queried using contrastive questions. A pilot study was carried out to evaluate
the method, where the reported ndings show that participants preferred the interpretable policy
level explanations. Though these explanations were contrastive they were not based on an
underlying causal model. Reward decomposition was used by Juozapaitis et al. [117] to generate
minimally sucient explanations, where reward dierences were used to provide explanations
that answer what action does have an ‘advantage’ over another. Juozapaitis et al. utilise the
nature of the reward structure often present in domains to explain action preferences of the
agent.
2.3.4 Decision Tree Policy Explanations
Central to this thesis, here the discussion focus on how interpretability and explainability were
achieved through representing agents’ policies as decision trees or graphs.
From early work that represented the agent policy as a decision tree using the ‘G’ algorithm [45],
past literature has explored how decision trees can be used to represent and abstract policies of
MDPs. Roth et al. [194] proposed a Q-improvement algorithm that builds an abstract decision
tree policy for factored MDP based RL agents. Although decision tree policies are claimed to
be more interpretable to humans than black box policies, the extent to which this is true is
unclear as this work lacks human experiments. Abstract policy graphs have also been used as
the basis to generate policy level explanations [227]. A feature importance measure was used
to abstract multiple states into an abstract state which is then used to build the policy graph.
The interpretability of the graph was evaluated computationally which shows a linear growth
of the explanation size against an exponential growth of state-space. Although this implicitly
demonstrates the interpretability of the approach, human experiments are needed to understand
the eectiveness of the method.
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Though the above methods address interpretability to an extent, to the best of our knowledge
previous literature has not studied how decision nodes from a decision tree can be incorporated
with causal chains to provide explanations that are human-centred.
2.4 Causal Explanation
Causality has been intimately coupled with explanation literature in various disciplines from
philosophy of science [248, 247, 92] to cognitive science [140] and social sciences [104]. Expla-
nations can be non-causal— e.g. describing the nature of an event—, and a well-studied branch
of explanation literature [190, 226, 209]. This section focuses on several key areas in causality
and causal explanation, expanding upon how attributes in causality can be used to provide
explanations.
2.4.1 Assigning Causality to Explanations
An explanation can be thought of as assigning causal responsibility to an event [115]. There are
several ways to structure the explanation so that explanans refers to the causal relationships of
the event that is being explained (the explanandum).
Causal Chains and Sucient Explanations
Miller [156] argues that considering causal attribution as the causal explanation is incomplete
and causal attribution forms only a part of causal explanation. Causal attribution provides all
the causes of an event to the explainer, which might overwhelm the user if the event is complex.
This is also acknowledged in XAI literature where methods have been created to select only the
minimal and sucient variables to present as the explanation [122]. When selecting causes, it is
important to understand how causes can be arranged in dierent types of causal chains.
A causal chain is a path made up of causes that relates to a set of events [107]. Dierent types of
causal chains can produce distinct explanations for the same question from the explainee. Hilton
and John [107] discussed ve such types of causal chains.
First is the Temporal chain, where the order of the events does not aect the outcome of the
distal event. Consider the following example with three events A, B and C. A and B are causally
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related to C and are causes of C. The order in which event A and B occur is irrelevant in this
type of causal chain. Second is the Coincidental causal chain type, where the causal relationship
of two events holds only in certain situations (e.g. A is not a cause of B in general but becomes a
cause in certain environmental states). The third type is the Unfolding chains, where the causal
relationships between events hold in general. For example, event A causes B, and B causes C
in most cases. Fourth type is named Pre-emptive causal chains, where the order of the event
occurrence is important. Here, one of the proximal events is the cause of the distal event (e.g. A
causes C, B would have caused C if A didn’t occur).
Central to the work discussed in Chapter 4, Opportunity chains is the fth causal chain type
that Hilton and John [107] propose. Here, a distal event is enabled by a proximal event. As an
example, event A enables B, and B causes C. Event B will not cause C if it is not enabled by A. In
generating sucient causal explanations, one would select the type of the causal chain together
with a minimal set of causes that explain the event.
2.4.2 Contrastive Explanation
There are several objectives of an explanation. Primarily, an explanation helps with knowledge
transfer between two parties. This knowledge transferring process can also come in dierent
avours. While gaining new knowledge can be thought of as the most frequent function, updating
existing knowledge models are equally important. Miller [156] argues that ‘Why’ questions seek
to update such pre-existing knowledge models of the explainee. The question ‘Why event A’
implicitly includes an contrastive case, where the explainee’s real intention is to inquire why
event A occurred instead of event B. We term event B as the contrastive case of event A. As the
name suggests, when providing an explanation for the question above, it is important to contrast
the two events. To contrast, one would then need to identify the situation where event B occurred
instead of A. This is known as nding the counterfactuals [139, 102]. Miller suggests that people
often ask the question ‘Why event A’ while leaving out the contrasting case ‘B’ [156]. Lipton
argues that the solution for this is to include the contrastive case ‘B’ in the question [138], ‘Why A
rather than B?’. Thus to feasibly identify the implicit contrastive case present in ‘why’ questions,
one can use ‘why not’ questions giving the contrasting case with the question [156]
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Counterfactuals
Why questions in the form “Why A?” has the question “Why A rather than B?” question embedded
in them. Event A is referred to as the fact and event B is called the foil [138]. Here the fact is
the actual event that occurred and the foil is the event that did not (the counterfactual). While
the literature largely agrees that all ‘why’ questions contain the counterfactual case [106, 139],
inferring the counterfactual case can be intractable in practice. Consider the question ‘Why A?’
which can contain an innite number of foils events (e.g. B, C, D...), thus it is important to have
constraints within the question that can be used to identify the foil easily.
To constrain and identify the foil, dierent templates of explanatory questions can be used. Van
Bouwel and Weber [230] proposed four types of explanatory questions. Of those, the ‘P-contrast’
template is closely related to the nature of why questions asked from explainable systems. A
P-contrast question takes the form ‘Why does object a have property A, rather than property
B?’. The counterfactual case (B) is explicitly given here. This is similar to ‘Why’ and ’Why not’
questions explored in agent explanations [179]. ‘Why not’ questions take the form ‘Why not
B’ and the actual case (fact) is inferred through systems state. In the context of reinforcement
learning, the question would take the form ‘Why not action b’, and the actual action (fact) is
inferred from the agent’s policy.
To instantiate the counterfactual case, the ‘world’ in which the counterfactual event occurred
needs to be simulated, which gives the causes of the counterfactual event. For example, the
question ‘Why A, rather than B?’, can include the comparison (contrasting) of the causes of A
with the causes of B. This is akin to explaining the dierence between those two events [138].It is
the causes of B that needs to be simulated. To simulate the counterfactuals, a model of the world
(often a causal model) is needed.
2.4.3 Models of Causal Explanation
There are several formal models of causation in the literature that aims to capture the causal
relationships and their eects [177, 87, 133, 195]. Causal models seek to answer questions
about the eect variables have over others and the mechanisms that govern them [176]. We
use causal models to draw conclusions about causal connections and this process is known as
causal inference. Causal models can be deterministic or probabilistic, and structural equations
24
2.4 Causal Explanation Related Work
can be used to describe how variables can depend on its causal predecessors [28]. Though
there are many popular parametric and non-parametric methods of modelling causality, this
discussion focus on the graphical causal models introduced by Pearl [175] and how it is used for
explanation.
Pearlian Causal Models
Pearlian causal models also known as Pearlian DAGs are a class of causal graphical models
popularised by Pearl [175, 176]. A causal model can be represented by a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) and the variables can be described using a structural causal model (SCM) [92]. When
the underlying system or environment can be represented by a Pearlian DAG, causal discovery
can be attempted to learn the causal structure [56]. This is a crucial property used in the work
described in Chapter 5.
Halpern and Pearl’s [91, 92] denition of causal explanation uses SCM’s to model counterfactuals
and extracts explanations. Halpern and Pearl’s formalisation explicitly considers an agent that
can autonomously generate explanations (e.g. a planning agent [93]). Variables of the model
is divided into two sets; exogenous variables, which often exist outside the agent’s model with
values determined by external factors and endogenous variables which contain inside the agent’s
model with values aected by their relationship with other variables. In SCM’s, each endogenous
variable’s value is determined by a function (a structural equation). This assignment of values to
the variables of the causal model is known as the context [92]. Halpern and Pearl further expand
upon SCM’s by providing a criteria for a actual cause of an event X = x (endogenous variable X
set to the value x) as a set of events W given that following three conditions hold.
AC1: Both X and W are true in the actual world;
AC2: If there exists any counterfactual values for the events W, then X would not have
occurred;
AC3: W is minimal, having no irrelevant events.
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Halpern and Pearl’s formalism has similarities with concepts introduced in explainability
literature, notably in agent-based explanations. Minimally sucient explanations [122] for
causal explanations can be derived using SCM’s as they satisfy the AC3 condition above. In the
context of reinforcement learning agents, a context in the SCM can be thought of as the current
state of the agent. Derivation of explainability concepts and transforming SCM’s for the RL agent
context forms a central contribution of this thesis and is discussed at length in Chapter 3.
2.4.4 Causal Explainability
The recent boom in the search for explainability also prompted exploration of how causality can
be used to improve the understanding of an AI system, though most work has focused on the
interpretability aspect.
Chattopadhyay et al. [46] introduced a new neural architecture that views each layer of the
network as an SCM and proposes methods to calculate the average causal eect. Narendra
et al. [166] followed a similar approach that abstract the neural network as an SCM by applying a
function as a lter on each layer of the network. Harradon, Druce, and Ruttenberg [95] introduced
a human-centred approach of causal interpretability by auto-encoding neuron activation. The
major advantage of this architecture lies in its ability to extract human-understandable ‘concepts’
while building causal relationships between them. Zhao and Hastie [255] argue that to generate
interpretable causal relationships of black-box learning models, domain knowledge has to
be encoded as a causal graph with having means to visualise the graph. Causal explanation
generation for sequence-to-sequence models was explored by Alvarez-Melis and Jaakkola [6].
This framework is model-agnostic and infers causal dependencies between the input and the
output tokens to select a set of explanations. Martinez and Marca [149] used causal models to
generate explanations for visual models. They used observational and interventional causal
models to produce a counterfactual image as the explanation. Causal frameworks have also
been used to understand GANs [19]. Bau et al. introduced an explanation framework that can
justify why images are generated through a visual GAN. Besserve et al. [23] also sought to
explain GANs using causal models. They also generated counterfactual images as explanations
through manipulating internal variables of the GAN. Learning the underlying causal model of
the data that is used by the black-box model was also suggested as a viable way to produce more
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interpretable models for machine learning [249].
Recent literature has widely explored how causal models can be used to make machine learning
models more interpretable. Comparatively, causal explanations in agents are hardly explored.
Of explainability in agents, causal explanations in reinforcement learning agents remain as an
unexplored research area.
2.5 Learning Causal Inuence Models
The ability to represent and reason about the world causally is a hallmark of human intelli-
gence [178, 248]. This enables us to solve complex problems by understanding and exploiting
the underlying causal mechanisms. Cognitive psychology studies suggest that children learn
causal mechanisms and how to discover new causal relationships early in their cognitive devel-
opment [85]. Causal knowledge is important in several key aspects. Causal relationships can be
used to predict and infer future events. Importantly, causal structures can be used to intervene
on the world to create new events. As evident from the wealth of psychology literature, causality
is tightly integrated into how we discover, predict, act and explain in the world.
2.5.1 Introduction
Advances in deep networks brought about a new wave of achievements in learning agents [13].
In many cases, these agents learn associative relationships between inputs and outputs and while
being procient in one task, often fails to generalise further. The complexity of the models of
these agents learns also hinders interpretability. Incorporating some form of causality into these
agents can potentially yield better performance and generalise better to novel situations [21].
Causal mechanisms can be introduced to agents in several dierent ways. Similar to humans,
agents can be trained to learn the causal relationships between variables which we call causal
discovery. In some instances, variables available to the agent might not constitute an apparent
causal structure (e.g. pixel input). This problem can be alleviated through causal representations,
where the raw input can be abstracted to generate a representation that has causal relationships.
Lastly, the agent can use a causal model to better inform the decision-making pipeline using a
causal reasoning approach.
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2.5.2 Causal Discovery
Learning the underlying mechanisms that guide the occurrences of events is the rst step in the
causal ladder. Causal discovery techniques investigate which variable’s change of value would
inuence or cause another variable’s value to change. In contrast, causal inference methods make
use of such existing relationship to see to what extent would a variable change when another
is modied. We do not discuss causal inference further in this thesis, and mainly focus on the
causal discovery literature.
Causal discovery methods are widely studied in dierent domains and in the articial intelligence
literature as a whole. We focus our attention on work that uses agent-oriented learning methods
here. These works can broadly be divided into three areas; score based methods, constraint
based methods and neural based methods. Although the gold standard in causal discovery is
randomised control trial techniques (a form of intervention), in practice interventional methods
are harder to perform due to limitations in repetition (e.g. in medical domains). Note that most
learning agents do not have this limitation as they are trained often in a simulated environment.
2.5.3 Score based Methods
Score-based methods assess the validity of a causal graph G using some score function S. This
score can be computed from observational or interventional data and can be used to nd the
best graph by searching through the space of possible directed graphs in the space.
Schwarz et al.’s Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [204] is one of the popular methods
that is used for model selection. The model with the lowest BIC is selected using a likelihood
function. Another common scoring method is the Minimum Description Length (MDL) [48],
where the main concept is to select the model that has the shortest description of the data. Geiger
and Heckerman extended scoring functions to handle continuous variables by introducing the
Bayesian Gaussian equivalent score [79]. Heckerman, Geiger, and Chickering also introduced a
Bayesian approach for scoring called Bayesian Dirichlet equivalence score [100] based on the
likelihood equivalence.
Another class of score-based methods rely on greedy search to explore the space of possible
causal graphs. A well known greedy score-based method is the Greedy Equivalence Search
(GES) [153]. The scoring happens at the node level, where a node is chosen and all the neighbours
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are scored, and one with the highest score being chosen as the next node if the overall score of
the graph improves. Several variations and extensions have been suggested for GES. Hauser
and Bühlmann [97] introduced Interventional Greedy Equivalence Search (IGES), by step-wise
modication of the graph to allow enhanced estimation. To improve the performance of GES,
Ramsey et al. [186] proposed the Fast Greedy Equivalence Search (FGES), which can handle
millions of variables. FGES introduced parallelism and allowed the graph to disregard the Markov
factorisation.
2.5.4 Constraint-based Methods
Constraint-based approaches construct a directed graph G that satisfy a given set of constraints.
Often many methods use conditional independence of the data distribution to apply constraints
that can narrow down the candidate graph that describes the data.
One of the best known constraint-based methods is the Peter-Clark (PC) algorithm [214], which
relies on the faithfulness criterion, where all the independent variables in a directed graph need
to satisfy the d-separation [80, 98] (where the separation of the set of variables is assessed). PC
algorithm is dependent on the order in which the algorithm considers each variable. Colombo and
Maathuis [50] introduced PC-stable to mitigate this by introducing a queue that saves nodes before
removing them. More recently, Tsagris [228] proposed another improvement to the PC algorithm
and introduced MPC by adding a new rule to the original where cycles would be prevented.
Another algorithm, parallel-PC was also recently proposed by Le et al. [132], with the main
dierence being having parallelism when conditional independence test was done. PC-simple
was developed to handle high-dimensional data by Bühlmann, Kalisch, and Maathuis [34], where
only the strongly related variables would be analysed. Aliferis, Tsamardinos, and Statnikov [5]
proposed the HITON-PC algorithm, another variation of the PC algorithm combining features
of PC-simple and PC-stable. PC algorithm has also been extended to deal with temporal data,
like the Dynamic Online Causal Learning algorithm proposed by Kummerfeld, Danks, and
Cognition [127].
Fast Causal Inference (FCI) method is another widely used causal discovery algorithm introduced
by Spirtes et al. [214]. Importantly, FCI disregard causal suciency [201], where some common
causes might not be measurable from data. In contrast to most causal discovery methods that
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build a directed acyclic graph (as the causal model), FCI builds a maximal ancestral graph [192].
FCI works rst by searching for conditional independence for every pair of variables to create
the structure of the graph and then orienting the connections (arrows) of the structure. Several
improvements have been suggested for FCI such as Really Fast Causal Inference (RFCI) developed
by Colombo et al. [51]. RFCI does not perform conditional independence tests for all the d-
separation sets, thus making it signicantly faster than the FCI algorithm.
2.5.5 Neural Network based Methods
Recent advancements in neural networks have brought forth a new class of causal discovery
algorithms, where the computation of the causal graph is approximated through a neural network.
Neural network approaches have been successful in nding causal relationships in observational,
temporal data.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) [126] have been successfully utilised to infer causal
relationships from temporal data. Nauta, Bucur, and Seifert [167] proposed an attention-based
mechanism named Temporal Causal Discovery Framework (TCDF) that learns ‘temporal’ causal
graphs. TCDF has the added advantage of having the ability to discover hidden confounders. A
recent approach by Marcinkevičs and Vogt [148] also focuses on the causal discovery in temporal
data by employing neural nets that can detect Granger causality.
Graph Neural Network (GNN) [199] based approaches have also been proposed for causal
discovery. Yu et al. [252] argued that GNNs can be used to approximate the directed graph
by employing a variational autoencoder architecture. Another graph encoder based method
was introduced by Ng et al. [169], that can learn structural equation models and can handle
both discrete and vector-valued variables. A score based method that uses a neural network
to approximate the non-linear relationships between variables was proposed by Lachapelle
et al. [130], which is based on the continuous optimisation approach presented by Zheng et
al. [256].
Generative and Adversarial based approaches have also been suggested to discover causal-
ity. Goudet et al. [86] used a generative neural model (CGNN) to learn the causal relationships of
the data. CGNN can identify the causal hypothesis, conditional independence and the directed
graph of the observational data. Adversarial training has been used to learn causal generative
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models [119], where a game-theoretic approach is used to conditionally estimate the variable
distribution.
Neural combinatorial optimisation based approaches have also found success in uncovering
causal relationships from data. In particular, central to this thesis, reinforcement learning-based
approaches were also proposed as a mechanism to search for the correct causal graph. Zhu,
Ng, and Chen [257] uses an encoder-decoder model and BIC scoring to assess the causal graph,
while using reinforcement learning to search through the graph space. A similar approach was
proposed by Huang et al. [113] for incomplete observational data that uses an encoder integrated
with reinforcement learning to nd the graph using currently available information.
2.6 Dialogical Explanation
Novel explainable and interpretable models have managed to occupy the vast majority of the lit-
erature in the most recent rejuvenation in Explainable AI research. Miller argues that researchers
should pay equal attention to how the explanation is communicated to the end-user. This social
process of the explanation handles the interaction that occurs between the explainer and the
explainee. The importance of this interaction was rightfully acknowledged by early explainable
research that explored explanatory interaction [38, 37, 163]. This section discusses interactive
and dialogical explanations both from explainability literature in AI and social sciences, to
draw conclusions on how a model of interactive explanation can form a useful component in
explainable systems.
2.6.1 Interactive Explanation
Human explanations can provide an anchor to ground the development of interactive explanatory
protocols and models. In Cawsey’s [37] EDGE system, human explanatory discourse was
analysed to propose a user-centred system that can generate explanations in an interactive
setting. Cawsey importantly highlights how the user’s epistemic knowledge needs to be tracked
to provide useful explanations. Slotnick and Moore’s [211] QEX explanation model also uses
explanatory dialogue to interface with the user and handle user queries. The dialogue history
is kept and is used to inform explanation generation as not to repeat previously provided
knowledge. Explanatory dialogue is also useful to provide the context and can help generate
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relevant explanations. Mittal and Paris’s [159] make use of the explanation discourse of the user
to infer the context and discuss implications of having such context in text planning scenarios.
The necessity of a dialogue to the explanation process was emphasised in Moore and Swartout’s [163]
work. In a natural dialogue, users are free to ask follow-up questions to an explanation, but
this can pose diculties for the explainable system. Moore and Swartout developed a planning
system named Explainable Expert System (EES) that took user model and dialogue history into
consideration, and uses a pointing system to interact with end-users. Another explanation
dialogue planning system was proposed by Suthers, Woolf, and Cornell [218] that is interactive
and contextual. Suthers, Woolf, and Cornell further discuss how there are discrepancies between
cognitive theories of explanation and AI models of explanation. Their explanation planning
architecture is sensitive to the dialogue history of the explainee and the user model, which
enables incremental explanations. Explanation history is a useful heuristic as noted above and
can also serve as a knowledge base to provide future explanations. Rosenblum and Moore [193]
used case-based reasoning on explanatory dialogue history to extract contextual eects, and
implemented an intelligent tutoring system that uses the developed computational model.
Another critical aspect of explainable systems is their ability to inuence the trust a user can
have towards the system. Explanatory dialogues can improve and maintain user trust as it allows
users much longer interaction windows. Nothdurft, Heinroth, and Minker [173] studied the
eects explanation dialogues can have on user trust in domain-dependent tasks which indicated
the signicance of interactions in maintaining the trust of the users. Nothdurft et al. [172] also
highlighted how adaptive explanatory dialogue can prevent the loss of trust in cooperative tasks.
2.6.2 Dialogue Models
Generating and communicating explanations interactively can be a daunting task for explainable
systems. The structure and the ow of this interaction between the explainer (the system) and
the explainee (the user) need to be modelled accurately in order to provide such sequential
explanations. Dialogue models are a popular way of modelling this interaction. Dialogue models
can further provide a formalisation to the act of explanation. Though dialogue models usually
refer to verbal or textual modes of communication, the same concepts are applicable in building
other modes of interactions (e.g. visual-based, gaze-based and touch-based)
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Dialogue models are widely explored in the philosophy, social science and cognitive psychology
literature. To accommodate the communication aspects of explanations, several dialogue models
have been proposed. Walton [238, 237] introduced a shift model that has two distinct dialogues:
an explanation dialogue and an examination dialogue, where the latter is used to evaluate
the success of an explanation. Walton draws from the work of Memory Organizing Packages
(MOP) [200] and case-based reasoning to build the routines of the explanation dialogue models.
This dialogue model has three stages: opening, argumentation, and closing [238]. Walton suggests
an examination dialogue with two rules as the closing stage. These rules are governed by the
explainee, which corresponds to the understanding of an explanation [239]. This sets the
premise for the examination dialogue of an explanation and the shift between explanation and
examination to determine the success of an explanation [237].
A formal dialogical system of explanation was proposed by Walton [239], having three types of
conditions: dialogue conditions, understanding conditions, and success conditions. Arioua and
Croitoru [12] formalised and extend Walton’s dialectical system by incorporating Prakken’s [183]
framework of dialogue formalisation. Arioua and Croitoru’s dialogue architecture also had a
shift model that gave the explainee options to challenge the given explanation.
Gilbert note that both the structure and the explanation strategy is important when one builds a
formal dialogue model. Recent work of Attari, Heckmann, and Schlangen [15] has focused on
annotation-based verbal dialogue models, where the dialogue is represented through a tuple with
the questions, information, answers and participants, for collaborative tasks. Other dialogue
work has focused on formalising the dialogue structure by introducing a categorisation [4, 3]
mechanism for dierent dialogue acts. Explanation dialogues have also been used as an aid
to rectify imprecise planning problems and improve their solutions, where the dialogue was
formalised using a planning approach [65].
2.6.3 Argumentation in Explanation
The natural dialogue of the explanation process can often contain an argumentation sub-
dialogue [24]. Intuitively this allows the explainee to ask follow-up questions about a given
explanation or event contest the explanation through an argument. The purpose of the argumen-
tation dialogue is to resolve knowledge discrepancies between the explainer and the explainee,
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which can result in a deeper understanding of the system that is being explained.
Walton and Bex [24] introduced a dialogue system for argumentation and explanation that
consists of a communication language that denes the speech acts and protocols that allow
transitions in the dialogue. This allows the explainee to challenge and interrogate the given
explanations to gain further understanding. Villata et al. [234] focused on modelling information
sources to be suited in an argumentation framework, and introduce a socio-cognitive model of
trust to support judgements about trustworthiness.
Argumentation dialogues have also received attention explicitly in the Explainable AI commu-
nity. Sklar and Azhar [208] introduced an argumentation framework for the purpose of explaining
agents. The framework was formalised as a dialogue game having inquiry, information-seeking
and persuasion dialogue game types. A similar argumentation-based approach for explainable
systems was proposed by Zeng et al. [253], where assumption-based argumentation is used
to formalise the explanations. Eorts have also been made towards using argumentation in
explainable systems deployed in clinical settings, where argument schemes are supplemented as
explanations that support a wellness consultation scenario between a human and an agent [198].
This previous work on explanation dialogues is largely conceptual and involves idealized models,
and mostly lacks empirical validation. In contrast, the work described in the Chapter 6 take a
grounded, data-driven approach to determine what an explanation dialogue should look like.
2.7 Conclusion
The need for explainability in intelligent systems was a well understood problem, with the
literature spanning back to the expert systems era [43, 163, 38]. Much of the recent work in
explainability was driven by the urgency that comes with having complex black-models making
decisions, sometimes in high-stake situations [90]. Though there are numerous sub-areas in
explainability, this survey specically focused on the explainability of reinforcement learning
agents, causal explanation and on interactive explanation.
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2.7.1 Inuence from Social Sciences
De Graaf and Malle [57] commented on how humans would expect familiar models and methods
of explainable from articially intelligent agents. Miller’s [156] work further emphasised this fact,
and through a comprehensive survey of social and cognitive science literature, drew a landscape
for social science inspired explainability. In fact, a major recurring theme in cognitive science
literature is the notion of causal models and causal explanations [248]. Causality in articial
intelligence is a prominent research area [176], though causality and causal explanations for the
purpose of explainability remains largely under explored. This is especially true in the case of
explainable reinforcement learning agents, where there’s a distinct lack of causal explanation
methods in the literature.
2.7.2 Explaining Reinforcement Learning Agents
Reinforcement learning poses a dierent explainability challenge than explainability in clas-
sication or planning as the agent actively interact with the environment inuencing change.
Several approaches have been proposed to tackle the explainable reinforcement learning problem
such as, relevant variable explanations [122], policy explanations [99] and policy summarisa-
tion [9]. Further improvements can be made for human acceptance and understandability by
incorporating concepts of explainability from cognitive sciences.
The RQ1 poses the question “How can reinforcement learning agents provide causal explanations
of agent behaviour that increase the understanding and trust of the users?”. Introducing causal
explanations to RL agents is a plausible direction that can help to build a familiar model of
explainability that can address this research question. Having a causal model of explanation can
further help with generating contrastive explanations using counterfactuals [155]. To investigate
the RQ2, “Do distal causal explanations of RL agents improve the intelligibility of the agent
behaviour?”, a human-centred approach to causal explanations, as noted in the cognitive science
literature discussed above, can be better suited. RQ3 focus on “How can reinforcement learning
agents discover the causal action inuence structure of the domain?”, to address the need for an
action inuence discovery algorithm to facilitate causal explanation models.
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2.7.3 Interactive Explanation
The social process of the explanation —communicating the explanation— is an equally important
component of an explainable system alongside the cognitive process. Recent explainable devel-
opments have given much less attention to this aspect comparatively though the importance of
it was rightfully highlighted by many researchers [156, 57, 89]. Walton’s [238, 239, 237] semi-
nal work in dialogical explanation can pave a path for interactive explanations in explainable
systems, though a grounded, empirically tested model can be better suited when implemented
in intelligent agents. Further, for an intelligent agent to provide interactive explanations, a
proper conceptualisation and formalism of the dialogue structure that is transferable to an agent
readable format is needed. The RQ4 aims to mitigate this research gap by addressing “What are
the patterns of dialogical explanation that can facilitate interactive explanations in XAI systems?”
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Chapter 3
Causal Explanations in Reinforcement
Learning Agents1
Many prominent theories in cognitive science propose that humans understand and represent
the knowledge of the world through causal relationships. In making sense of the world, we build
causal models in our mind to encode cause-eect relations of events and use these to explain why
new events happen by referring to counterfactuals — things that did not happen. This chapter
discuss how causal models can be used to derive causal explanations of the behaviour of model-
free reinforcement learning agents. We present an approach that learns an action inuence
model, which is an extension of structural causal models (SCMs) [92] during reinforcement
learning and encodes causal relationships between variables of interest. This model is then used
to generate explanations of behaviour based on counterfactual analysis of the causal model.
The explanation module is computationally evaluated in 6 domains, measuring performance
and task prediction accuracy. The model is also evaluated in a study with 120 participants who
observe agents playing a real-time strategy game (Starcraft II) and then receive explanations
of the agents’ behaviour. The human evaluation investigates: 1) participants’ understanding
gained by explanations through task prediction; 2) explanation satisfaction and 3) trust. Results
show that causal model explanations perform better on these measures compared to two other
baseline explanation models.
1This chapter is adapted from the published article: "Explainable reinforcement learning through a causal lens."
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Articial Intelligence. Vol. 34. No. 03. 2020.
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3.1 Introduction
There is a wealth of pertinent literature in cognitive psychology that explore the nature of
explanations and how people understand them. As humans, we view the world through a causal
lens [210], building mental models with causal relationships to act in the world, to understand
new events and also to explain events. Importantly, causal models give people the ability to
consider counterfactuals — events that did not happen, but could have under dierent situations.
Although this notion of causal explanation is also backed by literature in philosophy and social
psychology [104], causality and counterfactuals are only just becoming more prevalent in XAI.
Further, compared to the burst of XAI research in supervised learning, explainability in model-free
reinforcement learning is hardly explored.
We introduce an action inuence model for model-free reinforcement learning (RL) agents and
provide a formalisation of the model using structural causal models [92]. Action inuence models
approximate the causal model of the environment relative to actions taken by an agent. Our
approach diers from previous work in explainable RL in that we use causal models to generate
contrastive explanations for why and why not questions, which previous models lack. Given
assumptions about the direction of causal relationships between variables, during the policy
learning process, we also learn the quantitative inuences that actions have on variables. Which
enable our model to reason approximately about counterfactual states and actions. We dene
how to generate explanations for ‘why?’ and ‘why not?’ questions from the action inuence
model. We dene minimally complete explanations taking inspiration from social psychology
literature [151].
We computationally evaluated our approach on 6 RL benchmarks domains using 6 dierent RL
algorithms. Results indicate that these models are robust and accurate enough to perform task
prediction [110, p.12] with a negligible performance impact. We conducted a human study using
the implemented model for RL agents trained to play the real-time strategy game Starcraft II.
Experiments were run for 120 participants, in which we evaluated the participants’ performance
in task prediction, explanation satisfaction, and trust. Results show that our model performs
better than the tested baseline, but its impact on trust is not statistically signicant.
The main contribution of this chapter is twofold: 1) We introduce and formalise the action inu-
ence model based on structural causal models and present denitions to generate explanations;
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2) We conduct a between-subject human study to evaluate the proposed model with baselines.
3.2 Related Work
In this section, we briey discuss the literature that is most closely related to the chapter.
There exists a substantial body of literature that explores explaining the policies and actions of
Markov Decision Processes (MDP), though most of them do not explicitly focus on reinforcement
learning. Elizalde et al. [68] generated explanations by selecting and using ‘relevant’ variables
of states of factored MDPs, evaluated by domain experts. Taking the long term eect an action
has, Khan, Poupart, and Black [122] proposed generating sucient and minimal explanations
for MDPs using domain independent templates.
Policy explanations in human-agent interaction settings have been used to achieve trans-
parency [99] and provide summaries of the policies [9]. Explanation in reinforcement learning
has been explored, using interactive RL to generate explanations from instructions of a hu-
man [77] and to provide contrastive explanations [236]. Soft decision trees have been used to
generate more interpretable policies [52], and reward decomposition has been utilized to provide
minimum sucient explanations in RL [116]. However, these explanations are not based on an
underlying causal model.
Other work on causal explanation has focused on scientic explanations [197] and explanations
using causal trees [170]. Although some recent work has emphasized the importance of causal
explanation for explainable AI systems [156, 155, 145, 146], work on generating explanations
from causal explanation models for MDPs and RL agents have been absent.
3.3 Causal Models for Explanations
In this section, we introduce the action inuence model, which is based on structural causal models
of Halpern and Pearl [92]. For the purpose of implementing RL agents for explanation, we use a
scaled-down version of the full Starcraft II 1v1 match (an adversarial scenario) with 4 actions
and 9 state variables for the agent’s model (see Figure 3.1). In the following sections we use this
Starcraft II scenario accompanied by Figure 3.1 as our running example.
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3.3.1 Preliminaries : Structural Causal Models
Structural causal models (SCMs) [92] represent the world using random variables, divided into
exogenous (external) and endogenous (internal), some of which might have causal relationships
which each other. These relationships can be described with a set of structural equations. Formally,
a signature S is a tuple (U ,V ,R), where U is the set of exogenous variables, V the set of
endogenous variables, andR is a function that denotes the range of values for every variable
Y ∈ U ∪ V .
Denition 3.3.1. A structural causal model is a tuple M = (S ,F ), where F denotes a set of





R(X) give the value of X based on other variables in U ∪ V . That is, the equation FX denes
the value of X based on some other variables in the model. 
A context ~u is a vector of unique values of each exogenous variable u ∈ U . A situation is dened
as a model/context pair (M,~u). An instantiation is dened by assigning variables the values
corresponding to those dened by their structural equations. An actual cause of an event ϕ is a
vector of endogenous variables and their values such that there is some counterfactual context
in which the variables in the cause are dierent and the event ϕ does not occur. An explanation
is those causes that an explainee does not already know. For a more complete review of SCM’s
we direct the reader to [92].
3.3.2 Causal Models for Reinforcement Learning Agents
The intent in this work is not to provide explanations of evidence from the environment, but to
provide explanations of the agent’s behaviour based on the knowledge of how actions inuence
the environment. As such, we extend the notion of SCMs to include actions as part of the causal
relationships.
We incorporate action inuence models for MDP-based RL agents, extending SCMs with the
addition of actions. We use the standard MDP notation described given in Chapter 2. The
objective of an RL agent is to nd a policy π that maps states to actions maximizing the expected
discounted sum of rewards. We dene the action inuence model for RL agents as follows.
Formally, a signature Sa for an action inuence model is a tuple (U ,V ,R,A), in which U , V ,
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andR are as in SCMs, and A is the set of actions.
Denition 3.3.2. An action inuence model is a tuple (Sa,F ), where Sa is as above, and F is
the set of structural equations, in which we have multiple for each X ∈ V — one for each unique
action set that inuences X. A function FX.A, for A ∈ A, denes the causal eect on X from
applying action A. The set of reward variables Xr ⊆ V are dened by the set of nodes with an
out-degree of 0; that is, the set of sink nodes. 
We dene the actual instantiation of a model M as M~V←~S, in which ~S is the vector of state
variable values from an MDP. In an actual instantiation, we set the values of all state variables in
the model, eectively making the exogenous variables irrelevant.
Figure 3.1 shows an action inuence graph of the Starcraft II agent described in the previous
section, with exogenous variables hidden. These action inuence models are SCMs except that
each edge is associated with an action. In the action inuence model, each state variable has a
set of structural equations: one for each unique incoming action. As an example, from Figure
3.1, variable An is causally inuenced by S and B only when action Am is executed, thus the
structural equation FAn.Am (S, B) captures that relationship.
3.4 Explanation Generation
In this section, we present denitions that generate explanations from an action inuence
model. The process of explanation generation has 3 phases: 1) dening the qualitative causal
relationships of variables as an action inuence model; 2) learning the structural equations
during RL; and 3) generating explanans from SCMs using the denitions given below.
We dene an explanation as a pair that consist of: 1) an explanandum, the event to be explained;
and 2) an explanan, the subset of causes given as the explanation [156]. Consider the example
‘Why did you do P?’ and the explanation ‘Because of Q’. Here, the explanandum is P and explanan
is Q. Identifying the explanandum from a question is not a trivial task. We dene explanations
for questions of the form ‘Why A?’ or ‘Why not A?’, where A is an action. In the context of a
RL agent we dene a complete explanan below.
Denition 3.4.1. A complete explanan for an action a under the actual instantiation M~V←~S is a
tuple
(
~Xr = ~xr, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xi = ~xi
)
, in which ~Xr is the vector of reward variables reached by
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Rewards
State variables:
W - Worker number
S - Supply depot number
B - barracks number
E - enemay location
An - Ally unit number
Ah - Ally unit health
Al - Ally unit location
Du - Destoryed units
Db - Destroyed buildings
Actions:
As - build supply depot
Ab - build barracks























Figure 3.1: Action inuence graph of a Starcraft II agent
following the causal chain of the graph to sink nodes; ~Xh the vector of variables of the head
node of action a, ~Xi the vector of intermediate nodes between head and reward nodes, and ~xr,
~xh, ~xi gives the values of these variables under M~V←~S. 
Informally, this denes a complete explanan for action a as the complete causal chain from action a
to any future reward that it can receive. From Figure 3.1, the causal chain for action As is depicted
in bold edges, and the extracted explanan tuple ([S = s] , [An = an] , [Du = du, Db = db]) is
shown as darkened nodes. We use depth-rst search to traverse the graph until all the sink nodes
are reached from the head node of the action edge.
3.4.1 ‘Why?’ Questions
Lim, Dey, and Avrahami [135] found that the most demanded explanatory questions are Why
and Why not questions. To this end, we focus on explanation generation for why and why not
questions in this work.
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Minimally Complete Explanations
Striking a balance between complete and minimal explanations depend on the epistemic state of
the explainee [156]. We assume that we know nothing about the epistemic state of the explainee.
Recall from the denition of explanans (Denition 3.4.1), a ‘complete’ explanation would include
explanans of all the intermediate nodes between the head and reward node of the causal chain.
Clearly, for a large graph, this risks overwhelming the explainee. For this reason, we dene
minimally complete explanations.
McClure and Hilton [151] show that referring to the goal as being the most important for
explaining actions. In our causal models, the rewards are the ‘goals’, but these alone do not form
meaningful explanations because they are merely numbers. We dene the human interpretable
‘goal’ using the variables in the predecessor nodes of the rewards. These dene the immediate
causes of the reward, and therefore which states will result in rewards.
However, rewards alone is only a longer-term motivation for taking an action. As such, we also
include the head node of the action edge as the immediate reason for doing the action. We use
this model to dene our minimally complete explanations.
Denition 3.4.2. A minimally complete explanation is a tuple
(
~Xr = ~xr, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xp = ~xp
)
,
in which ~Xr = ~xr and ~Xh = ~xh do not change from Denition 3.4.1, and ~Xp = ~xp is the vector
of variables that are immediate predecessors of any variable in Xr within the causal chain, with
~xp the values in the actual instantiation. 
Informally, for a complete causal chain, we take the rst and last arcs of the causal chain, with
their source and destination nodes, omitting intermediate nodes, as the minimal explanation.
From Figure 3.1, for the action As, the minimally complete explanation is just the complete
explanation, as there are no intermediate nodes.
Clearly, one could dene other heuristics to decide which intermediate nodes to use as expla-
nations, such as the knowledge of the explainee. However, in this chapter, we use this simple
denition.
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3.4.2 ‘Why not?’ Questions
Why not questions let the explainee ask why an event has not occurred, thus allowing counter-
factuals to be explained; something that is known to be a powerful explanation mechanism [156,
36]. Our model generates counterfactual explanations by comparing causal chains of the actual
event occurred and the explanandum (counterfactual action). First, we dene a counterfactual
instantiation that species the optimal state variable values under which the counterfactual
action B would be chosen.
Denition 3.4.3. A counterfactual instantiation for a counterfactual action B is a model M~Z← ~SZ ,
where ~Z gives the instantiation of all predecessor variables of action B with current state values
and the instantiation of all successor nodes (of B) of the causal chain by forward simulating,
using the structural equations. 
Informally, this gives the ‘optimal’ conditions (according to the action inuence model) under
which we would select counterfactual action B, simulated through structural equations. We
unravel this further in the Example 3.4.1 discussion using the Starcraft II scenario.
In the following denition, we use ~X = ~x to represent the tuple
(
~Xp = ~xp, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xr = ~xr
)
,
and similar for ~Y = ~y for readability.
Denition 3.4.4. Given a minimally complete explanation ~X = ~x for action A under the
actual instantation, and a minimally complete explanation ~Y = ~y for action B under the
counterfactual instantiation M~Z← ~SZ (from Denition 3.4.3), we dene a minimally complete
contrastive explanation as the tuple (~X′ = ~x′, ~Y′ = ~y′, ~Xr = ~xr) such that ~X′ is the maximal
set of variables in ~X in which (~X′ = ~x′) ∩ (~Y′ = ~y′) 6= ∅, where ~x′ is then contrasted with ~y′.
That is, we only explain things that are dierent between the actual and counterfactual. This
corresponds to the dierence condition [155]. And ~Xr gives the reward nodes of action A. 
Intuitively, a contrastive explanation extracts the actual causal chain for the taken action A, and
the counterfactual causal chain for the B, and nds the dierences.
Example 3.4.1. Consider the question, asking why a Starcraft II agent built supply depots,
rather than choosing to build barracks:
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Question Why not build_barracks (Ab)?
Explanation Because it is more desirable to do action build_supply_depot (As) to
have more Supply Depots (S) as the goal is to have more Destroyed
Units (Du) and Destroyed buildings (Db).
First we get the actual instantiation m = [W = 12, S = 1, B = 2, An = 22, Du = 10, Db = 7]
(instantiation should include all variables in the current state, only the required ones are shown for
readability). The causal chain for the actual action ‘why As?’ would be as in Figure 1, and for the
counterfactual action ‘why not Ab?’, the causal chain nodes would be B→ An → [Du, Db]. We
then get the counterfactual instantiationm′ = [W = 12, S = 3, B = 2, An = 22, Du = 10, Db = 7]
using Denition 3.4.3. Applying the dierence condition here, we obtain the minimally complete
contrastive explanation (from Denition 3.4.4) as the tuple ([S = 1] , [S = 3] , [Du = 10, Db = 7])
and contrast [S = 1] with [S = 3] to obtain the explanation of Example 3.4.1 (generated using a
simple NLP template).
3.4.3 Learning Structural Causal Equations
Our approach so far relies on knowing the structural model, in particular, to determine the eects
of counterfactual actions. Why not questions are inherently counterfactual [17], and having
just the policy of an agent is not enough to generate explanations as counterfactuals refers to
possible worlds that did not happen. Consider the Example 3.4.1, to generate this explanation,
the optimal/maximum value of the state variable S is needed in the given time instance.
However, in model-free reinforcement learning, such environment dynamics are not known.
Learning a complete model of the environment is a dicult problem. However, given a graph of
causal relations between variables, learning a set of structural equations that are approximate
yet ‘good enough’ to give counterfactual explanations may be feasible.
To this end, we assume that a DAG specifying causal direction between variables is given, and
learn the structural equations as multivariate regression models during the training phase of the
RL agent. We perform experience replay [160] by saving et = (st, at, rt, st+1) at each time step t
in a data set Dt = {e1, ..., et}. Then we update the sub-set of structural equations FX.A using a
regression learner L̂(s,a,r,s′)∼U(D), in that we only update structural equations associated with the
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specic action in the experience frame, drawn uniformly as mini-batches from D. For example,
from Figure 3.1, for any experience frame with the action As, only the equation FS.As(W) will be
updated. Any regression learner can be used as the learning model L̂, such as a linear regressor
or a multi-layer perceptron regressor.
While this approach may seem similar to learning environment dynamics of model-based RL
methods, we only learn the structural equations, and we are only after an approximation that
is good enough for explaining instances. Thus they can be approximate but still useful for
explanation. Further, specifying the assumptions about the causal direction between variables is
a much easier problem to encode by hand, and can be tested with the data.
3.5 Computational Evaluation
We evaluate action inuence models in 5 OpenAI RL benchmark domains [31] and in the Starcraft
II domain. The goal of this evaluation is to determine if learning action inuence models leads
to models that are faithful to the problem. Task prediction accuracy and training time for the
structural causal equations are measured. The purpose of task prediction is to evaluate if the
model is accurate enough to predict what an agent will do next, under the assumption that if it
is not, then the model will not be of use to a human explainee.
We computationally simulate task prediction using Algorithm 1. Here we instantiate all the
equations (which are the set of regression models L) with the values of the current state S of the
agent. We identify the equation that has maximum dierence with the predicted state variable
value and the actual, then get the action associated with it. This is informed by the reasoning
that the agent will try to follow the optimal policy, and the action with the biggest impact to
correct the policy will be executed. The impact is measured by the above mentioned dierence.
This is itself an approximation, but is a useful guide for task prediction.
We use linear SGD regression (LR), decision tree regression (DT) and multilayer perceptron
regression (MLP) as the learners that approximate the structural equations. We choose benchmark
domains based on varying levels of complexity, size (state features/number of actions) and
train them using various RL algorithms to demonstrate the robustness of the model. Table 3.1
summarises the results of task prediction and time taken to train the structural equations given
the replay data.
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Algorithm 1 Task Prediction:Action Inuence Model
Input: trained regression models L, current state St
Output: predicted action a
1: ~Fp ← [] ; vector of predicted dierence
2: for every L̂ ∈ L do
3: Py ← L̂ · predict(Sx.t); predict variable Sy at St+1







Env - RL Accuracy (%) Performance (s)
Size LR DT MLP LR DT MLP
Cartpole-PG 4/2 83.8 81.6 86.0 0.007 0.018 0.03
MountainCar-DQN 3/3 69.7 57.8 69.6 0.020 0.037 0.32
Taxi-SARSA 4/6 68.2 74.2 67.9 0.001 0.001 0.49
LunarLander-DDQN 8/4 68.4 63.7 72.1 0.002 0.002 0.33
BipedalWalker-PPO 14/4 56.9 56.4 56.7 0.010 0.015 0.41
Starcraft-A2C 9/4 94.7 91.8 91.4 0.144 0.025 3.33
Table 3.1: Action inuence model evaluation in 6 benchmark reinforcement learning domains (using
dierent RL algorithms, PG, DQN etc.), measuring mean task prediction accuracy and training time of
the structural causal equations in 100 episodes after training.
Overall, the results show the model did a reasonable job of task prediction, providing evidence
that this could be useful for explanations. In domains that had discreet actions (all except the
bi-pedal walker domain) the task prediction accuracy was close to 70% and over. This implies
that computationally, action inuence models are able to perform task prediction with only using
structural causal equations accurately 70% of instances, where this accuracy can translate to
a similar level of humans understanding of the agent when explanations are generated using
the action inuence models. Domains that have a clear causal structure (e.g Starcraft) performs
best in task prediction. Starcraft II has a clear causal structure due its action set being highly
dependant on the execution of previous actions which inuences specic variables. In contrast
domains like bi-pedal walker has actions that inuence every variable (as continuous actions
and features). Considering the performance cost it incurs, there was little gained by using MLP
to approximate the equations, where in most cases linear regression is adequate. Apart from the
BipedalWalker domain, our model performs well in task prediction with a negligible performance
hit. The bipedalWalker domain has continuous actions, which our current model cannot handle
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accurately. We plan to extend our model to continuous actions in future work.
3.6 Empirical Evaluation: Human Study
A human-grounded evaluation is essential to evaluate the explainability of a system, thus we
carry out human-subject experiments involving explaining RL agents. We present two main
hypotheses for the empirical evaluation; H1) Causal-model-based explanations build better
mental models of the agent leading to a better understanding of its strategies (We make the
assumption here that there is no intermediate eect on the mental model from other sources);
and H2) Better understanding of an agent’s strategies promotes trust in the agent.
We conducted a 4-condition between-subject study, with each condition having 2 within-subject
variables. Here, the 4 independent conditions are given by the explanation generation models,
while the 2 within-subject variables represent ‘familiar’ and ‘novel’ scenarios of the agent. Further
details of these conditions are provided in the experiment parameters section below.
3.6.1 Methodology
We use StarCraft II, a real-time strategy game and a popular RL environment [235] as the domain.
We implemented a RL agent for our experiment that competes in the default map.
To evaluate hypothesis (H1), we use the method of task prediction [110]. Task prediction can
provide a quick view of the explainee’s mental model formed through explanations, where the
task is for the participant to predict ‘What will the agent do next?’. We use the 5-point Likert
Explanation Satisfaction Scale developed by Homan et al. [110, p.39] to measure the subjective
quality of explanations. To evaluate hypothesis (H2), we use the 5-point Likert Trust Scale of
Homan et al. [110, p.49]. We obtained ethics approval from The University of Melbourne human
research ethics committee (ID-1953619.1).
Experiment Design
We use a recording of a full gameplay video (22 min) with the RL agents playing against in-game
bot AI. The experiment has 4 phases.
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Phase 1 involves collecting demographic information and training the participants. Using ve
gameplay video clips, the participant is trained to understand and dierentiate the actions of the
agent.
In phase 2, a clip of the gameplay video (15 sec) is played in a web-based UI, with a textual
description of the scene. The participant can select the question type (why/why not) and the
action, which together forms a question ‘Why/Why not action A?’. Then, the textual explanation
for the question with a gure of the relevant sub-graph of the agent’s action inuence graph is
displayed. Explanations are pre-generated from our implemented algorithm. The participant can
ask multiple questions in a single gameplay video. After every gameplay video, the participant
completes the Explanation Satisfaction Scale. This process is repeated so we have data for each
participant from ve videos.
In Phase 3, we measure the understanding the explainee has after seeing the gameplay and
the explanations. We measure understanding using the task prediction method as follows: the
participant is presented with another gameplay video (10 sec), and presented with three selections
of textual descriptions of what action the agent will do in next step; the participant selects an
option, which includes ‘I don’t know’. We expect the participant is projecting forward the
local strategy of the agent using their mental model. This mental model is formed through (or
helped by) explanations seen in phase 1. This process is repeated for 8 tasks. In 4 of the task
predictions, the behaviour is explainable using a causal chain previously seen in the training, but
with dierent variable values. In the other 4 tasks, the behaviour is novel, but can be inferred by
combining causal chains from dierent training tasks. In Phase 4, the participant completes a
5-point Trust Scale.
We conducted the experiments on Amazon MTurk, a crowd-sourcing platform popular for
obtaining data for human-subject experiments [35]. The experiment was fully implemented in
an interactive web-based environment. We excluded noisy data of users in 3 ways. First, we
tested participants to ensure they had learnt about the agent’s actions by prompting them to
identify them. If the participant failed this, the experiment did not proceed. Then, for participants
who completed, we omitted their data from analysis based on two criteria: 1) if the threshold
of the time the participant spent on viewing explanations and answering tasks is below a few
seconds, which was deemed too short to learn anything useful; and 2) if the participant’s textual
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responses to explain their task prediction choice were gibberish text or a 1-2 word response,
as this indicated lack of engagement and care in the task. We controlled for language by only
recruiting participants from the US.
Experiment Parameters
The experiment was run with 4 independent variables. We tested abstract (C) and detailed (D)
versions of our action inuence models and 2 baseline models described below: 1) Gameplay
video without any explanations (N); 2) Relevant variable explanations (R). These explanations are
generated using state relevant variables using template 1 of Khan, Poupart, and Black [122, p.3]
and visualized through a state-action graph, e.g ‘Action A is likely to increase relevant variable
P’; 3) Detailed action inuence model explanations, where the causal graph is augmented to
include atomic actions.
The above 4 independent variables (explanation models) are detailed below. Generated explana-
tions of each model are given as examples.
• No-explanations (N): The video and a textual description of the agent behaviour is provided.
The participant cannot query further about the behaviour (as there is no explanation model
to query from). E.g: ‘AI agent is doing the action build_supply_depot’.
• Relevant-variable explanations (R): Explanations are generated using template 1 of Khan,
Poupart, and Black. The participant can query further about the agent behaviour using
why questions (why not questions are not available as this explanation model cannot
generate causal counterfactuals). A state-action gure that highlights the relevant variable
is shown to the participant. E.g.: ‘Because, the action build_supply_depot is likely to make
the number of Supply Depots 1’
• Causal explanations (C): We use our action inuence model and it’s explanation generation
methods. The used action inuence model is abstract, in that the action in the model is
concatenated (e.g. in StarCraft II, to build a supply depot, 3 separate granular actions need
to be performed, which are 1. selecting a worker, 2. selecting a space in the map, and 3.
commanding the worker to build. In the abstract model, we consider these 3 actions as
one action - build_supply_depot) Participants can query the agent behaviour with both
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why and why not questions. The action inuence diagram is visualised and the relevant
chain is shown to the participant. E.g.: ‘Because, the goal is to increase Killed units and
Buildings destroyed: Which depends on Army number: Army number is inuenced by
build_supply_depot’.
• Detailed causal explanations (D): We use the action inuence model with the granular
StarCraft II actions. The action inuence diagram is visualised and the relevant chain
(which is more detailed) is shown to the participant. E.g.: ‘Because, the goal is to increase
Killed units and Buildings destroyed: Which depends on Army number: Army number is
inuenced by build_supply_depot’. Note that although the explanation for this query is
the same as the causal explanation (C), the presented action inuence diagram is more
detailed with granular actions.
We used power analysis to determine the needed sample sizes for the 4-conditions. Pilot runs
were done for the conditions, having n = 5 participants for each condition. We consider the
conditions causal explanations (C) and relevant-variable explanations R and calculate Cohen’s d
and obtain the eect size of 0.744. Using this eect size and power = 0.8 and signicance level
α = 0.05, we do power analysis for both T-test and F-test (ANOVA) and obtain values 29.33 and
23.97 respectively. Thus we determined the total number of samples needed as n = 120.
We ran experiments for 120 participants, allocated evenly to the independent variables. Only 2
participants failed the test condition (learning of the agent’s action, with repeated trials). Using
the criteria described in the section Experiment Design, we excluded 18 participants from the
analysis to yield 120 participants. The breakdown of the excluded data points are as follows, 1).
Participants didn’t exceed the time threshold - 4 (breakdown: conditions N - 1, R - 0, D - 2, C -
1), 2). Participants that had gibberish or very short text responses - 14 (breakdown: conditions
N - 1, R - 4, D - 5, C - 4). Each experiment ran for approximately 40 minutes. We scored each
participant on task prediction, 2 points for a correct prediction; 1 for responding ‘I don’t know’
and 0 for an incorrect prediction for a total of 16 points. Scores were tallied. We compensated
each participant with 8.5USD. Of the 120 participants, 36 were female, 82 male and 2 were not
given. Participants were aged between 19 to 59 (µ = 34.2) and had an average self-rated gaming
experience and Starcraft II experience of 3.38 and 2.02 (5-point Likert) respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Box plot of task
prediction scores of explanation
models, T=total score, F=familiar
score, N=novel score (higher
is better, means represented as
bold dots).
Figure 3.3: Box plot of expla-
nation quality (likert scale 1-5,
higher is better, means repre-
sented as dots).
Figure 3.4: Box plot of trust
(likert scale 1-5, higher is better,
means represented as dots).
3.7 Results
Task Prediction
For the rst hypothesis, the corresponding null and alternative hypotheses are: 1) H0 : µC =
µR = µD = µN ; 2) H1 : µC ≥ µR; 3) H2 : µC ≥ µD; 4) H3 : µC ≥ µN , where abstract causal
explanations (our model), detailed causal explanations, relevant variable explanations, and no
explanations are given by C, D, R, and N respectively.
We conduct one-way ANOVA (Figure 3.2 illustrates the task score variance with explanation
models). We obtained a p-value of 0.003 (µC = 10.90, µD = 10.20, µR = 8.97, µN = 8.53).
Further values obtained by the one-way ANOVA test is as follows (sum of squares=109.8917,
degrees of freedom=3, mean squares=36.6306, F-value=4.7684, eta-square eect size=0.1098).
Thus we conclude there are signicant dierences between models on task prediction scores. We
performed Tukey multiple pairwise-comparisons to obtain the signicance between groups. From
Table 3.3, the dierences between the causal explanation model paired with other explanation
models are signicant for C-R and C-N pairs with p-values of 0.006 and 0.034. Additionally, we
calculate the eect of the number of questions on the score, and obtain no statistical correlation
using a correlation test (number of questions vs score, p = 0.33, model C) among same models.
Because participants could select “I don’t know” and receive 8 out of 16, we also further analyse
scores based on 2 = ‘correct’, 0 = ‘incorrect or ‘I don’t know’, and obtain results that are still
signicant (p=0.004), means (C=10.90, D=10.10, R=8.93, N=8.47), for model pairs (C-N p=0.005,
C-R p=0.035). We conducted Pearson’s Chi-Square as a non-parametric test on the task prediction
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scores, which showed signicant results (p-value = 0.008, X-squared = 17.281).
Familiar and novel scenario type analysis: We further analyse the task prediction scores
for familiar and novel scenarios (Depicted in Figure 3.2). For the familiar scenarios we perform
one-way ANOVA and obtain values (F-value=1.426, p-value=0.238, eect-size=0.035) and for the
novel scenarios we obtain values (F-value=5.023, p-value=0.002, eect-size=0.115). We conclude
that the dierences between the novel scenarios across explanation models are statistically
signicant.
Therefore we reject H0 and H2 and accept all other alternative hypotheses. Our results show
that causal model explanations lead to a signicantly better understanding of agent’s strategies
than the 2 baselines we evaluated, especially against previous models of relevant explanations.
Participants did slightly worse on tasks with novel behaviour.
Eect of why and why not questions: To mimic real-world world human-agent explana-
tions, participants were given the freedom to ask any number of questions (both why and why
not) from the models that have the ability to generate explanations. Note that in the no explana-
tion (N) condition, participants cannot ask questions as there is simply a description of the agent
behaviour. Similarly, the relevant-variable (R) condition, only why questions can be asked due
to the model’s inability to simulate counterfactuals. Table 3.2 summarises the analysis of the
eect of why and why not questions on the task prediction score. From the Table 3.2, we see
that the total number of questions asked for each model were; C=340, D=328, R=224 and N=0.
Breaking down the question number further; why questions asked were, C=190, D=182, R=224
and N=0; and why not questions asked were, C=150, D=146, R=0 and N=0. We further used a
t-test to investigate whether there are any signicant dierences between the number of dierent
types of questions asked in each condition. Note that we can only compare model pairs that can
generate questions for the same type of questions (i. e. for why questions, models C, D and R;
for why not questions models C and D). For why questions we obtain the following values, C-R
model pair (statistic=-1.98, p-value=0.052), C-D model pair (statistic=0.48, p-value=0.63). Below
values are obtained for the why not questions, C-D model pair (statistic=0.13, p-value=0.89).
Though for why questions there is a barely signicant dierence (p-value = 0.52) between model
pair C-R, for others, question number does not seem to dier signicantly.
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Question type Model Question-number Mean Median Standard-deviation Variance
Why
C 190 6.33 7 2.32 5.42
D 182 6.06 6 1.86 3.46
R 224 7.46 8 2.01 4.04
N 0 0 0 0 0
Why not
C 150 5 4 3.91 15.33
D 146 4.86 5 3.58 12.84
R 0 0 0 0 0
N 0 0 0 0 0
All
C 340 11.33 11 5.54 30.75
D 328 10.93 10.5 4.87 23.79
R 224 7.46 8 2.01 4.04
N 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.2: Eect of why and why not questions on the task prediction score. Explanation models are
given by letters N, R, D, C.
Model pair mean-di lwr upr p-value
C - N 2.400 0.534 4.265 0.006
C - R 1.966 0.101 3.832 0.034
D - N 1.666 -0.198 3.532 0.097
D - R 1.233 -0.632 3.098 0.316
C - D 0.733 -1.132 2.598 0.735
R - N 0.433 -1.432 2.298 0.930
Table 3.3: Pairwise-comparisons of explanation models of task prediction scores (higher positive di is
better)
Metric Mdl-pair Mean-dif Median-dif p-val
Complete C-N 0.707 0.700 0.061C-R 0.873 1.000 0.012
Sucient C-N 0.746 0.700 0.039C-R 1.013 1.000 0.002
Satisfying C-N 0.633 0.800 0.082C-R 0.740 0.700 0.029
Understand C-N 0.326 0.400 0.497C-R 0.400 0.400 0.316
Table 3.4: Explanation quality (likert scale data 1-5)
Explanation Quality
To measure the subjective quality of the explanations, we used the explanation quality survey of
Homan et al. [110, p.39]. The survey includes 8 questions having a 5-point Likert scale. Though
we presented the whole survey to the participants, we only report results on the rst 4 questions.
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The last 4 questions measure ‘how to use the software’, ‘useful for the user’s goal’, ‘accuracy’
and ‘trust and not trust’. These last 4 questions are not relevant to the reinforcement learning
agent we developed because of its strategy-oriented nature. Further, the last question is omitted
because trust is later analysed with a dierent survey.
Figure 3.3 depicts the likert scale data of explanation metrics (understand, satisfying, sucient
detail and complete) for aggregated video explanations of explanation models. As before we
performed a pair-wise ANOVA test, results are summarised in Table 3.4. Our model obtained
statistically signicant results and outperformed the benchmark ‘relevant explanation’ (R) for all
metrics except ‘Understand’.
Trust
We use the Trust survey of Homan et al. [110, p.49] to measure the subjective user trust
towards the agent. This survey consists of 8 questions with questions having a 5-point Likert
scale. Similar to the explanation quality survey, we present the whole survey to the participants.
The last 4 questions of the survey; ‘ecient’, ‘wary of the tool’, ‘better task performance’, ‘use
for decision making’ are not relevant for our agent setting. Thus we report results on the rst 4
questions of the survey.
For the second main hypothesis (H2) that investigate whether explanation models promote
trust, the obtained p-values for trust metrics condent, predictable, reliable and safe were not
statistically signicant (using pair-wise ANOVA). Although the dierence is not signicant we
can see causal models have high means and medians (see Figure 3.4). We conclude that while the
explanation quality and scores are signicantly better for our model, to promote trust further
interaction is necessary; or perhaps our RL agent is simply not a trustworthy Starcraft II player.
We answered the main hypothesis (H1) based on the task prediction scores and the explanation
quality results. While the trust results of the hypothesis H2 does not vary signicantly across
dierent models, from higher means and medians, causal model based explanations seems to
invoke higher level of trust. This has implications on how the explanation model can eect the
generation of trust, when the interaction between the explainee and the explainer spans a longer
time frame.
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We further analysed self-reported demographic data to see if there is a correlation between
task prediction scores and self-reported Starcraft II experience level (5-point Likert). Pearson’s
correlation test was not signicant (p=0.45) thus we conclude there is no correlation between
scores and experience level. This can possibly be attributed to our Starcraft II scenario diering
from the standard game.
A limitation of our experiment is that we made a strong linearity assumption for Starcraft II,
which enabled linear regression to learn SCMs for a relatively small number (9) of state variables.
3.8 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we introduced action inuence models for model-free reinforcement learning
agents. Our approach learns a structural causal model (SCM) during reinforcement learning and
has the ability to generate explanations for why and why not questions by counterfactual analysis
of the learned SCM. We computationally evaluated our model in 6 benchmark RL domains on task
prediction. We then conducted a human study (n=120) to evaluate our model on 1) task prediction,
2) explanation ‘goodness’ and 3) trust. Results show that our model performs signicantly better
in the rst 2 evaluation criteria. One weakness of our approach is that the causal model must be
given beforehand. Chapter 5 will focus on learning the the action inuence structure using the
agent’s state-action interaction traces.
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Chapter 4
Distal Explanations for Reinforcement
Learning Agents1
4.1 Introduction
Explanation models that emulate human models of explanations have the potential to provide
intuitive and natural explanations, allowing the human a deeper understanding of the agent [58,
1, 156, 241]. There exists a large body of literature in cognitive psychology that studies the
nature of explanations. One prevalent theory is that explanations are innately causal [92]. Causal
explanations resonate with humans as we make use of causal models of the world to encode
cause-eect relationships in our mind [210], and leverage these models to explain why events
happen. Causal models also enable the generation of counterfactual explanations—explanations
about events that did not happen but could have under dierent circumstances [92]. So causal
explanations have the potential to provide ‘better’ explanations to humans.
Recent work in the XAI research community has demonstrated the eectiveness of causality and
causal explanations for interpretability and explainability [36, 125, 89, 203]. In the context of
model-free reinforcement learning (RL) agents, causal models have been encoded using action
inuence graphs to generate explanations using causal chains and in the work presented in
Chapter 3 show to support subjectively ‘better’ explanations and yield improved performance
in task prediction [110] as compared with state-action based explanations [122]. While action
inuence models provide a skeleton to generate causal explanations for RL agents, ner details
1This chapter is adapted from the pre-print article under review: "Distal explanations for explainable reinforcement
learning agents." arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.10284 (2020).
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of the composition of causal explanations can be absent. We argue that, through investigating
interactions of RL agents and humans, some shortcomings of action inuence models can
potentially be alleviated.
To ground the eect that explanation models have on human explanation, we conduct human-
agent experiments on how humans formulate explanations of agent behaviour. Participants of
this study received explanations from three dierent models: visual agent behaviour explanations;
state-action based explanations [122]; and causal explanations. Then participants were asked
to formulate their own explanations of the agents’ behaviour as a textual input. The study was
carried out with 30 participants and we obtained 240 explanations in total. We used thematic
analysis [30] to identify recurring concepts present in the explanations.
Results of our analysis show that while causality was indeed present, these self-provided ex-
planations predominantly referred to a future action that was dependent on the current action.
Participants’ tendency to include a future action in their explanations indicates an understanding
of the causal chain of actions and events. This phenomenon is well explored in cognitive psychol-
ogy and is dened as opportunity chains [109]. We use insights gained from the human-agent
study to inform our design of an explanation model that can explain opportunity chains and the
future action termed the distal action.
A B C
enable
Figure 4.1: An opportunity chain [109], where event A enables B and B causes C.
Hilton, McClure, and Slugoski [109, 152, 108] note that humans make use of opportunity chains
to describe events through causal explanation. An opportunity chain takes the form of A enables
B and B causes C (depicted in Figure 4.1), in which we call B the ‘distal’ event or action. Simply,
the distal action is the action that is being enabled in the future by some action that occurs before
it. If A fails to occur, the distal action B cannot be executed. For example, an accident can be
caused by slipping on ice which was enabled by water from a storm the day before. Here, the
distal action is the ‘slipping on ice’ which was enabled by ‘rain water’. Opportunity chains are
causal chains that can be extracted from action inuence models. Thus action inuence models
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can be used as a platform to augment causal explanations with opportunity chains.
To that end, we propose a distal explanation model that can generate opportunity chains as
explanations for model-free RL agents. We provide denitions for distal explanations and learn
the opportunity chains of extracted causal chains using a recurrent neural network [202]. A
distal explanation by itself would not make a complete explanation. For this reason, we use action
inuence models to get the agent’s ‘goals’. We further improve upon action inuence models by
using decision trees to represent the agent’s policy.
We computationally evaluate the accuracy of task prediction [110, p.12] and counterfactuals in 6
RL benchmark domains using 6 dierent RL algorithms, and show that our distal explanation
model is robust and accurate across dierent environments and algorithms. Then we conduct
human experiments using RL agents trained to solve 3 dierent scenarios, where agents solve
1) an adversarial task; 2) a search and rescue task; and 3) a human-AI collaborative build task.
The human study was run with 90 participants, where we evaluate task prediction [110] and
explanation satisfaction. Results indicate that our model performs better than the two tested
baselines.
The main contribution in this chapter is twofold: 1) we introduce a distal action explanation
model that is grounded on human data; 2) we extend action inuence models by using decision
trees to represent the agent’s policy and formalise explanation generation from decision nodes
and causal chains. As secondary contributions, we also provide the coded corpus of human-agent
experiment with 240 explanations and two custom maps that are suited for explainability in the
StarCraft II environment.
4.2 Related work
In this section we discuss the body of literature that explores explainability in a human-centered
manner. Literature relating to explainable reinforcement learning is discussed in Chapter 2.2.
4.2.1 Human-Centred Explanation
Some researchers have recently emphasised how humans models of explanations can benet XAI
systems [156] and how humans expect familiar models of explanations from XAI systems [58].
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Though some recent progress has been made, human-centred computational models is still in its
infancy.
Hilton, McClure, and Slugoski [109, 152, 108] has explored how causal chains of events inform
and inuence the explanations of humans. Opportunity chains can inform the explainee about
long term dependencies that events have on each other, where certain events enable others.
Human experiments have also been carried out that investigate he eects of opportunity chains
on human-to-human explanation [109]. However, this work has not yet been extended to the
case of model-free MDPs.
Our proposed distal explanation model takes insights from social psychology literature to combine
opportunity chains with causal explanations. To the best of our knowledge this is the rst of such
model in the context of explainable reinforcement learning agents.
4.3 Human-Agent Study: Insights from Human Explanations
In this section, we discuss insights we can gain from human models of explanation in literature.
We then ground these models in data by conducting a human-agent experiment.
4.3.1 Human Models of Causal Explanation
Causality is a recurring concept in explanation models of social psychology and cognitive science
literature [106, 111, 142]. Using causal models as the basis for explanation seems natural and
intuitive to humans [210], since we build causal models to represent the world and to reason
about it. Thus, it is plausible that, when used in intelligent agents, causal models have the ability
to provide ‘good’ explanations to humans.
Importantly, causal models consist of causal chains. A causal chain is a path that connects a set
of events, where a path from event A to event B indicates that A has to occur before B [156] (we
use event and action interchangeably in the chapter). Hilton, McClure, and Slugoski [109] dene
ve types of causal chains that lead to ve dierent types of explanations. Hilton, McClure,
and Slugoski categorise these as, temporal, coincidental, unfolding, opportunity chains and
pre-emptive. Through human experiments, Nagel and Stephan [165] demonstrated that distal
causes forms signicant portion of an explainee’s understanding of a terminal cause. Böhm and
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Pster [27] also arms that, humans give both proximal and distal causes as explanations. Its
important to note that, while in cognitive psychology literature a distal cause is a remote cause
of an event in the past (essentially looking ‘backward’ from an event), in our agent simulations
we use the distal terminology to denote an ‘action’ that is remote in the future (according to the
agent’s viewpoint this is looking ‘forward’ from a present event/action). Hilton, McClure, and
Sutton [108] also explored how humans select dierent causal chains to provide explanations
through human experiments. We conduct a similar study to gain insights from human models of
explanation in a human-agent setting, and report results below.
4.3.2 Study Objectives
We seek to investigate how humans provide explanations of intelligent agents’ behaviour and
what concepts are present in such explanations. In contrast to similar studies done in social
psychology [108], our experiments present explanations of the agent’s behaviour rst to the
participant and then gives the freedom to form their own explanations of the agent. The main
objective of the study is to discover the frequency of dierent concepts in these human generated
explanations given the agent behaviour explanations using dierent explanation methods.
4.3.3 Experiment Design
We conducted a human-agent study with 30 participants. In the rst phase, participants were
shown reinforcement learning agents playing the game StarCraft II. The agent behaviour (policy)
was explained by providing ‘local’ explanations of agents’ actions using one of 3 dierent
explanations models: 1) No explanations, just visual description of the agent’s behaviour; 2)
State-action based explanations [122]; and 3) Causal explanations. Participants were divided
evenly for each of these explanation models. Experiment was run on a web based interactive
interface in through the Amazon Mechanical Turk [35].
In the second phase, participants were shown new agent behaviour and were asked to ‘predict’
the agent’s next action. Participants are expected to predict the next action based on the learned
model of the agent in the rst phase through explanations. This prediction task is not important
to the objectives of this study, but is used as a way to get the participants to reasong about
behaviour. In the same page, participants were then asked formulate their own explanations
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Table 4.1: Codes (of the concepts) and descriptions of human generated explanations of agent be-
haviour. Examples are given from dierent participants.
Code Description Example
Action An action of the agent P10: “It will keep attacking while it has the advan-
tage”
Feature A feature of the agent P4: “The optimal number of supply depots is 2.
and they should build those before a barracks”
Temporal Refer some temporal
quality
P12: “I think the articial player will want to train
marines right away so that it has an army quickly
and be able to attack the enemy.”
Objective Refer to a short term ob-
jective
P12: “I think the articial player will want to train
marines right away so that it has an army quickly
and be able to attack the enemy.”
Causality Implies a causal relation-
ship
P3: “you need an army to attack[action] and by
training marines you can do that”
Quantitative Refers to a numerical
value of a feature
P4: “The optimal number of supply depots is 2. and
they should build those before a barracks”
Qualitative A qualitative reference
to a feature
P4: “As long as they have enough healthy
marines. they should keep attacking”
Uncertainty Mentions uncertainty P5: “The army is in good health. it will most likely
continue to attack.”
Contrastive Contrasting a feature
with another
P15 “There are 2 supply depots but only 1 bar-
rack.”
Goal Refer to the goal(s) of the
agent
P10: “The point of the game is to kill the enemy
and destroy their base. so (incorrectly) the AI
thinks the next step is to attack.”
about the agent. Participants were given a text-box to input the formulated explanations with
no restrictions to word limit. This process is repeated for 8 rounds.
To lter out devious participants, we used the following approaches. Explanations containing
less than three words or gibberish text were omitted. We also considered the time it took to
input the explanation as a threshold. We omitted six participants according to the above criteria.
In total we obtained a total of 240 explanations.
4.3.4 Method
We use thematic analysis [30] to code the data and to identify concepts. By using thematic
analysis, meaningful insights can be gained on how explanations of agents behaviour relates
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Figure 4.2: Codes and their frequencies of 240 human explanations of reinforcement learning agents
(that were using 3 dierent explanation models)
to existing literature on human explanations. As the rst step in the thematic analysis, each
explanation will be be divided into small chunks to identify categories and then these will be
divided further into codes. Intuitively, a ‘code’ represents an atomic concept that exist in the
explanation corpus. For an example, when a reference to an ‘action’ of the agent is present in the
explanation, the sub-string of that reference can be coded (tagged) as an Action. This process
is done manually until all the data chunks and explanations are coded. To ensure correctness,
further passes through the explanation corpus is done as an attempt to identify new concepts
that might have been missed in the rst pass. Coded concepts and their descriptions are given in
Table 4.1, along with example explanations extracted from participants.
4.3.5 Results
Figure 4.2 shows the frequencies of 9 codes across the 3 explanation models of the RL agents.
Participants referred to ‘actions’ and ‘features’ of the agent the most, and often included the
‘objective’ or the ‘goal’ of the agent, which is present in action inuence models. Most importantly,
the third most frequent code is ‘temporal’, in which participants refer to future actions the agent
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will take (i.e. distal actions). For example, consider an explanation from the data corpus, “The
AI will want to have barracks so that it can then train soldiers to engage in attacks. It will
want to progress”. Here, the participant’s explanation contains the distal action ‘train soldiers’
which is enabled by ‘have barracks’. ‘Causality’ is also present in the explanations, interestingly
even in ‘No explanation’ and State-action based explanation models. This suggests that humans
frequently associate causal relationships when generating explanations. Our human-agent
experimental data rearm the presence of opportunity chains in causal chains [109], and show
that these are frequently used to express how future actions are dependent on current actions of
agents.
4.3.6 Discussion
Table 4.2: Presence of the concepts that were derived from codes, in dierent explainable reinforce-
ment learning methods.
XRL Method Action Feature Temporal Causal Contrast Objec Goal Quan Qual Uncer
[69] X X X
[122] X X X X X
[243] X X X X X
[236] X X X X
[215] X X X
[99] X X X X X
[9] X X X X
[224] X X X X
[77] X X
[117] X X X X
Action Inu-
ence Models
X X X X X X X X
Proposed
method
X X X X X X X X X
The concepts that were derived from the codes are present in previous explainable reinforcement
learning methods to varying degrees. Table 4.2 shows how these concepts are distributed. As
most of these methods were not developed in a ground-up manner, some important concepts
present in human explanations were not implemented in their explanation generation. When
developing novel explanation models, insights gained from human-agent studies can help ground
the model in the characteristics of human explanation. Human grounded explainable models can
be more eective and accepted when deployed [156, 131]. To this end, we conducted human-
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agent experiments to discover how a human would explain the reasoning and behaviour of an
agent, when the agent has given prior explanations of it’s own actions. When these human
explanations were abstracted into ‘codes’, notable concepts like ‘causality’ and ‘temporality’
emerged. Previous work done in social psychology support our ndings and coincide well with
notions like opportunity chains [109].
Though previous studies have explored the structure of causal chains in human explanations [108],
these are largely done in the absence of an intelligent agent. Further, in [108], an explanation
structure is investigated for events that have already occurred. In our study, as human explana-
tions are for the behaviour of the agent, they can refer to how the past and present actions of the
agent can inuence the future. Ultimately, we use the resultant concepts of causality and distal
opportunity chains to propose the distal explanation model for reinforcement learning agents.
4.4 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the necessary background that is required to follow the remainder of
the chapter.
4.4.1 Markov Decision Processes
We concern ourselves with providing an explanations for Markov Decision Process (MDP) based
model-free RL agents. An MDP is a tuple (S ,A, T ,R, γ), where S and A give state and action
spaces respectively (here we assume the state and action space is nite and state features are
described by a set of variables φ); T = {Psa} gives a set of state transition functions where Psa
denotes state transition distribution of taking action a in state s;R : S ×A → R is a reward
function and γ = [0, 1) gives a discount factor. The objective of a reinforcement learning agent
is to nd a policy π that maps states to actions maximizing the expected discounted sum of
rewards. In model-free reinforcement learning, T andR is not known and the agent does not
explicitly learn them.
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4.4.2 Structural Causal Models
Structural causal models (SCMs) [92] provide a formalism for representing variables and causal
relationships between those variables. SCMs represent the world using random variables, di-
vided into exogenous (external) and endogenous (internal), some of which might have causal
relationships which each other. These relationships can be described with a set of structural
equations. A detailed discussion of SCMs is done in Chapter 2 and 3.
Denition 4.4.1. A signature S is a tuple (U ,V ,R), where U is the set of exogenous variables,
V the set of endogenous variables, andR is a function that denotes the range of values for every
variable Y ∈ U ∪ V . 
A context ~u is a vector of unique values of each exogenous variable u ∈ U . A situation is
dened as a model/context pair (M,~u). Given a situation (M,~u) an instantiation of M given ~u
is dened by assigning all endogenous variables the values corresponding to those dened by
their structural equations.
An actual cause of an event ϕ is a vector of endogenous variables and their values such that
there is some counterfactual context in which the variables in the cause are dierent and the
event ϕ does not occur. An explanation is those causes that an explainee does not already know.
Following example gives perspective to the notions discussed above.
Example 4.4.1. Consider the coee task [29] where a robot has to deliver coee to a user. The
state consists of six binary variables, robot location (L), robot is wet (W), robot has umbrella
(Umb), raining (Rn), robot has coee (C) and user has coee (Usr). Actions of the robot are go,
buy coee, get umbrella and deliver coee. Then we can identify the set of endogenous variables U
as L, W, Umb, C and Usr because the values of these variables can be inuenced by the actions
of the robot. In contrast, variable the variable Rn (raining) is an exogenous (V ) variable, because
it is not dened by a function. A signature for this is generated by combining U , V and the
value range the variables can take (in this case either 0 or 1). Having the signature at hand, we
can formulate a structural causal model M by identifying the set of functions F that describe
causal relationships of state variables. Assuming there is only one such function, we can dene it
FUsr = C + L. This implies that the variable ‘user has coee’ is causally inuenced by variables
‘robot has coee’ and ‘robot location’. Model M can be instantiated by getting the current values
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of the state variables and applying them to the set of F . The actual cause of the event Usr being
true is the vector (C = 1, L = 1) as both of these variables needs to be true for the user to have
the coee.
For a more complete review of SCM’s we direct the reader to [92].
4.4.3 Action Inuence Models
Action inuence models provide explanations of the agent’s behaviour based on the knowledge
of how actions inuence the environment. Informally, action inuence models are an extension
of SCMs that are augmented with agent actions. These models capture the causal relationships
that exist in agent’s knowledge about the world (i.e. state variables). Action inuence models
are formally dened for RL agents as follows,
Denition 4.4.2. The actual instantiation of an action inuence graph is dened as M~V←~S,
in which ~S is the vector of state variable values from an MDP and V as in Denition 3.3.1. A
counterfactual instantiation for a counterfactual action B is a model M~Z← ~SZ , where
~Z gives the
instantiation of a counterfactual state ~SZ. 
In an actual instantiation, we set the values of all state variables in the model, eectively making
the exogenous variables irrelevant. Similarly, a counterfactual instantiation assign values to the
model M that could have realised under the action B.
Figure 3.1 shows the graphical representation of Denition 3.3.2 as an action inuence graph
of the StarCraft II agent described in the previous section, with exogenous variables hidden.
These action inuence models are SCMs except that each edge is associated with an action. In the
action inuence model, each state variable has a set of structural equations: one for each unique
incoming action. As an example, from Figure 3.1, variable Ân is causally inuenced by Ŝ and
B̂ only when action Am is executed, thus the structural equation FAn.Am (S, B) captures that
relationship.
4.4.4 Explanations
An explanation is generally dened as a pair that contains; 1) an explanandum, the event to be
explained and 2) an explanan, the subset of causes that explain that event [156]. In its simplest
67
4.5 Distal Explanation Model Distal Explanations for RL Agents
form, the explanation for the question ‘Why P?’ would be in the form of ‘Because Q’. In the
above example, P is the explanandum and Q is the explanan. As Lim, Dey, and Avrahami (2009)
notes, why and why not questions are the most demanded explanatory questions. In the context
of RL agents, we are interested in answering ‘Why A?’ and ‘Why not A?’ questions. Here, A is
an action of the agent and the explanation will be local.
Action inuence models can be used to generateminimally complete explanations. An explanation
that constitutes all the causes as an explanan risk overwhelming the explainee, thus it is important
to balance the completeness and the minimality of the explanations [156].
Denition 4.4.3. Aminimally complete explanation for an action a under the actual instantiation
M~V←~S is a tuple
(
~R =~r, ~H =~h,~I =~i
)
, in which ~R is the vector of reward variables reached
by following the causal chain of the graph to sink nodes; ~H the vector of variables of the head
node of action a,~I is the vector of variables that are immediate predecessors of any variable in
~R within the causal chain, with~r,~h,~i giving the values of these variables under M~V←~S from
Denition 4.4.2. 
McClure and Hilton [151] argue that ‘goals’ should be referred to in some form when explaining
actions. In reinforcement learning, rewards of the agent can be thought of as a proxy for the goals.
Though in most cases the ‘rewards’ (~R from Denition 4.4.3) on itself would not form a complete
explanation, because they are not attached to variables. Immediate predecessor nodes (~I) of the
reward nodes refer to the state variables that ‘trigger’ rewards.. Though this combination now
can explain the long term motivation of the agent, the head node (~H) attached to the action
is used to explain the immediate (short-term) cause. From Figure 3.1, the explanation for Why
action As would constitute, Du and Db in as reward variables ~R, An in~I and S in ~H. Chapter 3
present a method for generating such explanations, and evaluate this on a large-scale user study.
4.5 Distal Explanation Model
From the insights gained from human explanations discussed in Section 4.3 we propose a distal
explanation model that can generate explanations for opportunity chains. In the following
sections we use the adversarial scenario (discussed at length in Section 4.6.1) of the StarCraft II
environment as a running example to aid the denitions.
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Explanation :: (S, An, Aa)
Train tree policy
RL agent trace
Figure 4.3: An overview of the Distal explanation model
Figure 4.3 shows an overview of the distal explanation model. The model consists of four distinct
components. First, state-action pairs are extracted as a replay dataset from the episodes during
reinforcement learning. Dataset generation happens at the agent training time. This dataset
is used to train the decision-tree policy (indicated as the blue sub-component in Figure 4.3).
The decision-tree policy is used as a surrogate policy for the agent, where it is used to extract
reasons (in the form of decision nodes) for a given action (we discuss this process at length in
Section 5.2). The dataset is also used to train the distal action predictor (shown as the green
sub-component), which predicts dependent actions. Because we want to predict distal actions
(contained in a opportunity chain) using a sequence of prior actions from the agent action trace,
a many-to-one recurrent neural network [202] is used as the predictor, though other sequence
predictors can also be used. An action inuence graph is used to extract causal chains (shown in
red) that is used in conjunction with the decision tree policy to produce the nal explanation.
The explanation is given as a three-tuple: reward nodes of the causal chain; matched decision
nodes; and the predicted distal action.
Before formalising the distal explanation model we rst discuss how explanations can be gener-
ated using decision tree policies.
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4.5.2 Causal Explanations from Decision Trees
Although causal explanations from action inuence models have been shown to perform better
than state-action based [122] explanation models, the use of structural equations models the
environment rather than the policy of the agent. Thus, the explanations from these model why
an action would be a good idea, rather than why the agent chose it. In this work, we instead
propose to extract reasons for action selection from a surrogate policy. We learn an interpretable
surrogate policy in the form of a decision tree using batched replay data. If the agent’s underlying
policy is also a decision tree, this step can be omitted.
Training The Surrogate Policy: The distal explanation model we introduce uses decision
nodes of a decision tree that represent a surrogate policy to generate explanations with the aid of
causal chains from an action inuence model. Let T̂ be a decision tree model. In each episode at
the training of the RL agent, we perform experience replay [136] by saving et = (st, at) at each
time step t in a data set Dt = {e1, ..., et}. Drawing uniformly from D as mini-batches, we train
T̂ using input x =~s and output y =~a. Clearly, explanations generated from an unconstrained
decision tree can overwhelm the explainee, as these produce a large number of decision nodes
for a question. Thus we limit the growth of T̂ by setting the max number of leaves to the
number of actions in the domain (i.e. the leaves of the trained T̂ will be the set of actions of
the agent). We later show that this hardly aects the task prediction accuracy compared to a
depth unconstrained decision tree for our experiments. To get the decision nodes of T̂ in state
St, we simply traverse the tree from the root node until we reach a leaf node and get the nodes
of the path. The decision tree of the StarCraft II adversarial task is given in Figure 4.4 a), with
the decision nodes An and B for the action As. Each decision node maps to a feature variable of
the agent’s state. Figure 4.4 shows how the decision nodes are mapped to the action inuence
graph, in the StarCraft II adversarial scenario.
Generating Explanations Using the Surrogate Policy: In the context of an RL agent, we
introduce a new denition of minimally complete explanations using decision nodes for ‘why’
questions below.
A primitive explanation can be generated by using the decision-tree policy alone, by extracting
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State variables:
W - Worker number
S - Supply depot number
B - barracks number
E - enemay location
An - Ally unit number
Ah - Ally unit health
Al - Ally unit location
Du - Destoryed units
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Actions:
As - build supply depot
Ab - build barracks
Am - train marine
Aa - attack
a) b)
Figure 4.4: Generating explanations by mapping (a) decision nodes to (b) causal chains.
the decision nodes of an action. E.g. for the question Why As, we can obtain the decision nodes
simply by traversing to the leaf node As from the root node (An and B are the decision nodes
in this case, as highlighted in Figure 4.4 a)). However, an explanation like this can contain
variables that are not causally relevant to the action performed. This primitive explanation can
be enhanced by taking the causal chain for the action being explained from an action inuence
model and ltering out causally irrelevant variables. We dene this as a minimally complete
explanation below.
Denition 4.5.1. Given the set of decision nodes ~Xd = ~xd for the action a from a decision tree
T̂, we dene a minimally complete explanation for a why question as a pair
(
~R =~r, ~N = ~n
)
, in
which ~R is the vector of reward variables reached by following the causal chain of the graph to sink
nodes; ~N is such that ~N is the maximal set of variables in which ~N = ( ~Xa = ~xa) ∩ ( ~Xd = ~xd),
where ~Xa is the set of intermediate nodes of the causal chain of action a, with~r, ~xa and ~xd giving
the values under the actual instantiation M~V←~S from Denition 4.4.2. 
Above denition only select the decision nodes (from the total set of decision nodes given from
the decision-tree policy) that exist as intermediate nodes of the causal chain of the given action.
In the StarCraft II scenario, for the question ‘Why action As?’, we can generate the minimally
complete explanation by rst nding the decision nodes for action As, shown as medium grey
nodes in Figure 4.4(a). Then nding the causal chain of action As (given by the bold path in
Figure 4.4). And nally getting the common set of nodes from the causal chain and the decision
nodes (B in Figure 4.4) and appending the reward nodes (Du and Db). Example 4.5.1 below
compare and contrast an explanation with and without the use of action inuence models.
Example 4.5.1. Question: Why As?
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Algorithm 2 Generating Counterfactuals
Input: causal modelM, current state St, trained decision tree T̂, actual action a, ∆
Output: contrastive explanation t ~Xc
1: ~Xd ← T̂ · traversetree(a) ;vector of decision nodes of a from T̂
2: ~Xc ← [] ;vector of counterfactual decision nodes.
3: for every D ∈ ~Xd do
4: xd ← D · decisionNodeValue(); decision boundary value of D
5: xm ← D ·moveBoundary(xd); boundary value changed by a ∆.
6: Stm← St ∪ xm; modify the corresponding state feature variables with the new xm.
7: ~Xc ← ~Xc ∪ T̂ · predict(Stm); get the counterfactual decision nodes by getting the counterfactual
action and then traversing the tree.
8: end for
9: return ~Xc
Just decision-tree policy: Because Ally unit number (An) is 4 and Barracks number
(B) is 1.
With action inuence models: Because ally unit number (An) is 4 and the goal is to have
more Destroyed Units (Du) and Destroyed buildings (Db).
4.5.3 Contrastive Explanations from Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals explain events that did not happen—but could have under dierent circumstances.
Counterfactuals are used to describe events from a ‘possible world’ and to contrast them with
what happened in actuality. Embedding these counterfactuals in explanations can make the
explanation more meaningful [36]. Naturally, an explanation given to a ‘why not’ question should
compare the counterfactuals with the actual facts to form a contrastive explanation [156, 155].
For this reason, we concern ourselves with generating contrastive explanations from decision
nodes and causal models.
We generate the counterfactual decision nodes using Algorithm 2, in which we nd the decision
nodes of the counterfactual action b by changing the decision boundary of the actual action b in
the decision tree. We can now dene minimally complete contrastive explanations for ‘why not’
questions using these counterfactual decision nodes.
Denition 4.5.2. Given the set of decision nodes ~Xd = ~xd for the action a from a deci-
sion tree T̂, a minimally complete contrastive explanation for a why not question is a pair(
~R =~r, ~Xcon = ~xcon
)
, in which ~R is same as in Denition 4.5.1; ~Xcon is such that ~Xcon is the
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maximal set of variables in which ~Xcon = ( ~Xb = ~xb) ∩ (~Xc = ~xc), where ~Xb gives the set
of intermediate nodes of the causal chain of the counterfactual action b, and ~Xc is generated
using the Algorithm 2. Values~r, ~xc are contrasted using the actual instantiation M~V←~S and
counterfactual instantiation M~Z← ~SZ from Denition 4.4.2. 
Instead of just having the intermediate nodes of the causal chain of the actual action (as in
Denition 4.5.1), we now get the set of intermediate nodes for for the counterfactual action from
its causal chain. Then the intermediate nodes of the counterfactual chain is compared with the
set of nodes we get from the Algorithm 2, to get the common set of nodes, of which the variable
values will nally be contrasted.
As before, we explain Denition 4.5.2 using the adversarial StarCraft II task. Consider the question
‘Why not action Ab’, when the actual action is As, for which the explanation is generated as
follows. We rst get the decision nodes An and B having <= 5 and > 2 as the decision
boundaries respectively. Then each decision boundary value starting with the node closest to
the leaf node, is moved by a small ∆ amount 0.01 and applied as the new feature value in the
current state of the agent (B feature value will change to 1.99). We use this new state to predict
the counterfactual action as Ab from the decision tree, and to get the counterfactual decision
nodes (which remains the same). Next, we get the intersection of nodes in the causal chain of the
counterfactual action Ab (B→ An → [Du, Db]) with ~Xc, which gives B as ~Xcon with the actual
value 3 and counterfactual value 1.99. Finally, these values are contrasted and appended with the
reward nodes of the causal chain of Ab to generate the explanation. A graphical interpretation
of this explanation is shown in Figure 4.5.
4.5.4 Learning Opportunity Chains
Explaining the behaviour of the agent using only the policy (or a surrogate policy) alone, even if
the explanation is causal, has shortcomings as this does not consider that some actions might
be chosen because they enable other actions. In this section we discuss how information on
enabling actions can be used to form a more complete explanation.
In the context of reinforcement learning, we dene a ‘distal action’ as the action that depends
the most on the execution of the current action of the agent. The agent might not be able to
execute the distal action unless some other action was executed rst (i.e. some actions ‘enable’
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Figure 4.5: Visual example of the explanation for Why not Ab. Actual action and the actual causal
chain is shown in blue, counterfactual chain and nodes are shown in red and the contrast node is
shown in green.
the execution of other actions). For example, in the StarCraft II domain, the action ‘train marines’
cannot be executed until ‘build barracks’ action is executed. While it is possible to extract distal
actions from environment dynamics and pre-conditions in a model-based system, for model-free
RL agents, this remains a challenge. However, for the purpose of explanation, it is possible to
provide an approximation and predict the distal action.
We use a many-to-one recurrent neural network (RNN) [202] as our prediction model L̂ to
approximate the distal action given a sequence of previous states and actions of the agent. We
implement L̂ with a fully connected hidden layer of 10 units, and a batch size of 100. For training
data, we use the batch replay dataset Dt discussed in Section 4.2. We dene a sequence as a
state-action trace that ends in an action that is one of the last actions in a causal chain (e.g. in
Figure 2, the last action of all causal chains in the ‘attack’ action). The output of the model L̂
will be the distal action and its expected cumulative reward. Formally, this action prediction
model can be written as: ŷtN+1 = f (xt1 , xt2 , ..., xtN ; t1, t2, ..., tN), where xtN is the state-action
pair (including state features) of the last action of a causal chain, ŷtN+1 gives the distal action
and the reward. Here, we use the immediate next action that lies in a particular causal chain as
the ground truth. Note that even though we used an RNN to implement the prediction model, it
is entirely possible to use other models to approximate the distal action. With the distal action
prediction model L̂ in hand, we now dene minimally complete distal explanations for ‘why’
and ‘why not’ questions that incorporate causal nature to the explanations.
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Denition 4.5.3. Given a minimally complete contrastive explanation, current action a and a
prediction model L̂, a minimally complete distal explanation is a tuple
(
~R =~r, ~Xcon = ~xcon, ad
)
,
in which ~R and ~Xcon do not change from Denition 4.5.2; and ad gives the distal action predicted
through L̂ such that ad ∈ A∩ Ac, where A is the action set of the agent and Ac gives the action
set of the causal chain of current action a. 
Informally, this simply prepends the predicted distal action to a minimally complete contrastive
explanation generated through Denition 4.5.2 if the distal action exists in the causal chain of
the current action. Consider the example ‘Why not action build_barracks (Ab) , when the actual
action is train_marine (Am). This would yield the counterfactual decision node An (ally unit
number) with the actual value 10 and the counterfactual value 5. When the predicted distal
action is attack (Aa), we can generate the below explanation text using a simple natural language
template. The causal explanation is generated with Denition 4.4.3 while the distal explanation
is generated through Denition 4.5.3.
Causal Explanation: Because it is more desirable to do the action train marine
(Am) to have more ally units (An) as the goal is to have
more Destroyed Units (Du) and Destroyed buildings (Db).
Distal Explanation: Because ally unit number (An) is less than the optimal
number 18, it is more desirable do the action train marine
(Am) to enable the action attack (Aa) as the goal is to have
more Destroyed Units (Du) and Destroyed buildings (Db).
Note that the Denition 4.5.3 can also be used in conjunction with the Denition 4.5.1 to generate
distal explanations for ‘why’ questions.
4.5.5 Computational Evaluation
We use ve OpenAI benchmarks [31] and the adversarial StarCraft II scenario (discussed in
Section 5.1) to evaluate the task prediction [110] accuracy of our distal explanation model and
compare against action inuence models as a baseline. Task prediction can be used to predict
what the agent will do in the next instance, and measures how faithful the surrogate policy is
against the underlying policy.
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Env - RL SE - Accuracy (%) DP - Accuracy (%)
Size LR DT MLP DP DPn
Cartpole-PG 4/2 83.8 81.6 86.0 96.83 97.10
MountainCar-DQN 3/3 69.7 57.8 69.6 88.66 86.75
Taxi-SARSA 4/6 68.2 74.2 67.9 82.44 86.19
LunarLander-DDQN 8/4 68.4 63.7 72.1 72.82 72.91
BipedalWalker-PPO 14/4 56.9 56.4 56.7 67.99 69.28
StarCraft-A3C 9/4 94.7 91.8 91.4 97.36 86.04
Table 4.3: Distal explanation model evaluation in 6 benchmark reinforcement learning domains that
use dierent RL algorithms, measuring mean task prediction accuracy in 100 episodes after training.
SE-structural equations (trained with LR-linear regression, DT-decision trees, MLP-multi layer percep-
trons), DP-decision policy tree and DPn-unconstrained decision policy tree.
We choose the benchmarks to have a mix of complexity levels and causal graph sizes (given
by the number of actions and state variables). We train the RL agents using dierent types of
model-free RL algorithms (see Table 4.3), using a high performance computer cluster node with
2 Nvidia V100 GPUs, 56GB of memory and 20 core CPU with 2.2GHz speed. All agents were
trained until the reward threshold (to consider as ‘solved’) of the environment specication is
reached.
We evaluate two versions of the distal explanation model, where one is a based on a depth limited
decision tree with the number of actions (DP in table 4.3), other trained until all leaves are pure
nodes (DPn). Results summarised in Table 4.3 show our model outperforms task prediction of
action inuence models (with their structural equations trained by either linear regression (LR),
decision trees (DT) or multi layer perceptrons (MLP)) in every benchmark, some by a substantial
margin.
The benet gained through unconstrained decision trees (DPn) does not translate well into an
increase in task prediction accuracy. We conclude that for the purpose of using distal models for
explanation, a depth limited tree (DP) provide an adequate level of accuracy. Moreover, as a
depth limited tree is likely to be more interpretable to a human, it is more suited for explainability
and explanation.
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Figure 4.6: StarCraft II Collaborative task scenario: The agent is controlling the leftmost section and
the participant controls the right section (divided by the ssure)
4.6 Evaluation: Human Study
We consider human subject experiments to be an integral part of XAI model evaluation and as
such conduct a human study with 90 participants. We consider two hypotheses for our empirical
evaluation; 1) Distal explanation models leads to a improved understanding of the agent; and 2)
Distal explanation models provide subjectively ‘better’ explanations. Our experiment involves
RL agents that complete objectives in three distinct scenarios, which are based on the StarCraft
II [235] learning environment. We rst discuss these scenarios below.
4.6.1 Scenarios
In addition to the default scenario of the StarCraft II, we developed two additional scenarios
as custom maps using the StarCraft II platform as a framework, that are better suited for
explainability. Custom maps were made to add a more strategic nature to scenarios and in some
cases to elicit cooperation from the interacting human. Note that these scenarios are completely
dierent from the StarCraft II game. We only use StarCraft II assets as a simulation framework,
similar to how e.g. a grid-world framework can be used to make many dierent scenarios. We also
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release these maps with state and action specications as test-beds for explainability research.
Adversarial In this scenario, the agent’s objective is to build its base by gathering resources
and destroy the enemy’s base. The agent can build oensive units (marines) to attack the enemy’s
base and to defend its own base. This is the default objective in a normal StarCraft II game, but
here we only use 4 actions for the purpose of the experiment rewards are given for the number
of enemies and buildings destroyed (shown in Figure 4.4 b) as an action inuence graph). During
the experiment, the trained RL agent will provide explanations to the participant and the strength
of the explanations are evaluated through task prediction.
Rescue This scenario is a custom map, where the agent’s objective is to nd a missing unit
and bring it back to the base using an aerial vehicle. The agent also has to avoid or destroy
enemy units during the rescue and aid the aerial vehicle using an armed unit. The agent has
access to 5 actions, the reward is given for the number of missing units saved. The evaluation is
done through task prediction as before.
Collaborative Task The collaborative task is fundamentally dierent from the previous sce-
narios, in that the participant has to help the agent to complete the objective. We made this task
as a custom map (depicted in Figure 4.6) where the map is partitioned as the agent and human
‘area’. The agent can perform 5 actions in this task, while the human can choose 4 actions to
execute. The objective of the task is to build a series of structures that nally leads to the creation
of an ‘elite’ unit, which the human has to transport to a base. The success of the task depends on
the participant choosing to execute the action that best support the agent.
4.6.2 Experiment Design and Methodology
To investigate the two main hypotheses, we use a mixed design [121] (within subject and between
subject) for our experiment. Every participant will be evaluated on the 3 independent variables
which are 1) ‘no explanations’, where only a visual description of the agent behaviour is provided;
2) causal explanations generated with action inuence models and 3) our distal explanation model.
At a glance, the experiment has 3 phases where participants receive explanations from RL agents,
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Figure 4.7: The web-based interface of the experiment showing the Collabrative Task.
subjectively evaluate the explanation and are then evaluated through task prediction [110] to
gauge their understanding of the agent.
Task prediction is an eective measure that can peek into the mental model of an explainee
to evaluate how successful the given explanation was in transferring the knowledge from the
explainer [110, 156]. In task prediction, the participant is asked the question ‘What will the agent
do next?’. We use task prediction to evaluate the hypothesis 1) for the Adversarial and Rescue
scenarios, and invert the question as to ask ‘What would you do next?’ in the Collaborative task.
We investigate hypothesis 1) by employing the 5-point Likert explanation satisfaction scale of
Homan et al. [110, p.39]. Explanation satisfaction is evaluated after each explanation and also
at the end of the experiment which compares explanations of causal and distal models.
Experiment Design: We use Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk)—a crowd sourcing platform
well known for obtaining human-subject data [35]—to conduct the experiments. A web-based
interactive interface is used as the medium of interaction.
We rst display the ethics approval obtained through a university, and after the participants’
consent gather demographic information. We then show video clips of the agents solving the
3 StarCraft II scenarios that capture the behaviour of the agents. Each scenario has 4 distinct
behaviours of the respective agent (around 10 seconds per clip). Every participant sees all three
scenarios, and all three explanation types, but between participants, the combination of scenario
and explanation type are mixed. For example, a participant may experience: Adversarial with no
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explanations, Rescue with casual explanations and Collaborative with distal explanations. The
order of these is randomised to control for ordering eects.
The rst stage of the experiment involves training the participants to identify agents’ actions
using video clips of the agents performing those actions before the start of each scenario. In the
Collaborative scenario, participants are trained to identify the actions they can use instead. After
validating that participants can distinguish dierent actions through a question, the scenario
will be presented.
The second stage lets the participants ask explanatory questions (in the form of why/why not
action), after watching the agent’s behaviour through the video clip. Participants can ask any
number of questions and we did not control for a minimum number of questions; however, we
incentivised participants to ask questions because they knew they would receive bonus payments
for getting predictions correct later in the experimence. After each explanation video, participants
are presented with the explanation satisfaction survey. For each explanation/scenario pair, each
participant engages in 4 tasks.
The third stage involves evaluating the participants’ ‘understanding’ of the agent through task
prediction. Participants are presented with 4 new videos with dierent situations, and are asked
what action the agent will do next, and can select one of the 4 options (which are 3 actions of
the agent plus the option of ‘I don’t know’). Each participants makes predictions for 4 tasks.
After this stage participant will move to the next scenario with a dierent explanation model and
repeat from Stage 1 to 3. This is done until all the scenarios are encountered by the participant.
In the nal stage, the participant is presented with 3 additional explanation videos (of the scenario
they did for the no explanation condition), and is presented with causal explanations from action
inuence models and our distal explanation model side by side. We use Homan et al. [110,
p.39]’s explanation satisfaction scale but this time as a movable slider that subjectively compares
the two explanation.
Experimental Conditions: We ran the experiment with the above mentioned 3 independent
variables (the explanation models), which resulted in 3 combinations of explanation model and
scenarios, with participants seeing all 3 scenarios and all 3 explanation types. Each combination
had 30 participants for a total of 90 participants in the experiment. Each participant is scored
on the total number of correct task predictions out of 12 (4 each for each model-scenario
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combination).
Each experiment ran approximately 50 minutes, and we compensated each participant with
8.5USD (a bonus compensation of 0.5USD was also given to participants for each point above 10).
Participants were aged between 23 to 60 (µ = 38.1), and of the 90 participants, 51 were male
while 38 were female and 1 who did not provide an answer. Participants reported an average
self-rated gaming experience and StarCraft II experience of 2.47 and 1.47 out of 5 (5-point Likert)
respectively.
To ensure the quality of data from participants, we recruited only ‘master class’ workers with
95% or more approval rate. We controlled for language by only recruiting workers from the
United States. We excluded the noisy data of users in 3 ways. First, we tested participants to
ensure they had learnt about the scenario by asking them to identify actions shown in several
videos. If the participant failed this, the experiment did not proceed (participants were paid
a $2USD base amount). Second, we tracked how much time each participant spent viewing
explanations and answering tasks. If this was regularly below a threshold of a few seconds, we
omitted that participant from our results. Third, participants were required to explain their task
predictions. If this text was gibberish or a 1-2 word response, we omitted that participant from
the results. We ltered out 16 participants according to the above constraints to yield the nal
participant number of 90.
4.6.3 Results
We rst discuss the results on hypothesis 1), where we investigate whether distal explanation
models lead to a better understanding of the agent. We present the null hypotheses as H0 :
PN = PC = PD and the alternate hypothesis as H1 : PD > PN and H2 : PD > PC, in which N,
C, D corresponds to ‘no explanation’, causal and distal explanation models. Here, P denotes the
proportions of the observed values of correct answers in task predictions by the participants.
We perform Pearson’s Chi-squared test for the three StarCraft II scenarios and obtain the
following values: Adversarial (p-value = 0.011, X2 = 13.00), Rescue (p-value = 0.034, X2 = 10.40)
and Collaborative (p-value = <0.001, X2 = 35.47). As the Chi-squared test was signicant at the
0.05 level across the three scenarios, we investigate the pairwise dierences between models
using a z-test. We summarise the results in Table 4.4. From Table 4.4, considering the proportions
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Scenario Adversarial Collab Rescue
Figure 4.8: Box plot of task prediction scores of the explanation models across the StarCraft II scenar-
ios (means are represented by bold dots)
(P) between model pairs, we can see that apart from Adversarial and Rescue scenarios for the D
- C model pair, distal explanation models have statistically signicant results at the 0.05 level
between other combinations. Thus we accept H1 for every StarCraft II scenario and accept H2
only for the Collaborative scenario. We further test the validity of our results by employing
a pairwise t-test which produce similar conclusions (results shown in Table 4.3. We illustrate
these results as a box-plot in Figure 4.8. Clearly, the Collaborative scenario poses a much higher
challenge to the participants, and results indicate that distal explanations perform better than
other models in this task.
ExplanationQuality: The second main hypothesis 2), evaluate whether distal explanations can
provide subjectively better explanations. The corresponding null hypothesis is H0 : PN = PC =
PD and the alternative hypothesis is H1 : PD > PC. P in this case P becomes the proportion
of the observed values of the Likert scale data (using the survey of Homan et al. (2018, p.39)),
where participants have rated as ‘5’. We consider four explanation quality metrics; ‘Complete’,
‘Sucient’, ‘Satisfying’ and ‘Understanding’. As before, we employ Pearson’s Chi-squared test to
see the signicance of the above 4 metrics in the 3 StarCraft II scenarios, and obtain p-values < 0.01
for every condition. As Likert data are ordinal type data and the distribution of the data cannot
be assumed to follow a normal distribution, we use a non-parametric test, Chi-squared test along
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Table 4.4: Pairwise dierences with a z-test for proportions for each model-pair and pairwise t-tests in
the three StarCraft II scenarios in task prediction scores, considering the correct response.
Model (m1-m2)
Z-test T-test
Scenario X2 p-value Prop (m1|m2) p-value t-stat
C - N
Adversarial 5.437 0.019 0.53 | 0.38 0.056 -1.988
Rescue 2.283 0.130 0.71 | 0.62 0.169 -1.408
Collaborative 0.416 0.518 0.50 | 0.46 0.537 -0.623
D - N
Adversarial 11.269 <0.001 0.60 | 0.38 <0.001 -3.791
Rescue 9.931 0.001 0.80 | 0.62 0.010 -2.750
Collaborative 31.966 <0.001 0.81 | 0.46 <0.001 -4.761
D - C
Adversarial 1.085 0.297 0.60 | 0.50 0.325 -1.000
Rescue 2.784 0.095 0.80 | 0.71 0.221 -1.249
Collaborative 25.511 <0.001 0.81 | 0.50 <0.001 -4.367
Table 4.5: Pairwise dierences with a z-test for explanation quality metrics in models Distal (D) vs
Causal (C), data where participants rated ‘5’.
Metric Scenario X2 p-value Proportions (D|C)
Complete
Adversarial 3.267 0.070 0.56 | 0.45
Rescue 0.074 0.785 0.33 | 0.35
Collaborative 11.428 <0.001 0.40 | 0.20
Sucient
Adversarial 6.020 0.014 0.56 | 0.40
Rescue 0.018 0.892 0.35 | 0.34
Collaborative 15.55 <0.001 0.41 | 0.18
Satisfying
Adversarial 1.085 0.297 0.46 | 0.40
Rescue 1.528 0.216 0.29 | 0.36
Collaborative 9.981 0.001 0.42 | 0.23
Understanding
Adversarial 1.377 0.240 0.46 | 0.39
Rescue 0.071 0.788 0.35 | 0.37
Collaborative 15.31 <0.001 0.42 | 0.19
with proportion analysis [216]. As there are signicant dierences between explanation models
on explanation quality, we reject H0 and conduct a pairwise z-test. We summarise the results
in Table 4.5. Figure 4.9 captures the Likert scale data distribution across models and scenarios.
Though it is visually evident that distal explanation quality across the compared metrics has a
positive trend, from the three scenarios, only the Collaborative task yields signicant results for
every explanation quality metric (see Table 4.5). Thus we accept H1 only for the Collaborative
scenario.
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Complete Sufficient
Satisfying Understanding
Figure 4.9: Likert scale counts of explanation quality metrics and how they vary across explanation
models and scenarios. X-axis represent the total counts each Likert category received, adjusted to
represent 0 as the midpoint.
Discussion: The results we obtained for explanation quality mirror the results in task predic-
tion. Intuitively this makes sense as participants are more inclined to rate an explanation ‘good’
if they feel they have a better ‘understanding’ of the agent. Further investigations are needed to
explore why distal explanations perform substantially better in human-agent collaborative tasks.
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To investigate whether the knowledge of the StarCraft II game had any impact on task prediction
scores, we perform a Pearson’s correlation test between task prediction and StarCraft II experience
(self-report in a 5-point Likert scale). The obtained values (t = 1.515, p-value = 0.133) indicate
that there is no statistically signicant correlation between scores and StarCraft II experience.
Although our experiment was based on the StarCraft II environment, we used custom maps and
scenarios that are dierent from the game. Thus the results of the correlation test is plausible.
One weakness of our model is the need for a causal graph that is faithful to the problem, in
order to learn the opportunity chains. For the purpose of this work, we hand-crafted the causal
graphs for StarCraft II scenarios and the 5 RL benchmarks. While our hand-crafted models can
be veried easily with data, we acknowledge that it may become infeasible in larger domains. We
view generating a causal graph a distinct problem than generating explanations using a causal
graph. As such we propose this as our immediate future work.
Limitations of the experiment design: Although we used scenarios that have dierent
objectives than the standard Starcraft II game, familiarity with the game’s concepts may have
had some impact on the scores even if it is not signicant. Participants also may have had
commonsense knowledge about such scenarios (in particular rescue and adversarial) that can
aect their judgments. Our results should be generalisable across similar scenarios in dierent
domains, though further experiments are needed to evaluate the generalisability across dierent
scenarios (e.g. path planning, manufacturing).
4.7 Conclusion
We introduce a distal explanation model for model-free reinforcement learning agents that can
generate explanations for ‘why’ and ‘why not’ questions. These models learn opportunity chains
(in the form of A enables B and B causes C), and approximate a future action that enables
due to the current action of the agent. Our motivation comes from insights gained through a
human-agent experiment, in which we analysed 240 human explanations. Participants in this
study frequently referred to future action that depend on the current action of the agent, which
conform to the denition of opportunity chains. To learn opportunity chains at the training
phase in reinforcement learning we make use of action inuence models to extract causal chains
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and represent the approximated policy of the agent in a decision tree policy. In contrast to
action inuence models that use structural causal equations to generate contrastive explanations,
we use the decision policy in conjunction with causal chains to improve the accuracy of task
prediction. We evaluate our approach in 6 RL benchmarks on task prediction. We then undertake
a human study with 90 participants to investigate how the distal explanation model perform
in task prediction and explanation quality metrics in three custom scenarios built using the
StarCraft II platform.
While results indicate a signicantly better performance of distal explanations compared with
two other explanation models in collaborative situations, further research is needed to understand
the impact this technique may have on other types of scenarios. One weakness of our model is
the need of knowing the causal structure of the domain beforehand. Though this can be mitigated
by using existing causal discovery methods, the reinforcement learning setting provides a unique
opportunity to learn causal graphs that are better suited for explanation through inuencing
the exploration of the agent. Chapter 5 of this thesis discuss discovering the action inuence
structure at the training time of the agent.
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Chapter 5
Action Inuence Discovery for
Explainable Reinforcement Learning
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a novel way to learn an explainable model from the RL agent
interaction data of the environment, that is based on action inuence and causal relationships of
the environment variables. In Chapters 3 and 4, we focused on how to generate explanations
when the agent’s action inuence structure is known. Here we develop methods that can learn
this inuence structure end-to-end only through the agent’s previous state-action traces.
When explaining an RL agent, two distinct approaches can be taken. First, the agent’s action
can be explained (commonly known as local explanations). Second, the agent’s policy can be
explained, referred to as global explanations (e.g. summarising agent strategies [10]). Local
explanations help the explainee to understand the reasoning of a particular action while global
explanations make the overall behaviour of the agent more intelligible. A major shortcoming of
both local and global explanation generation strategies for RL agents is the need of requiring
an underlying explainable model, often handcrafted by domain experts. Here we introduce a
mechanism that can learn an explainable model autonomously through the agent’s interactions
with the environment, that can be used to generate local explanations.
The notion of action inuence has been used to understand agents’ goals that can mitigate safety
concerns [71, 70], and improve coordination in multi-agent settings [244]. Inuence diagrams
have also been used to model the agent’s beliefs [217] and mental models [78]. Action inuence
models were introduced in Chapter 3, which captures how can aect the endogenous variables
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(variables that are inside the agent’s model) and their causal relationships. In Chapters 3 and 4
we discussed how Action inuence models can be successfully used to generate explanations,
and have been shown to improve the human’s understanding of the agent. One of the main
shortcomings these models have is the requirement of a hand-crafted action inuence structure,
which capture the causal relationships between agent’s state variables and how the agent’s
actions inuence them. As environments become larger and more complex, hand-crafted models
can become infeasible and erroneous. To this end, in this Chapter, we introduce an architecture
that learns the action inuence structure, only using the RL interaction data with the environment
(i.e. state-action traces of the agent).
The action inuence learning architecture is composed of 3 stages; rst, inferring the inuences of
actions on state variables and encoding them; second, learning the causal relationships between
these encoded algorithms using causal discovery; and third, decoding the learned graph structure
into an action inuence graph. We use the causal discovery method of Zhu, Ng, and Chen [257]
and adapt it to our architecture to learn the causal relationships of RL agents’ state variables. Note
that this causal discovery algorithm can plausibly be substituted with another state-of-the-art
method, given it can be adapted to handle RL agent data streams. More importantly, though
we only focus and discuss the method in the context of model-free RL agents, our architecture
can be used with many other sequential decision making agents that have state-action based
modelling (e.g. planning agents).
We evaluate the action inuence discovery algorithm on 5 RL benchmark domains. Here, open
AI domains and 2 dierent StarCraft II domains were selected, considering the number of state
features, actions, and the number of connections (action inuences). We measure the correct
number of edges that the algorithm discovered. Here, a correct edge has to match the causal
relationship between variables (presence of a causal relationship and its direction) and the correct
action that inuences the variables, against a ground truth action inuence model. In addition,
we also report on missing, extra edges and incorrectly labelled actions. Results indicate that our
action inuence discovery architecture can learn the action inuence structure reasonably well
to use them in generating explanations.
The main contribution of this Chapter will be the action inuence discovery architecture, with
its methods and algorithm. This Chapter answers the RQ3 of the thesis, and forms an important
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base for the explanation generation methods described in Chapters 3 and 4.
5.2 Background
Action inuence models are causal models augmented with the actions of an agent. We briey
discuss action inuence models in the context of an RL agent below.
5.2.1 Preliminaries
Action inuence models are dened for RL agents based on Markov Decision Processes (MDP),
and we make use of the standard denition. Action inuence models describe the causal rela-
tionships between state variables of the agent that are inuenced by the agent’s actions. This
model can be represented using a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with state variables as the nodes
and edges annotated with the agent’s actions. In contrast, vanilla causal models does not have
labeled edges because the inuence between variables is not an agent action.
Informally, action inuence models gives a model that capture the causal structure and the causal
eects that might exist between the state variables of the agent. Graphically, the causal structure
between two or more variables when inuenced by an action is depicted by a directed labeled
edge in a DAG. The causal eect between two or more variables is captured by structural causal
equations [92]. Consider the following example.
Example 5.2.1. Consider the coee task [29] where a robot has to deliver coee to a user. The
state consists of six binary variables, robot location (L), robot is wet (W), robot has umbrella
(Umb), raining (Rn), robot has coee (C) and user has coee (Usr). Actions of the robot are go,
buy coee, get umbrella and deliver coee. We can formulate an action inuence model M by
identifying the set of functions F that describe causal relationships of state variables. Assuming
there is only one such function, we can dene it as FUsr.deliver−co f f ee = C + L. This implies that
the variable ‘user has coee’ is causally inuenced by variables ‘robot has coee’ and ‘robot
location’ when the action deliver coee is executed by the robot. Prior knowledge of the causal
structure is needed to formulate this function (Here, Usr is inuenced by L and C through the
action deliver coee has to be known beforehand). Causal eect can be approximated by training
these functions as regressors.
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In Chapter 3 we discussed how the causal eect of action inuence models can be approximated in
model-free RL agents. While this allowed action inuence models to generate causal explanations,
one notable weakness is the reliance in prior knowledge of the causal structure. In the work
presented in Chapter 3, the causal inuence structure needs to be handcrafted using domain
knowledge. Importantly, the work described in Chapter 3 only learns the structural causal
equations for a given action inuence structure, whereas in this work we focus on discovering
the innate action inuence structure.
5.2.2 Generating Explanations
We use the explanation generation method proposed in Chapter 3 that can generate ‘why’ and
‘why not’ explanations using an action inuence graph. Note that this paper only focused on
discovering the action inuence graph, and not on approximation of the structural equation.
Further, other types of explanation generation techniques can also be applied using the causal
structure (e.g. Distal explanation generation discussed in Chapter 4).
5.3 Action Inuence Discovery
In this section, we introduce a causal inuence discovery model that learns the structure of the
causal relationships that are inuenced by the agents actions, without any prior knowledge
















Figure 5.1: An overview of the Causal Inuence Discovery Model
The action inuence discovery problem can be decoupled into three main components. Figure 5.1
shows an overview of this model. We dene the architecture using a 4-tupleM = (D, E, C, D).
90
5.3 Action Inuence Discovery Action Inuence Discovery
The agent’s interactions with an environment (shown in grey) is used to produce experience
replay [136] batches, given by D. E encodes the action inuences into variables. In contrast to
traditional causal discovery methods that rely only on observational data (i.e. variable changes),
we encode the inuence an action can have on the variable change (shown in green). C denotes
the causal discovery algorithm. We use Zhu, Ng, and Chen [257]’s reinforcement learning based
causal discovery method (shown in blue) to nd the causal graph structure Gc that best describes
the encoded inuence data. Importantly, our model can use an alternate general causal discovery
method as the inuence encoding is decoupled from causality learning. The learned best causal
structure would then be decoded into an action inuence graph Ga (shown in red), given by
D. Note again that we can substitute the causal discovery algorithm C if better algorithms
are derived in the future literature. For the propose of the empirical evaluation, Zhu, Ng, and
Chen [257]’s causal discovery algorithm is adapted to handle RL agent data. We discuss these
components in detail below.
5.3.1 Inuence Encoder
Given an experience replay dataset D = {s, a, s′}t=nt=m of a RL agent, where m, n gives the time
step range of the batch and e = (st, at, st+1) gives the current state, the action and the next
state in an agent time step t, we are concerned with encoding the action inuence eects. In
Figure 5.2, the top half represents how the action inuence is encoded between state-action
transitions. This matrix like structure captures the action inuence by generating a new dataset
with inuence encoded variables.





of st+1 will have altered values from the values in st (e.g. see
darkened cells in Figure 5.2). We can then generate a new dataset Dc = {si}, where si :=
f (xi.a), i = 1, 2.., p∧ x ∈ I . Dataset Dc can be fed into a causal discovery algorithm to nd the
causal relationships between variables. This will produce a causal graph similar to the one given
in Figure 5.2. Note that in contrast to a causal graph one would discover through observational
data, an action inuence causal graph’s nodes are associated with an action.
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Action Influence GraphCausal Graph
Figure 5.2: Encoding action inuence (darkened cells indicate the state variable(s) inuenced by the
action) from RL experience replay batches for causal discovery and decoding to generate the Action
inuence graph.
5.3.2 Neural Architecture
We closely follow the neural architecture introduced by [257] and use the dataset Dc generated
above to create the observational space. The purpose of the architecture is to generate a binary
adjacency matrix A ∈ {0, 1}n×n. Here, n denotes the action encoded feature nodes (e.g. x2.a in
Figure 5.2. The equivalent directed graph would be ensured for acyclicity and will be selected
based on a scoring function descried below.
5.3.3 Encoding and decoding the graph
This section describes how the action inuence dataset is translated into a graph-like structure.
Note that this encoder-decoder model is distinct from the action inuence decoder discussed
above. The purpose of the encoder-decoder module is to generate a graph structure that represents
the agent input data. Transformers [232] have been successful in representation learning in
domains like natural language processing computer vision. We use the architecture proposed by
Vaswani et al. as neural encoder that takes the dataset Dc described above as the input.
Two such encoders, enci and encj where enci,j = 1, 2, 3..., n : dimension = denc is used
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W1, W2 ∈ Rdenc×dh , u ∈ Rdh denotes the trainable parameters. We generate the adjacency
matrix A each element at a step, as opposed to row-wise generation. Each element gij would be




, where the probability
indicates the likelihood of a directed edge from element xi to xj. Element (i, i) is masked to
avoid cycles.
5.3.4 Searching for the Inuence Graph
The encoder-decoder architecture described above would represent adjacency matrices where
we need to select the one that best describes the action inuence and causal relationships of
the agent’s model. Recent work of [257] found success in combining traditional score based
methods with reinforcement learning to nd the best graph. In this work, we apply the same
search method to nd the best inuence graph.
5.3.5 Score Function
We use the well known Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [204] as the score function. BIC for a




+ dθ log m, where θ̂ gives the maximum like-
lihood estimator and dθ gives the dimension of θ. Assuming linearity in the causal relationships





(m log (RSSi/m)) + (no.edges) log m
Here, RSSi is the residual sum of squares for the i-th feature (with xki denoting ith element in






5.3.6 Reinforcement Learning for Search
We employ the actor-critic architecture to formulate the search. This is represented visually in
Figure 5.1 (in blue) in coupled with the encoder-decoder (as the actor). We describe the reward
and the objective function of the agent below. The RL agent’s reward constitutes of the score
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function and additional penalty terms.
R = − [BIC (G) + λ1 I (G /∈ DAGs) + λ2h (A)]
Here, G gives the current graph that is considered and the DAGs give the set of graphs that
is scored. We use the same penalty terms (λ1, λ2) used by [257] to ensure the acyclicity of the
selected graph. Penalty term is also used in conjunction with h (A) introduced by [254], where




− d = 0. Here, eA gives the matrix exponential of A. I gives the indicator
function and BIC gives the score function. We can now write the objective function of the agent
as below,
J (ψ | s) = EA∼π(.|s){R}
Here, s is the state input given by the experience replay dataset Dc and is constructed by drawing
random samples. We use policy gradient for the optimisation and use the REINFORCE [220]
algorithm to obtain the gradient∇ψJ (ψ | s). We use the Adam optimiser [124] to train the critic
network using n samples from s as a batch. We follow the network architecture of [257] for the
critic with a 2-layer feed forward network with ReLU units, with the input {enci}di=1. Means
squared error is used to for the error between the true rewards of the critic and the predictions.
Training this RL agent can be done at the run-time of the of explainable agent using the encoded
action inuence dataset. Output for this search would be a causal graph (a DAG) without the
actions labeled (as seen in Figure 5.2), with action inuence embedded within the nodes. We can
now decode this graph to generate action inuence graph.
5.3.7 Decoding the Action Inuence Model
A node of the encoded graph Ge is denoted by Xi · a, where X gives the feature with its associated
action a ∈ agent’s action set. We follow a simple pruning method to label the edges and combine
nodes of the graph. For every node Xi · a of the graph Ge, every incoming edge e will be annotated
with the action a. After the action annotation, if there exist node(s)Xi such that i = j; 1, 2, ...p,
combine the nodes into one (while combining edges as well). As an example, from Figure 5.2,
we can see the node X4 · a and X4 · c can be combined to the node X4 while annotating the
incoming edges from node X2 as c and X3 as a respectively. We get the action inuence graph
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Ga as the output of the pruning and annotating process. We can now use the action inuence
graph to generate explanations.
5.4 Empirical Evaluation
We carry out empirical experiments using 5 dierent RL domains and report on accuracy against
a against ground truth models. We chose domains in the well known Open AI gym environments
and custom made scenarios in the StarCraft II domain. Computational times for dierent domains
are also compared.
5.4.1 Domains
Selection of domains were based on the complexity of the environment and the number of
features (agent’s endogenous variables) and the number of actions of the agent. We note that the
domains were also chosen based on the ease of access to the ground truth action inuence graph
that can be inferred by the simulator.
OpenAI gym environments: From the openAI gym environments we used the Lunar-lander
(features - 8, actions - 4), Taxi (features - 6, actions - 4) and the Cart-pole (features - 4, actions -
2). Ground truth action inuence graphs we obtained through the consultation of the simulator
code.
StarCraft II environments: StarCraft II is a real-time strategy game and a well-known RL
playground for evaluating agent capabilities and is also used for explainability research. We used
2 dierent agents for the default StarCraft II map with one having 9 features, 4 actions and the
other having 15 features, 8 actions. We obtained the ground truth through the simulator code
and by consulting StarCraft II build trees.
In all of the domains, reply data was gathered in batches of 500 steps (i.e. batches of 500
interactions with the simulator), and our model is then trained interactively with incoming
batches. In total, we gathered 500000 data points of state-action traces for each domain.
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5.4.2 Measurements
To evaluate the generated action inuence models against ground truth models, we introduce
two measurements. These measures are based on causal discovery metrics but are augmented to
handle actions.
Correct directed labeled edges: This metric count the correctly labelled directed edges of Ga
against the ground truth action inuence graph. An edge is correct i the annotated action and
the direction is correct.
Structural action hamming distance: This metric is based on structural hamming distance
(SHD) [229]. Here we measure the dierence between Ga and the ground truth action inuence
graph by counting the number of missing edges, extra edges and incorrectly labeled directed
edges.
5.4.3 Results
Table 5.1 reports the results of our action inuence discovery algorithm against the ground truth
action inuence models using the aforementioned metrics.
Domain actions/features correct vs no. g.truth edges missing edges extra edges incorrect actions
Cart-pole 4/2 4/6 2 2 2
Taxi 4/5 10/16 6 2 0
Lunar Lander 8/4 22/40 12 10 4
StarCraft II v1 9/4 8/12 2 2 2
StarCraft II v2 15/8 12/20 4 4 2
Table 5.1: Structural action hamming distance (columns 4-6) and correctly inferred edges vs no. of
ground truth edges edges of the generated action inuence graphs.
From the table, all 5 domains yield comparable results to Zhu, Ng, and Chen [257]’s method that
has a similar number of nodes (features). We note that direct comparison with the usual causal
discovery benchmarks is not possible, due to the need for actions in action inuence models.
Further, to have a correct edge in action inuence models, the action needs to match in addition
to the edge and the edge direction (that represent the causal relationship). This is in contrast to
the correct edge measurement of causal discovery methods, where only the direction and the
presence of an edge is considered.
In the 5 domains used, considerable variations exist. While some domains have small action
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and feature spaces (e.g. cart-pole), complex domains like StarCraft II has consist of large action
and feature spaces. Importantly the number of actions and features (which makes up the nodes
in the action inuence graph) alone is a not good metric to measure the complexity of action
inuence models. The main objective of the action inuence discovery algorithm is to correctly
identify inuencing action(s) in a causality related to two or more variables. As such the number
of connections (with their actions) is the metric that we use here to compare against a ground
truth model (Table 5.1 column 3). For example, from Table 5.1, in the Lunar Lander domain,
we can see that the number of actions and features are not the highest of the tested. But this
domain has the largest number of connections, due to the actions having inuence over multiple
feature variables at a connection. Over the 5 domains, the action inuence discovery algorithm
manages to correctly identify more than 50% of action inuences. The performance of the
algorithm is higher in domains like StarCraft II due to the clearly dened inuence structure.
Another important metric to consider is the number of incorrect actions. From the Table 5.1,
our algorithm show a low number of incorrect actions. That is, in most cases, the algorithm
manages to correctly identify the inuencing action given the correct causal relationship and its
direction. Though this is encouraging from the discovery of action inuences, it also implies that
the nding of the correct action inuence graph can depend on the underlying causal discovery
method used. We leave handling other types of causal discovery methods and incorporating
them with action inuence discovery to future work. Missing edges and extra edges given in
Table 5.1 also largely depend on the causal relationships of the variables and the causal discovery
method. Here an extra edge is an edge that does not exist in the ground truth graph. Though
this edge will be labelled with some action, this does count towards the incorrect actions metric
(i.e. an action is incorrect if it is labelled erroneously to dierent action to the action inuence
connection in the ground truth graph). Overall, the results indicate that the action inuence
algorithm can generation plausible action inuence model structure from the RL agent data,
which subsequently can be used to generate causal explanations using the work described in
Chapters 3 and 4.
Accuracy of the structure of the action inuence model can have an impact on the faithfulness of
the generated explanations. Extra edges, missing edges and incorrect actions can all impact the
accuracy of the explanation. These incorrect actions have the highest severity for explanation
faithfulness. In Chapter 3, explanation generation methods do not make use of the full causal
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chain, thus having several missing edges or extra edges would not impact the nal explanation
drastically. Note that missing edges can make some explanations impossible to generate (if
the explainee ask a direct question about that edge). Incorrect actions can make explanations
unfaithful as they can include incorrect causal chains. In our evaluation, we note that the
incorrect actions discovered remain low compared to other metrics.
5.5 Conclusion
Causal explanations generated via Action Inuence Models have been shown to increase the
intelligibility of reinforcement learning agents. The main drawback of these models is the need
for the action inuence structure that exists between the environment and the agent, which
capture the causal relationships between the agent’s variables (i.e. state features) and how the
agent’s actions can inuence those variables. Handcrafting this structure is time-consuming
and is prone to human errors and might not be feasible in large domains. This chapter presents
a novel action inuence discovery algorithm that learns this structure using the replay data
(state-action traces) of an RL agent, without interventions from a human expert.
In this chapter, we developed an architecture encode the action inuences to learn the underlying
causal structure. The agent’s replay dataset is rst encoded according to action inuences,
casting the inuences as additional variables (in addition to features). Causal discovery is then
performed using actor-critic reinforcement learning model to search for viable causal structure,
using the BIC scoring method. The best causal graph is then decoded back to an action inuence
graph. Results indicate that the action inuence structure discovered is accurate in how the
actions are labelled, which can then be used to generate causal explanations.
Several future directions exist in improving the action inuence structure for the purpose of
causal explanation. Action inuence structure can be learned at dierent levels of abstraction. In
this work, we only considered the basic level of abstraction that exist within the data, though in
generating explanations, the levels can dier between explainees. We expand upon this further in
Chapter 7 Future work section. Another possible direction is using the action inuence structure
in the training process of the RL agent, where the agent’s exploration can be guided by the
information available in the action inuence structure.
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Chapter 6
An Interaction Protocol for Explainable
Agents1
This chapter discuss how the social process of the explanation can be quantied into a grounded
framework that is based on data from human explanation dialogues. We investigate the in-
teraction between an explainer and an explainee and investigate the structural aspects of an
interactive explanation to propose an interaction protocol, and follow a bottom-up approach
to derive the model by analysing transcripts of dierent explanation dialogue types with 398
explanation dialogues. We use grounded theory to code and identify key components of an ex-
planation dialogue. We formalise the model using the agent dialogue framework (ADF) as a new
dialogue type and then evaluate it in a human-agent interaction study with 101 dialogues from
14 participants. Our results show that the proposed model can closely follow the explanation
dialogues of human-agent conversations.
6.1 Introduction
In scenarios where people are required to make critical choices based on decisions from an
articial intelligence (AI) system, it is important for the system to able to generate understandable
explanations that clearly justify its decisions. An appropriate explanation can promote trust
in the system, allowing better human-AI cooperation [234]. Explanations also help people to
reason about the extent to which, if at all, they should trust the provider of the explanation.
1This chapter is adapted from the published article: "A Grounded Interaction Protocol for Explainable Articial
Intelligence." Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.
2019.
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As Miller [157, pg 10] notes, the process of Explanation involves two processes: (a) a Cognitive
process, namely the process of determining an explanation for a given event, called the explanan-
dum, in which the causes for the event are identied and a subset of these causes is selected
as the explanation (or explanans); and (b) the Social process of transferring knowledge between
explainer and explainee, generally an interaction between a group of people, in which the goal is
that the explainee has enough information to understand the causes of the event.
However, much research and practice in explainable AI use the researchers’ intuitions of what
constitutes a ‘good’ explanation rather than basing the approach on a strong understanding of
how people dene, generate, select, evaluate, and present explanations [157, 158]. Most modern
work on Explainable AI, such as in autonomous agents [246, 32, 41, 75] and interpretable machine
learning [63], does not discuss the interaction and the social aspect of the explanations. The
lack of a general interaction model of explanation that takes into account the end-user can be
attributed as one of the shortcomings of existing explainable AI systems. Although there are
existing conceptual explanation dialogue models that try to emulate the structure and sequence
of a natural explanation [12, 238], we propose that further improvements will come from an
empirically driven study of explanation.
Explanation naturally occurs as a continuous interaction, which gives the interacting party
the ability to question and interrogate explanations. This allows the explainee to clear doubts
about the given explanation by further interrogations and user-driven questions. Further, the
explainee can express contrasting views about the explanation that can set the premise for an
argumentation-based interaction. This type of iterative explanation can provide richer and
satisfactory explanations as opposed to one-shot explanations. Note that we are not claiming
that AI explanations are necessarily textual conversations. These interactions, questions, and
answers can occur as part of other modalities, such as visualisations, but we believe that such
interactions will follow the same model.
Understanding how humans engage in conversational explanation is a prerequisite to building
an explanation model, as noted by Hilton [105]. De Graaf [59] note that humans attribute
human traits, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, to intelligent agents, and it is thus a small
step to assume that people will seek to explain agent behaviour using human frameworks of
explanation. We hypothesise that AI explanation models with designs that are inuenced by
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human explanation models have the potential to provide more intuitive explanations to humans
and therefore be more likely to be understood and accepted. We suggest it is easier for the AI to
emulate human explanations rather than expecting humans to adapt to a novel and unfamiliar
explanation model. While there are mature existing models for explanation dialogs [238, 237],
these are idealised conceptual models that are not grounded on or validated by data, and seem to
lack iterative features like cyclic dialogues.
In this Chapter our goal is to introduce a dialogue model and an interaction protocol that is based
on data obtained from dierent types of explanations in actual conversations. We derive our
model by analysing 398 explanation dialogues using grounded theory [83] across six dierent
dialogue types. Frequency, sequence and relationships between the basic components of an
explanation dialogue were obtained and analyzed in the study to identify locutions, termination
rules and combination rules. We formalize the explanation dialogue model using the agent
dialogue framework (ADF) [150], then validate the model in a human-agent study with 101
explanation dialogues. We propose that by following a data-driven approach to formulate and
validate, our model more accurately denes the structure and the sequence of an explanation
dialogue and will support more natural interaction with human audiences than explanations
from existing models. The main contribution of this chapter is a grounded interaction protocol
derived from explanation dialogues, formalized as a new atomic dialogue type [240] in the ADF.
We rst discuss related work regarding explanation in AI and explanation dialogue models,
then we outline the methodology of the study and collection of data and its properties. We
then present the analysis of the data, identifying key components of an explanation dialogue
and gaining insight to the relationships of these components, formalising it using ADF and
comparing with a similar conceptual model [25]. We then describe the human-agent study and
present the validation of the model. We conclude by discussing the model with its contribution
and signicance in explainable AI.
6.2 Related Work
Explaining decisions of intelligent systems has been a topic of interest since the era of expert
systems, e.g. [44, 120]. Early work focused particularly on the explanation’s content, responsive-
ness and the human-computer interface through which the explanation was delivered. Kass and
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Finin [120] and Moore and Paris [162] discussed the requirements a good explanation facility
should have, including characteristics like “Naturalness”, and pointed to the critical role of user
models in explanation generation. Cawsey’s [39] EDGE system also focused on user interaction
and user knowledge. These were used to update the system through interaction. So, in early
explainable AI, both the cognitive and social attributes associated with an agent’s awareness of
other actors, and capability to interaction with them, has been recognized as an essential feature
of explanation research. However, limited progress has been made. Indeed recently, de Graaf
and Malle [59] still nd the need to emphasize the importance of understanding how humans
respond to Autonomous Intelligent Systems (AIS). They further note how humans will expect a
familiar way of communication from AIS systems when providing explanations.
Though there exist conceptual models of dialogical explanation [238, 239], these methods are
not ground in human-agent explanations from a XAI context. The reader can examine section
2.6 for a more conclusive discussion on dialogical models and their limitations.
6.3 Methodology
To address the lack of a grounded explanation interaction protocol, we studied real conversational
data of explanations. This study consists of data selection and gathering, data analysis, and
model development, and then validation in a lab-based simulated human-agent experiment.
We designed a bottom-up study to develop an explanation dialogue model. We aimed to gain
insights into three areas: 1. key components that make up an explanation interaction protocol
(locutions); 2. relationships within those components (termination rules); and 3. component
sequences and cycles (combination rules) that occur in explanations.
6.3.1 Design
We formulate our design based on an inductive approach. We use grounded theory [83] as the
methodology to conceptualize and derive models of explanation. The key goal of using grounded
theory, as opposed to using a hypothetico-deductive approach, is to formalize a model that is
grounded on actual conversation data of various types, rather than a purely conceptual model.
The study is divided into three distinct stages, based on grounded theory. The rst stage
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consists of coding [83] and theorizing, where small chunks of data are taken, named and marked
manually according to the concepts they might hold. For example, a segment of a paragraph in an
interview transcript can be identied as an ‘Explanation’ and another segment can be identied
as a ‘Why question’. This process is repeated until the whole data set is coded. The second
stage is categorizing, where similar codes and concepts are grouped together by identifying
their relationship with each other. The third stage derives a theoretical model from the codes,
categories and their relationship.
6.3.2 Data
We collected data from six dierent data sources encompassing six dierent types of explanation
dialogues. Table 6.1 shows the explanation dialogue types, explanation dialogues that are in
each type and the number of transcripts. Here, ‘static’ is dened as when an explainee or an
explainer is the same person from transcript to transcript (e.g. same journalist interviewing
dierent people). We gathered and coded a total of 398 explanation dialogues from all of the
data sources. All the data sources2 are text-based, where some of them are transcribed from
voice and video-based interviews. Data sources consist of Human-Human conversations and
Human-Agent conversations. We collected Human-Agent conversations to analyze if there are
signicant dierences in the way humans carry out the explanation dialogue when they knew
the interacting party was an agent with respect to the frequency of dierent locutions.
Table 6.1: Coded data description.
Explanation Dialogue Type #Dialogue #Scripts
1. Human-Human static explainee 88 2
2. Human-Human static explainer 30 3
3. Human-Explainer agent 68 4
4. Human-Explainee agent 17 1
5. Human-Human QnA 50 5
6. Human-Human multiple explainee 145 5
Data source selection was done to encompass dierent combinations of participant types and
numbers. These combinations are given in Table 6.2. We diversify the dataset by including data
2Links to all data sources (including transcripts) can be found at https://explanationdialogs.azurewebsites.net
103
6.4 Grounded Explanation Interaction Protocol An Interaction Protocol for Explainable Agents
sources of dierent mediums such as verbal based and text-based.
Table 6.2: Explanation dialogue type description.
Participants Number Medium Data source
1. Human-Human 1-1 Verbal Journalist In-
terview tran-
scripts
2. Human-Human 1-1 Verbal Journalist In-
terview tran-
scripts
3. Human-Agent 1-1 Text Chatbot con-
versation tran-
scripts
4. Human-Agent 1-1 Text Chatbot con-
versation tran-
scripts
5. Human-Human n-m Text Reddit AMA
records
6. Human-Human 1-n Verbal Supreme
court tran-
scripts
Table 6.3 presents the codes and their denitions. We identify ‘why’, ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions
as questions that ask counterfactual explanations, questions that ask explanations of causal
chains, and questions that ask causality explanations respectively. The whole number of the code
column refers to the categories the codes belong to, where 1) Dialogue boundary; 2) Question
type; 3) Explanation; 4) Argumentation; 5) Return question type.
6.4 Grounded Explanation Interaction Protocol
In this section, we present the interaction model resulting from our grounded study, and formalize
the model using agent dialogue framework (ADF) [150] as an atomic dialogue type [240]. Note
that a dialogue can range from a purely visual user interface interaction to verbal interactions.
We analyse some observed patterns of interaction and compare the grounded model to an existing
conceptual model.
When formalizing the model, we consider the interaction between explainer and explainee as a
dialogue game. Dialogue games are depicted as interactions between two or more players. The
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Table 6.3: Code description.
Code Description
1.1 QE start Explanation dialogue start
1.2 QE end Explanation dialogue end
2.1 How How questions
2.2 Why Why questions
2.3 What What questions
3.1 Explanation Explanation given for questions
3.2 Explainee Armation Explainee acknowledges explanation
3.3 Explainer Armation Explainer acknowledges explainee’s acknowledg-
ment
3.4 Question context Background to the question provided by the ex-
plainee
3.5 Counterfactual case Counterfactual case of the how/why question
4.1 Argument Argument presented by explainee or explainer
4.2 Argument-s An argument that starts the dialogue
4.3 Argument-a Argument Armation by explainee or explainer
4.4 Argument-c Counter argument
4.5 Argument-contrast case Argumentation contrast case
5.1 Explainer Return question Clarication question by explainer


























Figure 6.1: Explanation Dialogue Model
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players can make ‘moves’ with utterances, according to a set of rules. Dialogue game models
have been used to model human-computer interaction [20], to model human reasoning [184]
and to develop protocols for interactions between agents [61].
Formal dialogue models have been proposed for dierent dialogue types [240], such as negotiation
dialogues [8], persuasion dialogues [240] and a combination of negotiation and persuasion
dialogues [61]. To the best of our knowledge there is no formal explanation dialogue game model
grounded on data.
In essence, Figure 6.1 depicts the state model resulting from the human explanation analysis. At
a glance, there are two sub-dialogues happening inside larger explanation dialogue; explanation
and argumentation. This model capture the dialogue acts, beginning and ends of the dialogues
and dialogues transitions. In the sections below, we explain the model in detail.
6.4.1 Agent Dialogue Framework
We use McBurney and Parson’s agent dialogue framework [150] to formalize the explanation
dialogue model as a dialogue game. The Agent Dialogue Framework (ADF) provides a modular
and unifying framework that can represent and combine dierent types of atomic dialogues in
the typology of Walton and Krabbe [240], with the freedom of introducing new dialogue type
combinations. The ADF has three layers: 1. topic layer; 2. dialogue layer; and 3. control layer. In
the topic layer, the topics of discussion in a dialogue game are presented in a logical language.
Then, the dialogue layer [150] consists of a set of rules:
Commencement rules: rules under which the dialogue commences.
Locutions: Rules that determine which utterances are permitted in the dialogue-game. Typical
locutions include assertions, questions, arguments, etc.
Combination rules: Rules that dene the dialogical context of the applicability of locutions.
E.g. it might not be applicable to assert preposition p and ¬p in the same dialogue.
Commitments: Rules that determine the circumstances where players express commitments
to a preposition.
Termination rules: Rules that determine the ending of a dialogue.
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More formally, given a set of participating agentsA, we dene the dialogue G at the dialogue layer
as a 4-tuple (Θ,R, T , CF ), where Θ denotes set of legal locutions,R the set of combinations,
T the set of termination rules and CF the set of commitment functions respectively [150].
Selection and transitions between dialogue types are handled in the control layer. Dialogue
types can be combined using iteration, sequencing and embedding [150, pg 10]. When combined,
an ADF is given by 5-tuple (A,L, Πa, Πc, Π) where the set of agents is given by A, logical
language representation given by L, set of atomic dialogue types given by Πa, set of control
dialogues given by Πc, and Π is the closure of Πa ∪Πc, which represents the set of formal
dialogues denoted by the 4-tuple given above. Closure is dened under the combination rules
presented by McBurney and Parsons [150].
6.4.2 Formal Explanation Dialogue Game Model
In this section we present the formal explanation dialogue model as a new atomic dialogue
type [240] using the modular ADF, and discuss how it is derived from the grounded data of
explanation dialogues according to the layers of ADF. Our analysis of the data shows that people
switch from explanation to argumentation and back again during an explanation dialogue, in
which the explainee questions a claim made by an explainer. For this reason, our model has two
dialogue types: Explanation and Argumentation. Dialogue games of atomic dialogue types [240]
have an initial situation and an aim (e.g persuasion dialogue having the initial situation of
conicting opinions of the interacting party and the aim of resolving the conict). For our
explanation dialogue, the initial condition is the knowledge discrepancy between explainer and
explainee of the topic p and the aim is to provide knowledge about the topic p to the explainee.
Formally, the explanation dialogue model (ADFE) is the tuple:
ADFE = (A,L, Πa, Πc, Π) (6.1)
where the set of agents A = {Q, E}, where labels Q and E refer to the Questioner (the
explainee) and the Explainer respectively; L is the set of logical representations about topics
(denoted by p, q, r, ...), Πa = {GE, GA}, where GE is the explanation dialogue and GA is
the argumentation dialogue, Πc = (Begin_Question, Begin_Explanation, Begin_Argument,
End_Explanation, End_Argument), and Π is the closure of Πa ∪Πc under the combination rule
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set. Π gives us the set of formal explanation dialogue G.
The Topic Layer is dependent on the particular application domain in which the explanation
dialogue is embedded, so we do not dene this further.
Dialogue Layer The dialogue layer consists of the two dialogue types: explanation (GE) and
argumentation (GA):
GE = (ΘE,RE, TE, CF E)
GA = (ΘA,RA, TA, CF A)
(6.2)
The set of legal locutions are dened by:
ΘE = (explain, arm, further_explain, return_question)
ΘA = (arm_argument, counter_argument, further_explain).
(6.3)
For clarity, we dene the commencement rules, combination rules, and termination rules via the
state transition diagram in Figure 6.1. While most codes are directly transferred to the model as
states and state transitions, codes that belonged to the information category are embedded in
dierent states. The combination rulesRE andRA are dened by the individual transitions on
the diagram. For example, after a dialogue begins with a question, the next locution is either the
explainer asking for clarication using a return_question or giving an explanation. Similarly,
the set of termination rules can be extracted from the state model as the state transitions that
lead to the termination state, giving TE = (arm(p), explain(p)) and TA = (arm_argument(p),
counter_argument(p)). We do not dene commitments CF as these were not observable in our
data.
Control layer This can be identied as state transitions that lead to and out of the two
dialogue types in Figure 6.1 (e.g. argue, explanation_end). Argumentation occurs naturally within
explanation dialogues, meaning that this is an embedded dialogue, as dened by McBurney and
Parsons [150]. An argument can occur after an explanation was given, which will then continue
on to an argumentation dialogue. The dialogue then returns to the explanation dialogue, as
shown in Figure 6.1. A single explanation dialogue can contain many embedded argumentation
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dialogues.
Explanation dialogues can occur in sequence, which is modelled by the external loop. Note that
a loop within the explanation dialogue implies that the ongoing explanation is related to the
same original question and topic, while a loop outside of the dialogue means a new topic is
introduced. We coded explanation dialogues to end when a new topic was raised in a question.
Questions that ask for follow-up explanations (return_question) were coded when the questions
were clearly identiable as requesting more information about the given explanation.
Example: We now go through the formal model with an example dialogue which is taken
from the human-agent experiments discussed in Section 6.5. Example is given in Table 6.4
with the dialogue text, locutions/rules and a commentary about the dialogue. Two agents who
are explainee (player) and the explainer (agent) participate in the dialogue given by Q and E
respectively and the topic ‘cities’ by p:
Table 6.4: Example: from human-agent experiments of Ticket to Ride domain.
Dialogue Text Locutions/Rules Commentary
E: Opponent is gazing at Duluth
to Omaha route and will try to
extend it to Kansas City.
Begin_Explanation(p) - Commence explanation dialogue
with an explanation about cities
which the opponent is gazing at p.
Q: Is he going to Pittsburgh? return_question(p) - Using locution return_question
available in Explanation dialogue
type, inquiring more information
E: Opponent will try to Extend
the path from Pittsburgh to
Houston through Atlanta, has
been repeatedly gazing at that
path
further_explain(p) - providing further explanation us-
ing further_explain locution about
topic p.
Q: No. He is going to El Paso. Begin_Argument(p) - Argumentation sub-dilaog begins
about topic p after.
E: Yes, now opponents gaze is
focused at El Paso and will try
to build from Little rock to Dal-
las to El Paso.
arm_argument(p) - Argument is acknowledged by
the Agent (E) using locution af-
rm_argument
. End_Argument(p) - End the embedded argument dia-
logue by using the control dialogue
End_Argument which also ends the
initial dialogue.
This example shows an interaction between an agent and a human using the explanation dialogue
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with an embedded argumentation dialogue. The human-agent study is discussed in depth in
Section 6.5. The example demonstrates the ability of our model to handle embedded dialogues
and cyclic dialogues (explanation dialogues that occurs twice with Begin_explanation and
further_explain) which is a similar model of explanation dialogue by Walton [25] lack. Detailed
model comparison between our model and Walton’s can be found in Section 6.4.4.
6.4.3 Analysis
We focus our analysis on three areas to further reinforce the derived interaction protocol: 1.
Key components of an Explanation Dialogue; 2. Relationships between these components and
their variations between dierent dialogue types; and 3. The sequence of components that can
successfully carry out an explanation dialogue.
Code Frequency Analysis
The average code occurrence per dialogue in dierent dialogue types is depicted in Figure 6.2. In
all dialogue types, a dialogue is most likely to have multiple what questions, multiple explanations
and multiple armations.
Argumentation is a key component of an explanation dialogue. The explainee can have dierent
or contrasting views to the explainer regarding the explanation, at which point an argument
can be put forth by the explainee. An argument in the form of an explanation that is not in
response to a question can also occur at the very beginning of an explanation dialogue, where
the argument set the premise for the rest of the dialogue. An argument is typically followed
by an armation and may include a counter argument by the opposing party. From Figure 6.2,
Human-Human dialogues with the exception of QnA have argumentation but Human-Agent
dialogues lack any substantial occurrences of argumentation.
Explanation Dialogue Termination Rule Analysis
Participants should be able to identify when a dialogue ends. We analyse the dierent types of
explanation dialogues to identify the codes that are most likely to signify termination.
From Figure 6.3, all explanation dialogue types except Human-Human QnA type are most likely to
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Figure 6.2: Average code occurrence per dialogue in dierent explanation dialogue types
end in an explanation. The second most likely code to end an explanation is explainer armation.
Ending with other codes such as explainee and explainer return questions is presented by
‘Dialogue ending In Other’ bar in Figure 6.3. It is important to note that although a dialogue
is likely to end in an explanation, that dialogue can have previous explainee armations and
explainer armations.
6.4.4 Model Comparison
We compare the explanation dialogue model, which also contains an argumentation sub-dialogue,
by Walton [25]. Walton proposed the model shown in Figure 6.4, which consists of 10 components.
This model focus on combining explanation and examination dialogues with argumentation.
A similar shift between explanation and argumentation/examination can be seen between our
model and Walton’s. According to the data sources, argumentation is a frequently present
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Dialog ending in explanation
Dialog ending in Explainee Affirmation
Dialog ending in Explainer Affirmation
Dialog ending in Preconception
Dialog ending in Argument Affirmation
Dialog ending in Argument Counter
Dialog ending in Other
Figure 6.3: Average code occurrence in per dialogue in dierent explanation dialogue types
Figure 6.4: Argumentation and explanation in dialogue [25]
component of an explanation dialogue, which is depicted by the Explainee probing component
in Walton’s Model. The basic ow of explanation is the same between the two models, but the
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models dier in two key ways. First, is the lack of examination dialogue shift in our model.
Although we did not derive an examination dialogue, a similar shift of dialogue can be seen
with respect to armation states. That is, our ‘examination’ is simply the explainee arming
that they have understood the explanation. Second is Walton’s focus on the evaluation of the
successfulness of an explanation in the form of examination dialogue, whereas our model focuses
on delivering an explanation in a natural sequence without an explicit form of explanation
evaluation.
Thus, we can see similarities between Walton’s conceptual model (Figure 6.4 and our data-driven
model (Figure 6.1). The dierences between the two are at a more detailed level than at the
high-level, and we attribute these dierences to the grounded nature of our study. While Walton
proposes an idealised model of explanation, we assert that our model captures the subtleties that
would be required to build a natural dialogue for human-agent explanation.
6.5 Empirical Validation
In this section, we discuss the validation of the derived explanation interaction protocol. We
conducted a human-agent study in which an agent provides explanations using our model. The
purpose of the study is to test whether the proposed model holds in a human-agent setting, and
in particular, that the human participants follow the dialogue model when interacting with an
articial agent. The ethics approval to conduct the study was provided by The University of
Melbourne’s human ethics committee (ID: 1647972).
6.5.1 Study
We conducted our study using the Ticket to Ride3 online computer game in a co-located competi-
tive setting, previously used by Newn et al. and Singh et al., in a university usability lab. The
basic layout of the game is shown in Figure 6.5. In this game, players must compete to build train
routes between two cities, with each player building at least two such routes. For the purpose of
the study, a game is played between two players who we term as the player and the opponent.
The player is assisted by an intelligent software agent that predicts the intentions and plans of the
opponent. It is important to note that for a two player game, each route can be claimed only by
3https://www.daysofwonder.com/tickettoride/en/
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Figure 6.5: Ticket to Ride Computer Game
one player. This allows players to block each other deliberately or otherwise, therefore inferring
the intent of the opponent is benecial for winning the game. We use the intent recognition
algorithm of Singh et al. to predict the opponent’s future moves. The algorithm uses gaze data
from an eye tracker and the actions of the opponent to formulate the possible plans (e.g. most
probable routes the opponent can take). The opponent’s gaze will also appear as a heat map on
top of the player’s Ticket to Ride game screen4. The agent communicates the predictions and
their explanations to the player through a chat window.
To evaluate our model, we adopted a Wizard of OZ approach described by Dahlbäck, Jönsson,
and Ahrenberg, meaning that the natural language generation of the explanation agent is played
by a human ‘wizard’, but this is unknown to the human participant. It is important to note
4Video capture of an experiment is provided in supplementary material at https://explanationdialogs.azurewebsites.
net/supp.zip
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that only the natural language generation is delegated to the wizard, while the agent generates
and visualize plans (a set of connected train routes) in a separate interface in order to assist
the wizard. Wizard has access to the visualized plans, most gazed at routes and most gazed
at cities. The argument for using the Wizard of Oz (WoZ) technique as opposed to a natural
language implementation is twofold. First, to gather high quality empirical data related to the
model bypassing the limitation that exists in natural language interfaces [54]. Second, having an
interaction that closely resembles human discourse [54] allows the human to have more natural
responses. Wizard of Oz techniques have been demonstratively shown to successfully evaluate
conversational agents [47, 66], human-robot interactions [18] and automated vehicle-human
interactions [147, 174].
The Wizard uses the prediction information of the agent and translates it to a more natural
dialogue, enabling us to get empirical data on natural explanation dialogues between the player
and the agent. The player is informed that he/she can communicate with the agent in natural
discourse. A prediction of the game includes a route that the opponent might build (e.g from
Pittsburgh to Houston) and a city area opponent might be interested in (e.g Interested around
Houston). Predictions are generated from the implemented intent recognition algorithm of Singh
et al. The wizard follows a simple natural language template: prediction followed by the ex-
planation. The explanation template can include one or more of the following in any order:
gaze explanation (e.g the opponent has been repeatedly gazing at that path) and causal history
explanation (e.g the opponent has already built some paths along that route).
The protocol of the Wizard is outlined as follows. The Wizard follows the locutions, termination
rules and combination rules of the dialogue model. Predictions and explanations of the agent is
translated to natural language using the template described above by the wizard according to
the nature of the locution used. Players (experiment participants) can ask questions and present
arguments in natural language. Players can initiate dialogues as well as reply to the Wizard at
any time in the game, and are in control of the frequency of the interaction. The wizard follows
a static failure response to any interactions that failed or is unable to provide predictions and
explanations (e.g I’m unable to answer that). Note that in the case of a participant using an
invalid locution or a control dialogue, the dialogue will fail and the wizard will end the dialogue
with a termination rule.
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The parameters of the experiments are as follows. In total, we obtained 101 explanation dialogues
across 14 experiments. Players were from the same university, aged between 23 and 31 years
(M = 27.2). Players were observed through an observation room, in which the wizard was
located. The duration of each experiment had an upper bound of 30 minutes (M = 20.15),
limited by the duration of the game-play, with the ability to end early if the game is won by
either side before 30 minutes (game ends when all trains have been used by either side). During
game-play the player has the freedom to engage in conversation with the agent or play the game
disregarding the agent, thus each experiment yields a dierent number of dialogues (M = 7.21).
Conversations between the player and the wizard were carried out using a chat client, through
which we recorded the dialogue data. Extracted data were then analysed according to locutions,
control dialogues and their sequences.












































































































































Figure 6.6: Empirical results of human-agent dialogue games.
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Figure 6.6 illustrates the explanation dialogue games in the human-agent study. Control dia-
logues and locutions are depicted by shortened tags, which forms a sequence when combined.
An example of a dialogue game using the tags would be [BQ][E][AF], which corresponds to
[Begin_question ⇒ explain ⇒ arm] in locutions and control dialogues. Figure 6.6 shows
percentages a specic dialogue game type occurred, and invalid dialogue games.
The proposed explanation dialogue model held true for 96 out of 101 dialogue game instances we
observed. Figure 6.6 indicates the 5 invalid dialogue game types that occurred. These dialogues
became invalid dialogue games according to our model because of the parallelization of dialogue
combination moves. For example, consider the dialogue game [BE][AF][RQ][BA][EA]. Here,
after arm and return_question locution, Begin_Argumentaion control dialogue occurs. This
sequence is illegal according to the model. If parallelization is allowed, Begin_Argumentaion
control dialogue can occur without waiting for a termination rule (e.g. arm, explain). We
attribute this limitation to the nature of the grounded data where parallelization cannot be
accurately captured. This limitation can potentially be rectied by introducing parallelization
[150] to the combination rules.
6.6 Conclusion
Explainable Articial Intelligent systems can benet from having a proper interaction protocol
that can explain their actions and behaviours to the interacting users. Explanation naturally
occurs as a continuous and iterative socio-cognitive process that involves two (sub)processes: a
cognitive process and a social process. Most prior work is focused on providing explanations
without sucient attention to the needs of the explainee, which reduces the usefulness of the
explanation to the end-user.
This chapter proposes a interaction protocol for the socio-cognitive process of explanation that
is derived from dierent types of natural conversations between humans as well as humans and
agents. We formalise the model using the Agent Dialogue Framework [150] as a new atomic
dialogue type [240] of explanation with an embedded argumentation dialogue, and we analyse
the frequency of occurrences of patterns. To empirically validate our model, we undertook a
human behavioural experiment involving 14 participants and a total of 101 explanation dialogues.
Results indicate that our explanation dialogue model can closely follow Human-Agent explanation
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dialogues. The main contribution of this chapter lies in the formalized interaction protocol for
explanation dialogues that is grounded on data, a secondary contribution is the coded (tagged)
explanation dialogue data-set of 398 dialogues. By following a data-driven approach, the proposed
model captures the structure and the sequence of an explanation dialogue more accurately and
allow natural interactions than explanations from existing models. The main contribution of
this chapter is a grounded interaction protocol derived from explanation dialogues, formalized
as a new atomic dialogue type [240] in the ADF. XAI systems that deal in explanation and trust
will benet from such a model in providing better, more intuitive and interactive explanations.
There are several future directions that this work can evolve into in the context of interactive
explanations. Other forms of interaction modes can be introduced such as visual interactions
which may include dierent forms of combination and termination rules. Recent work has also
taken inuence of interactive explanations proposed here to introduced sequential explanations
for RL agents [251]. Explanation dialogue models can be used as the explanation interface to the
underlying explainable model, e.g. the work discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 can be instantiated as




This thesis presents original work that contributes to the body of explainable reinforcement
learning literature. We proposed and developed computational model-agnostic explainable
models for reinforcement learning agents, that can generate local explanations about agent’s
actions for ‘why’ and ‘why not’ questions. These models were largely inspired by the theories
of cognitive science relating to causal explanations. Further enhancements were done for the
causal explanation model through the insights gained via human explanations. Specically, the
primary outcome of the thesis is the introduction of the action inuence model and the distal
explanation model. Original research was done to learn action inuence models end-to-end, by
developing action inuence discovery algorithms. This thesis further proposes an explanation
dialogue model that can facilitate interactive explanations and can function as the explanation
interface between the explainable RL model and the explainee.
The majority of the work described in this thesis followed a human-centred approach. That is, in
generating, selecting, structuring and communicating the explanations, concepts and theories
were build upon the prevalent literature in cognitive and social sciences. A human-centred
approach can plausibly provide ‘better’ explanations to the end-users and the empirical results
reported in this thesis support this. This can also serve as a motivation for future research in
following a human-centred approach for explainability. This Chapter organises the research
contributions, insights and ndings obtained by answering the main research questions given
in Chapter 1. A commentary of the primary contributions and the developed artefacts is done,
giving limitations of each. Limitations of the explainable RL models, dialogical explanations and
challenges in combining them as a whole is discussed giving concrete future directions.
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7.1 Research Contribution
This thesis addressed four main research questions, and proposed new models and denitions
for explainable reinforcement learning agents. This section reects upon the specic research
contributions and artefacts produced by answering the research questions and how they are
situated in the literature. Table 7.1 summarises the research contribution of this thesis.






that increase the un-
derstanding and trust
of the users?
• Develop a human-centred explain-
able model for RL agents.
• Propose denitions and formalisa-
tions to generate explanations for
’why’ and ’why not’ questions of
agent actions.
• The Action inuence model,
as a model-agnostic explain-
able model for RL agents.
RQ2: Do distal
causal explanations
of RL agents improve
the intelligibility of
the agent behaviour?
• Develop a explainable model that
is grounded on human explanation
data for RL agents.
• Propose new denitions and formal-
isations to generate explanations.
• Improve upon the action inuence
model accuracy.
• The Distal explanation
model.
• Coded human explanations





the causal action in-
uence structure of
the domain?
• Learn the action inuence structure
from RL agents’ interaction data.
• The action inuence learn-
ing architecture and models.
RQ4: What are





• Develop a human-centred general
explanation dialogue model for ex-
plainable agents.
• Propose denitions and formalisa-
tions of the explanation sequence
structure.
• The Dialogue explanation
state model, dened by the
agent dialogue games.
• Coded corpus of human ex-
planation dialogues.
Table 7.1: Research contribution, proposed models, denitions and artifacts.
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7.2 Causal Explanations inExplainableReinforcement Learning
A major driver when developing an explainable system is the type of the explanation that
is presented to the explainee. The type of the explanation aects the generation, selection,
contrasting and structure of the explanation. Causal explanations are one such type of explanation.
To our knowledge, the Action inuence model is the rst such model that is made to generate
causal explanations for reinforcement learning agents, answering RQ1.
Motivation for exploring causal explanations of RL agents has clear roots in cognitive science,
philosophy and social science literature as elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3. People in general have
a strong anity to causal explanations in comparisons to other types (state-action explanations,
visual explanations) and indeed this was observed in the empirical evaluation discussed in
Chapter 3. Further, causal explainability and interpretability methods have found various levels
of success in supervised learning [164], paving a new avenue for causality based explainability
research.
The type of questions the explainee can query the agent can also vary, from ‘What’, ‘How’, ‘Why’
and ‘Why not’. RQ1 was focused on developing explanation generation methods for ‘Why’ and
‘Why not’ questions. This was motivated by the work of Penney et al. [179], that note the most
frequent types of questions asked from agents were ‘Why’ and ‘Why not’ questions. Though the
action inuence model explicitly focused on generating explanations for those types, our model
can be extended to answer ‘What’ and ‘How’ questions without fundamental changes. This is
due to causal models being in the top ring of the causal ladder [178], enabling them to answer
questions on associative (What) and interventionist (How) questions.
In answering RQ1, we considered explanation generation for a question posed for the agent’s
action, which is a form of local explainability. Other works have found success in explaining the
behaviour (represented by the policy of the agent) [99] and summarising the behaviour as expla-
nations [9]. Though global explanation methods provide an overview of the agent intelligibility,
we believe local explanations are also needed for a granular and a more nuanced understanding
of the agent. The need for this understanding can be visible in human-collaboration scenarios
(discussed below in RQ2). A hybrid approach can also plausibly perform better, and the action
inuence models can serve as the basis to generate causal policy explanations of RL agents.
The action inuence model is formalised using structural causal models [92], augmented with
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actions based on their causal inuence. This formalism allowed the model to handle ‘Why not’
questions by simulating counterfactuals and generating contrastive explanations. While there
are dierent ways to generate contrastive explanations [236, 122, 155], our approach that contrast
the causal chains can provide causal information that earlier methods lack. The explanation
selection is another variable that can change the explanation product. In Chapter 3, we dened a
minimally complete explanation for action inuence models, which included the reward nodes,
immediate nodes (before the reward nodes) and the header node of the action. This denition
was motivated by the need to include both the long term and the short term motivation of the
agent in the explanation. Other researchers can choose to use dierent proxies and heuristics to
dene minimality such as: selecting the highest impacted node in the causal chain, choosing
the node based on the explainee’s epistemic state. The action inuence models are exible to
allow such dierent selection methods, and this presents a possible direction in extending these
models.
The eectiveness of causal explanations generated using action inuence models was assessed in
both computational and human experiments, which showed signicant improvements compared
to other baseline local explanation models (state-action, descriptive). Limitations of the evaluation
phase are discussed in the sections below. Action Inuence models were targeted at reinforcement
learning agents and were specically evaluated in model-free RL agents. As these models act
as surrogate models, most RL agent architectures are supported, given that the replay data of
the agent is accessible. Importantly, due to its surrogate nature, action inuence models can be
extended to other sequential decision making agents (e.g. planning agents) with states, actions
and rewards.
7.3 Distal Explanations
Humans often expect familiar modes of communications, and explainable systems need to adhere
to these needs [131]. A human grounded approach for explainability can have the potential to
be more eective and accepted by the end-users. Keeping this as the motivation, in RQ2, we
followed a data-driven grounded approach to develop an explainable model for RL agents. A
distal explanation model is proposed as the answer to the RQ1.
We obtained data from 30 participants in a human-agent experiment, where the participants
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formulated their own explanations of StarCraft II RL agents after seeing the agents in action. Im-
portantly, participants had no restrictions on the format and the structure of the explanation, and
used free text as the medium. Thematic analysis was used to conceptualise the 240 explanations
that were obtained into distinct codes. We observed that the majority of the participants referred
to the agents’ state features, actions and causal relationships in the explanations. Intuitively this
made sense, as these codes convey the bulk of the knowledge that is needed for intelligibility.
Participants also noted some temporal dependency of the agent’s action, which prompted the
development of a distal explanation model. This temporal causal nature is described as the
opportunity chains, and explain the causal dependencies an action can have on future actions of
the agent.
RQ2, in addition to introducing the distal form of explanation, also improved the accuracy
of the action inuence models. In the base action inuence model, the causal eects were
estimated using structural causal equations. Though the accuracy of the task prediction using
these functions was acceptable to generate explanations, further improvements were possible.
In lieu of structural equations, we used decision trees to approximate the RL agent’s policy.
Action inuence models were used to extract the causal chains and a recurrent neural network
was used to predict the distal action of the agent. These three sub-models formed the distal
explanation model that addressed the RQ3. Other work have also used decision trees as surrogate
models for explainability [26, 206, 62], though it is possible to use other forms of RL agent
policy approximation methods [233, 112, 231, 33]. Further, to predict the distal action, other
architectures can be used such as action consequence predictions [42] and sequential action
predictions [154].
Most domains that exist for RL agent evaluations can be ill-suited to test the strength of an
explainable model. StarCraft II somewhat alleviate this challenge due to its large distinct action
and state space. Indeed, explainability researchers have proposed StarCraft II as an explainability
benchmark for RL agents [181]. In Chapter 4, we used the StarCraft II framework to develop
new scenarios focused on adversarial, search and rescue and collaborative tasks. In particular,
the collaborative task allowed the participants of the experiment to interact with the agent
to complete a task, where the distal explanation model performed signicantly better. The
usefulness of distal explanations can have implications for other types of scenarios like the join
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task planning and the human in the loop RL agents.
7.4 Learning the Action Inuence Structure
Action inuence models and distal explanation models rely on the pre-dened causal inuence
structure of the agent. In the work presented in Chapters 3 and 4, this causal inuence structure
is handcrafted through the examination of the constraints set in the RL environment. Though this
is feasible in small domains and simulations, for real-world problems with large state and action
spaces, handcrafting the inuence structure becomes more dicult. RQ3 seeks to answer this
challenge through learning the causal action inuence structure from the RL agent’s interaction
data (state-action traces) itself, without the need of a domain expert.
RQ3 specically focuses on discovering the causal action inuences an RL agent might have
within its state variables. The important distinction between the action inuence discovery
and the traditional problem of causal discovery lies in how the former also learns the action
that inuenced the causal relationship between some state variables, in addition to learning the
causal links between variables. In essence, in Chapter 5, we develop algorithms and models that
can learn the structure of the action inuence models. When the structure is present, structural
equations can be inferred and trained as needed for the action inuence models, or can be used
to extract the causal chains for distal explanation models.
Chapter 5 introduces methods to capture the inuences of actions, by encoding them in accor-
dance with the state variable changes of the next instance. By using a data-set of such encoded
actions (an action associated with one or more state variables), the problem of action inuence
discovery can be cast to a causal discovery algorithm. The encoded inuence is treated as another
variable in the causal discovery process. We used Zhu, Ng, and Chen [257]’s causal discovery
method for this process, though using other traditional score-based and constraint-based causal
discovery algorithms is also possible. The resulting causal graph from the discovery process does
not have actions annotated to the edges of the graph. This graph can be transformed into an
action inuence graph by decoding the nodes that have actions encoded into them by merging
and adding incoming edges that are action annotated. The accuracy of the architecture was
evaluated in RL domains by comparing the dierence the learned model had against the ground
truth action inuence graph.
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Implications of the ndings in Chapter 5 aect not just the explainability but the learning
mechanisms of RL agents. The learning of the action inuence structure happens throughout the
agents’ lifespan, that is the data from all the episodes of an agent is used, not just the data from
an optimal policy that is converged. The sub-optimal state-action data from the exploration is
also captured here, which allows the discovery of infrequently observed causal connections to be
formed. In explainability, this is vital when generating counterfactual contrastive explanations,
to justify why a specic action was not taken. Having an automated learning mechanism for
action inuence can also help to guide the RL agent’s learning process when integrated into the
exploration of the agent.
7.5 Dialogical Explanations
Chapters 3 to 5 focused solely on proposing explainable models for RL agents. In Chapter
6, we focused on the explanation interface that explainable models need to communicate the
explanations. RQ4 sought to understand the nature and the structure an explanation dialogue
can have and how to formalise this dialogue to build computational models. To answer RQ4,
Chapter 6 introduced a data-driven state model that captures the explanation dialogue between
the explainer and the explainee, grounded on human explanation dialogues.
RQ4 presented the challenge of having a deeper understanding of the structure and a sequence
of human explanation dialogue as a prerequisite to building a state model an agent can use in the
explanation interface. To this end, we gathered 398 human explanation dialogue transcripts from
dierent sources like journalist interviews and Reddit treads. When grounding computational
models on human data, it is important to capture the two-way interactions of dierent types
of explainers and explainees. Thus, a variety of human-human and human-agent dialogues
were selected, where the human and agent played the role of explainer and the explainee
interchangeably. This allowed the corpus of the explanation dialogues to capture (if there are
changes present) how humans structure the explanations based on the role. Subsequent analysis
showed that explanation dialogues can be generalised into the same structure and sequence.
A grounded approach was employed to code the corpus according to the themes observed. A
contrasting approach can be followed to build this explanation corpus, using a controlled study
to generate the dialogues [238], though the resulting corpus can have the risk of not generalising
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well into other settings.
To be useful for an intelligent agent, an explanation dialogue should have a computational
module formalised in an agent understandable manner. To this end, a state model was developed
by analysing the frequency and the sequence of the coded concepts. The Agent Dialogue
Framework [150] was used to formalise the state model as a dialogue game. Several other
frameworks also exist [22, 7, 187] that can be used to formalise the dialogue state model, to
describe the interactions between the explainee and the explainer.
An important nding of the RQ4 is the emergence of argumentation within the explanation
dialogue. Argumentation was observed at a high frequency across explanation types, and often
occurs after an explanation is given. In general, humans can contest an explanation and argue
with facts of their own in a natural dialogue. This has implications in developing explanation
dialogue systems for XAI systems, as most of the explainable models in the current literature does
not provide the ability to contest the explanations. Explanation dialogue models have also been
proposed in the social science literature [239, 25, 237], which takes argumentation into account.
These models are largely conceptual and suer from a lack of agent-based formalisation and
evaluation in human-agent settings. The explanation dialogue model’s coverage was evaluated
through a human-agent experiment, having a sequential decision-making agent assisting the
participants in the strategy of a board game scenario.
Several works have taken inspiration of a grounded approach in developing explanation dialogues
to proposed argumentation frameworks [101], interactive explanations [185, 212, 213] and user-
centred explanations [129]. Importantly, these works bridge the gap between the formalised
model and the implementation of it in an agent setting. Though the current ndings of RQ4 do
not directly implement the explanation dialogue model in RL agents, researchers have taken the
explanation dialogue concept further to provide sequential explanations in RL agents [251].
7.6 Limitations
The success of an explainable model is tightly coupled to the human factors of the end-users
of the system. As accurately modelling the human is a challenging task for current articial
intelligence methods, this naturally also introduces several key limitations that are common to
explainable AI systems in general. As the denition of what constitutes an explanation changes
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with the context, domain and methods used, distinct limitations are also present in each proposed
method [14]. This section discusses the limitations of the explainable models (action inuence
and distal inuence models) proposed in this thesis and limitations in the evaluation methodology
that was followed.
7.6.1 Explainable Models
The main drawback of action inuence models (and by extension distal explanation models)
was the need of a handcrafted causal action inuence structure. In Chapter 5, we discussed how
this limitation was mitigated through the learning of the inuence structure end-to-end just
from the RL agent’s state-action data. Another limitation lies in handling continuous action
spaces, due to the inuence structure requiring action labels to annotate the edges of the graph.
Recent progress in discretising RL actions [225] can potentially be used as a precursor model
to approximately solve this limitation. The level of abstraction explanations are generated can
aect the intelligibility of an XAI system. In RL agent explanations, abstraction levels can exist at
the action and the state level, and there can be unique action inuence models for dierent levels
of abstraction. In Chapter 3, we empirically tested 2 dierent levels of action inuence models,
where the less granular model fared better against the other. The number of abstraction levels
needed for a domain needs to be determined based on the domain and needs further research.
7.6.2 Evaluation and Environments
RL Environments: Limitations can be introduced through the choice of environments used
to evaluate the explainable RL models. In Chapter 3 through 5, we used a combination of
OpenAI benchmarks [31] and custom StarCraft II [235] scenarios to computationally asses the
performance of the explainable models. There is much debate [123, 114] on the lack of a standard
benchmark for RL, introducing inconsistencies in reproducibility challenges in the evaluation.
Though we selected dierent OpenAI environments and StarCraft II scenarios with varying
state-action spaces, further evaluations in other domains might be needed.
Human Evaluations: Considering human explanations, the StarCraft II domain was selected
for its expressive and visual nature [181], having agents that can exhibit complex strategic
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behaviours going beyond path and task planning. Further work is needed in human evaluations,
that make use of a dierent domain in assessing the generalisability of the action inuence
models.
7.7 Future Work
We propose two main avenues of future directions that stems from the original work presented
in this thesis.
7.7.1 Inferring the abstraction level of the explainee
As discussed above, a drawback of the current action inuence models is the ambiguity that exists
in selecting the correct abstraction level for the explanation. The implementation of multiple
explainable models with dierent abstract levels depends on the granularity of the domain. The
selection of the correct abstraction level poses a larger challenge in comparison, in that, the XAI
system would need to infer the level needed through the interactions with the explainee. The
explanation dialogue model presented in Chapter 6 can be used as the explanation interface to
infer the epistemic knowledge and the level of the end-user. Indeed preliminary work has been
proposed in this direction by Yeung et al. [251], where interactive sequential explanations for RL
agents are used to identify the mental model of the user.
7.7.2 Action inuence models beyond explainability
Having a causal model of the environments has the potential to enhance the reasoning capability
of intelligent agents [81, 55]. As action inuence models function as surrogate models that
enable explainability. Surrogate models can also be used for auxiliary tasks. Meta-reasoning and
causality based exploration in RL agents are possible future work that can make use of action
inuence models as surrogate models. Further, as these models are learned at the run-time of
the RL agent, exploration of the agents’ can be guided based on whether a selected action makes
sense based on the causal structure. As an example, the exploration can be guided by ‘why’ and
‘why not’ questions and their corresponding explanations, that compare contrasting behaviour.
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7.8 Final Remarks
This thesis took inspiration from the large body of literature in cognitive science and philosophy
that studies the nature of explanation, and introduced causal explainable models for reinforcement
learning agents. By following a human-centred approach, our action inuence models (and
subsequent extensions) obtained strong results. The work presented in this thesis paves a way
forward in studies of explainability, showing how a fundamental understanding of how humans
dene explainability can help achieve explainable agency in articial intelligence.
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